John I. Laskin

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's comments on the performance of witnesses demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the summary conviction appeal judge that while the comments were ill-advised and could cause concern if taken out of context, they did not demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellants were charged with illegal hunting practices on an Indian reserve under the Migratory Birds Convention Act.

They argued that a 1955 band council by-law passed under the Indian Act constituted a comprehensive code that ousted the application of the federal Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the two regulatory regimes did not conflict, as compliance with one did not require breach of the other.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the appellants could be charged under either the Act or the by-law.

The appellant, a young person, appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

He argued a reasonable apprehension of bias because the trial judge had accepted a guilty plea from his co-accused six weeks prior to his trial, during which facts implicating the appellant were read in.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, noting the high threshold for reasonable apprehension of bias and that trial judges routinely disabuse their minds of prior prejudicial information.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part to quash a sentence for breach of probation, as the appellant was not convicted of that charge, but the sentence for sexual assault was upheld.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the respondents on charges of conspiracy to break and enter and commit theft.

The trial judge had excluded surreptitiously intercepted communications under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the wiretap authorization breached s. 8 due to inaccurate information in the supporting affidavit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in the threshold required to name a party in an authorization and in classifying the intercepted communications as conscriptive evidence.

A new trial was ordered for both respondents.

The appellant appealed from a sentence, challenging a probation term excluding him from Muskoka and the trial judge's refusal to vary a probation term prohibiting contact with the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the geographic restriction appropriate given the appellant's intention to leave the area for rehabilitation.

The court also upheld the refusal to vary the no-contact order due to the nature of the offences and the short time since the appellant's release.

The appeal was dismissed without prejudice to a future application to vary.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the 'Nuremberg Principles' excused him from complying with Canada's domestic tax laws.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the principles as interpreted by the appellant have no effect on the obligation to comply with domestic tax laws.

The appellant appealed a 3-year sentence for extortion and threatening, arguing the sentencing judge failed to give adequate weight to the totality principle.

The appellant committed the offences while in custody for previous offences against the same complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the 3-year sentence reflected the totality principle, as the offences would have merited a longer sentence given the appellant's extensive criminal record had he not already been serving a substantial sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing confusion over whether he should be tried by a judge alone or a judge and jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that section 598(1) of the Criminal Code precluded the appellant's right to a jury trial because he failed to establish a legitimate excuse for his non-appearance at trial.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility or application of the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed convictions for historical sexual offences against seven boys, six of whom were former speech therapy patients and one of whom was his step-nephew, as well as a six-year penitentiary sentence.

The court rejected arguments that the trial judge scrutinized the accused's memory more harshly than the complainants' recollections, failed to distinguish credibility from reliability, improperly admitted similar fact evidence, and should have quashed one count for vagueness of timeframe.

The court held that the similar fact evidence properly went to whether the actus reus occurred in the patient counts, that there was no air of reality to collusion or tainting, and that the indictment gave sufficient information to permit a defence.

The sentence was within the normal range for sexual offences by an adult in a position of trust who groomed children over time.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, and criminal harassment against his former girlfriend.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant on four counts based primarily on the complainant's testimony, while acquitting him on five others.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his credibility assessment by failing to reconcile his finding that the complainant had no motive to fabricate with his acceptance of defence evidence showing she sought revenge.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge failed to give effect to the complainant's motive to falsely accuse the appellant and her deliberate lies during testimony.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that he was unlawfully detained prior to a consent search that revealed crack cocaine, and that he was prejudiced by improper cross-examination and jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings precluded a finding of detention, and that any potential prejudice from the Crown's improper cross-examination was sufficiently offset by the jury charge.

Following the dismissal of both the appeal and cross-appeal, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The appellant sought costs for transcripts, while the respondent argued not all transcripts were necessary and that he had borne the cost of some.

Given the divided success, the Court of Appeal ordered that the parties bear their own costs.

The Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corporation entered CCAA protection.

The Crown claimed priority over secured creditors for unremitted payroll deductions, GST, and associated penalties and interest.

The motion judge held the Crown did not have priority for penalties/interest on payroll deductions or for unremitted GST.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision regarding payroll deduction penalties and interest, finding the Crown ranks as an unsecured creditor.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding unremitted GST, holding that the deemed trust provision in section 222(3) of the Excise Tax Act prevails over section 18.3(1) of the CCAA based on the rule of effectivity for 'notwithstanding' clauses.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States on charges of fraud and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender him.

He argued that the extradition judge and the Minister erred by failing to order disclosure of Canadian investigative materials, alleging Charter breaches and illegalities by Canadian and American authorities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application for judicial review, finding that the requesting state did not rely on the Canadian evidence, there was no air of reality to the Charter claims, and the limited right to disclosure in extradition proceedings was not violated.

The appellant appealed a decision granting an application for partition and sale of commercial properties under the Partition Act.

The appellant argued that the scope of discretion to refuse partition and sale should be broadened beyond circumstances of malice, oppression, and vexatious intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that co-tenants have a prima facie right to compel partition or sale, which should only be refused in limited circumstances including hardship amounting to oppression.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for unpaid commissions, computer use, and the Infranor contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the claim was for unpaid commissions rather than loss of profits, the respondent had paid for computer use, and the trial judge's conclusion regarding the Infranor contract was open to him on the record.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a finding of liability under the Sale of Goods Act and the dismissal of its counterclaim regarding a defective machine.

The respondent cross-appealed the damages award, seeking compensation for lost business.

The Court of Appeal upheld the liability finding, noting the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in determining the machine was not reasonably fit for its purpose.

However, the Court reduced the damages awarded for lost time during service calls to prevent overcompensation and allowed a portion of the counterclaim for moving expenses.

The cross-appeal for loss of business was dismissed as the claims were too speculative.

The appellants sought a rehearing of an appeal regarding the enforcement of a foreign judgment, arguing that the discoverability principle under section 48 of the former Limitations Act did not apply because the respondent knew or ought to have known the appellants lived in Ontario.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants' frequent moves and alleged concealment of their address created a genuine issue for trial regarding when the respondent ought to have known of their residence in Ontario.

The Crown appealed a non-custodial sentence imposed on a repeat drinking and driving offender with a lengthy criminal record.

The trial judge had found exceptional circumstances based on the respondent's remarkable rehabilitative strides and four years of sobriety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's decision not to incarcerate the respondent, though it clarified that general deterrence applies equally to hardened alcoholics and cautioned against automatically equating residential treatment with pre-trial custody.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of seven bank robberies based on a videotaped confession, eyewitness identification, and circumstantial evidence.

On appeal, he argued that his videotaped statement was inadmissible because police did not reiterate his right to counsel when questioning shifted to other robberies, that the jury was inadequately instructed on photo lineups, that the trial judge's interventions caused a miscarriage of justice, and that the jury was not told to consider evidence for each count separately.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant understood his jeopardy and right to counsel, and dismissed the first three grounds.

While the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider the identification evidence separately for each count, the Court applied the curative proviso because the videotaped confession provided overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The appeal was dismissed.