Jonathon C. George

The appellant, Stephen B. Sutherland, appealed the dismissal of his action by a motion judge, who found it barred by res judicata and abuse of process.

The action was identical to a counterclaim previously dismissed in a collection action by the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC).

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, agreeing that the principles of res judicata and abuse of process correctly prevented relitigation.

The court found no evidence of unfairness or injustice to warrant intervention.

The appellants, gynecologic oncologists, appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed their application seeking continued funding from the Academic Medical Organization of Southwestern Ontario (AMOSO).

AMOSO, an unincorporated not-for-profit, had decided to discontinue their funding.

The appellants argued breach of contract and sought a contractual remedy or alternative dispute resolution, asserting they were third-party beneficiaries of a funding agreement.

The application judge dismissed their claim, finding no contractual right and that AMOSO's decision-making process was fair.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that the appellants were not parties to the agreement, nor were they intended third-party beneficiaries, and that the court's review of AMOSO's discretionary decision was limited to procedural fairness, which AMOSO had met.

The appellant, J.Y.L., appealed his conviction for historical sexual offenses involving a complainant, D.H., arguing that the trial judge erred by not determining the physical possibility of the assault as described and by focusing solely on credibility over reliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that it was open to the trial judge to accept the complainant's evidence despite minor inconsistencies, especially given the significant passage of time since the incident.

The appellant, Waseem Khan, was convicted of child luring and communicating for the purpose of obtaining sexual services from a person under 18.

He appealed his convictions, arguing errors in the trial judge's mens rea analysis and the dismissal of his abuse of process application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the mens rea ground, finding the trial judge correctly applied the Morrison framework.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the abuse of process ground, concluding the trial judge erred in her interpretation of the "genuine offer" element under s. 286.4 of the Criminal Code.

Consequently, the convictions were vacated, findings of guilt upheld, and a new trial ordered solely to complete the abuse of process application.

This appeal concerned the enforcement of Minutes of Settlement that resolved prior litigation between two factions of a church, Bethel Restoration Ministries.

The motion judge had ordered enforcement, requiring Bethel to make overdue payments and allowing a property registration.

The appellants challenged this order on three grounds: lack of jurisdiction due to the internal church dispute, the Minutes being void as prohibited by Bethel's constating documents, and the respondents having unclean hands.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Minutes created legally cognizable civil rights (contractual and property rights), thereby grounding the court's jurisdiction.

It also found that the Minutes were not prohibited by the church's by-laws, as they represented a valid exercise of the Elders' power to compromise claims.

The unclean hands argument was rejected as it pertained to conduct resolved by the Minutes.

The appellant, Thanuja Dhuruvasangary, appealed her removal as attorney for property for her mother, Logaranee Dhuruvasangary, and the appointment of the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) as Logaranee’s guardian of property.

The appellant argued the application judge erred by refusing an adjournment, failing to apply the correct test, reversing the burden of proof, and concluding there was sufficient evidence of misconduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the denial of the adjournment given the urgency and overwhelming evidence of misconduct.

The court also affirmed that the application judge properly understood and applied the two-part test for terminating a power of attorney and did not reverse the burden of proof.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The parties were unable to reach an agreement on costs after the appeal was dismissed.

The court reviewed written submissions and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal in the amount of $9,200, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The appellant, Juleth Dawson, appealed a motion judge's judgment for payment and possession under a mortgage, primarily challenging the calculation of interest owing.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision not to reduce the contractual interest rate from 7.5% to 2% due to the respondents' failure to deliver a mortgage statement.

The court distinguished the case from Cheung v. Moskowitz Capital Mortgage, affirming that the discretion to reduce interest is fact-driven and requires evidence of the mortgagee seeking an advantage or the mortgagor suffering prejudice.

As no such advantage was sought or prejudice suffered, and payments had not been made for four years, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that ordered payment on a mortgage and granted a writ of possession.

They argued the motion judge erred in rejecting their defence of unconscionability and in granting summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's analysis.

The court affirmed that the mortgage renewal was discretionary, no agreement to renew on original terms existed, and the doctrine of unconscionability was inapplicable as there was no new contract to set aside.

The court also found summary judgment appropriate as there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The appellant appealed the summary judgment dismissing her two actions against the respondent, alleging misapprehension of evidence, erroneous refusal of an adjournment, and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision, concluding that the appellant failed to raise a genuine issue requiring a trial and did not establish any error in the exercise of discretion, bias, or procedural unfairness.

The appellant, Melissa Bell, appealed the summary dismissal of her action against her former lawyer, Neda Amini, for negligence, malpractice, and defamation.

The solicitor-client relationship broke down after 13 days due to the appellant's unreasonable litigation strategy and accusation of collusion.

The motion judge found the lawyer was entitled to withdraw and her communications with Legal Aid Ontario were truthful.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no evidence of negligence or defamation, and affirmed the motion judge's application of summary judgment principles.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and sought leave to appeal his life sentence.

The appeal primarily concerned the trial judge's decision to revisit an earlier ruling on similar act evidence (related to triple murders) for cross-examination, despite initially excluding it due to prejudicial effect.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in revisiting the ruling without a material change in circumstances and without re-engaging in the probative value/prejudicial effect analysis.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice as the appellant ultimately did not testify, and the potential prejudice from the similar act evidence therefore disappeared.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the life sentence was not demonstrably unfit, despite minor errors in identifying aggravating factors.

The appellant, Grandfield Homes (Kenton) Ltd., appealed a lower court decision that denied its request for a trial on damages beyond forfeited deposits in a failed residential real estate transaction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the claim for additional damages was not sufficiently pleaded in the notice of application or supporting evidence.

The court emphasized that relief sought must be precisely stated in pleadings and that counsel's confirmation during cross-examination that additional damages were not sought in the application was binding.

The court also agreed that ordering a separate trial on damages would result in an unnecessary bifurcation and multiplicity of proceedings, causing potential prejudice to the respondent.

Melissa Hart brought a motion under rr. 59.06(2)(a) and 61.16(6.1) seeking to withdraw a previous Court of Appeal decision and requesting a rehearing of the appeal, alleging the court overlooked her evidence.

The motion was dismissed pursuant to Rule 2.1.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure because Ms. Hart had been declared a vexatious litigant under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

This order prohibited her from commencing or continuing any proceedings in any court without leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice, which she had not obtained.

The court also directed staff not to accept any further filings from Ms. Hart without such leave.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a parking agreement's rate calculation clause and the determination of new parking rates.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by deeming the clause unambiguous despite fundamental undefined terms, and by improperly relying on inadmissible hearsay evidence while rejecting expert evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the lower order set aside, and the Court re-interpreted the clause, establishing the monthly parking rates based on the appellants' expert evidence.

The moving parties sought to review an order from a single judge of the Court of Appeal that dismissed their motion for a stay of two interlocutory orders from a Superior Court case management judge.

The interlocutory orders had vacated pre-trial and trial dates and allowed a motion for directions.

The Court of Appeal panel dismissed the review motion, finding no factual or legal errors by the motion judge, who correctly applied the RJR-MacDonald test for a stay.

The panel also noted that the stay motion was moot as the vacated dates were long past and the disputed motions had already been heard and were under reserve.

The appellant, N.C., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellate court found that the trial judge's reasons for rejecting the appellant's credibility were insufficient and conclusory, failing to provide an adequate explanation for perceived inconsistencies in testimony.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred by not explicitly addressing the mens rea requirement of the sexual assault offence, having only found that the actus reus was proven.

The court emphasized the necessity for trial judges to provide comprehensive reasons that allow for proper appellate review of all elements of an offence.

The Bank of Nevis International Limited (BONIL) appealed the dismissal of its action against Mark Kucher and BNI Holdcorp Ltd. The motion judge had dismissed BONIL's action, determining that Nevis, not Ontario, was the proper forum based on an exclusive jurisdiction clause and, alternatively, forum non conveniens.

The Court of Appeal dismissed BONIL's appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the forum selection clause applied to Mr. Kucher despite him not being a direct party to the agreement, and that Nevis was the more appropriate forum.

The appellant pleaded guilty to sexual assault and distributing intimate images, receiving a 12-month consecutive sentence.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not imposing a conditional sentence and by misapplying sentencing principles, including the consideration of public safety, drug addiction, and restraint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the sentencing judge's emphasis on denunciation and general deterrence, and finding no error in principle or demonstrably unfit sentence.

The court reiterated the high deference owed to sentencing decisions.

This appeal concerned a dispute over commercial rent arrears, specifically whether a binding rent relief agreement was in place during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in finding no genuine issues for trial due to alleged inconsistencies and an incomplete record.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the motion judge's factual findings, including that the rent relief offer had expired before acceptance and that no waiver or promissory estoppel applied.

The appeal was dismissed.