John I. Laskin

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding personal liability and interpreting a second contract as open-ended as to time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge's interpretation based on the plain wording of the contract and the parties' subsequent conduct.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to set aside a previous order striking their pleading.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's conclusion that the proffered fresh evidence did not demonstrate any ground to set aside the order.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The moving parties, three doctors practising cosmetic surgery, sought a stay pending appeal of a Divisional Court decision that permitted the College of Physicians and Surgeons to compel observation of their surgeries as part of a professional misconduct investigation.

The Court of Appeal granted the stay, finding that the appeal raised a serious issue, the doctors would suffer irreparable harm from the intrusive nature of the observations, and the balance of convenience favoured a stay given the lack of urgency and the College's prior acquiescence.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition to the United States.

He argued the extradition judge erred in accepting his counsel's waiver of submissions and concession of the case, and that appellate delay affected the fairness of the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the judge was entitled to accept counsel's position, the evidence for committal was overwhelming, and the appellate delay caused no prejudice and was partly attributable to the appellant.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge shifted the burden of proof and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof and made findings grounded in the evidence.

The sentence appeal, which sought a conditional discharge instead of the imposed fine and probation, was also dismissed as the trial judge made no error in principle.

The appellant appealed an effective sentence of 18 months imprisonment.

He argued the trial judge erred by rejecting what amounted to a joint submission from the Crown and defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge gave fair notice and adequate reasons for concluding the suggested sentence was contrary to the public interest, noting the appellant was an incorrigible con-man who victimized women and showed no respect for court orders.

The appellants appealed their 8-year sentences, which were significantly higher than the Crown's recommendations at trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the 8-year sentences constituted an error in principle given the Crown's recommendations, the ages of the appellants, and their prospects of rehabilitation.

The appeals were allowed and the sentences were reduced to 6 years for each appellant.

On a ministerial reference concerning a 1972 murder conviction, the court considered whether previously undisclosed police information about a potentially exculpatory alibi and witness statements, and new expert reports about false confessions, were admissible as fresh evidence.

The majority held that the alibi-related material and related witness information were admissible under the Palmer framework because they could reasonably have affected the verdict, although the Crown's non-disclosure did not render the 1972 trial unfair under the disclosure standards then prevailing.

The majority rejected the recent expert reports as not truly fresh, finding that their substance had already been before the jury through trial experts.

Treating the matter as an appeal, the majority quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial; one judge dissented on the first question and would have refused admission of the fresh evidence.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for the respondent's investment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility were supported by the record and revealed no error.

The Crown appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed a certiorari application and upheld a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences rather than determining if the inferences sought by the Crown were available on the evidence.

The matter was remitted to the preliminary inquiry judge with a direction to commit the respondent to stand trial on all charges.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in interpreting the phrase 'known to the police' and in delaying the ruling on his stay application until the end of the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's interpretation reasonable and the timing of the stay ruling a proper exercise of discretion that caused no prejudice.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was deemed fit.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for habeas corpus regarding a prison transfer.

He argued that the Warden's reasons for ordering the transfer were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reviewing judge that, although the reasons could have been better, the appellant knew he was being transferred due to security concerns triggered by an altercation with his cell mate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the reasons could have been fuller, the trial judge directed his mind to the application of W.(D.).

The court noted that the foundation for the conviction was evident from the record and the defence position was utterly implausible.

The parties sought resolution of three issues arising from the Court of Appeal's reasons regarding civil contempt sentencing.

The Court directed that the appellants be brought before the trial judge, and remitted the issues of credit for time served and passport retention to the trial judge for determination.

The appellant landlord appealed an order granting the respondent tenants specific performance of an option to purchase contained in a commercial lease.

The landlord argued that damages were a sufficient remedy, the option was a clog on the equity of redemption, and the option provision was ambiguous.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that specific performance was appropriate because the property was unique to the tenants due to their significant investments.

The court also held that there was no mortgage between the parties to create a clog on the equity of redemption, and the option provision was unambiguous.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion under Rule 59.06 to set aside a previous decision dismissing his action for abuse of process.

He argued that under s. 31 of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, only the Appeals Tribunal could determine whether his right to maintain a lawsuit could be taken away.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the previous dismissal of his action was upheld on the alternate ground of abuse of process, as he had claimed compensation from the Board, was denied, and had a right of appeal under the Act which he had not pursued.

The court held he could not circumvent his statutory appeal right by suing in court.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The respondent sought to maintain only its claim for damages.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the claim for damages was not foreclosed by res judicata and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The insured struck a pedestrian in a strip mall parking lot while driving alone, contrary to her G1 licence conditions.

She pleaded guilty to Highway Traffic Act offences.

Her insurer denied coverage, arguing she was not 'authorized by law' to drive under Statutory Condition 4(1).

The Court of Appeal held that the guilty pleas did not create issue estoppel in the civil action due to the minor stakes of the traffic tickets compared to the civil suit.

Furthermore, the parking lot was not a 'highway' under the Highway Traffic Act, meaning the graduated licensing restrictions did not apply at the time of the accident.

The insurer was ordered to defend and indemnify the insured.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's careful and thorough reasons on either of the points argued.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant, an Aboriginal woman with a tragic history of abuse and mental health issues, abducted a newborn infant from a hospital after her own child was stillborn.

She pled guilty and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by using a prior seven-year sentence as a baseline and failing to properly apply the principle of restraint and the Gladue framework for Aboriginal offenders.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to two and a half years' imprisonment.