Jill M. Copeland

The court upheld vacating a certificate of pending litigation and findings that the mortgagee had taken vacant peaceable possession before sale.

It also dismissed the respondent’s motion to quash, holding the appeal was not manifestly abusive.

The appellant challenged summary judgment dismissing his claim.

The court rejected both appellate arguments, upheld the motion judge’s credibility and documentary-evidence assessments, and found no palpable and overriding error.

The appellants challenged an order striking their contempt motion without leave to amend.

The court held the motion judge made no legal or principled error, upheld the costs framework used below, and dismissed both merits and costs-related challenges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for the reasons given by the Divisional Court and awarded fixed costs to the respondent.

On panel review under s. 7(5) CJA, the appellant challenged dismissal of a motion to extend time to perfect an appeal.

The panel found justice required an extension because perfection materials had been tendered before dismissal notice and defects were largely technical with no demonstrated prejudice.

The review motion was granted and timelines reset.

On a motion to quash, the court considered whether an appeal from dismissal of a contempt motion was interlocutory.

Applying established principles, it held the order was interlocutory because underlying proceedings remained ongoing and other procedural avenues were available.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed from a summary judgment dismissing its claim for insurance coverage under a Builder's Risk Policy.

The motion judge found the roof collapse was caused by frost heaving, an excluded peril under the policy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding summary judgment was appropriate where the respondent's expert evidence was uncontested, the frost or freezing exclusion applied, and the doctrine of nullification did not render the exclusion unenforceable because the policy still covered other perils.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the ground that the application judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the time from when the second trial date was set until the first offered trial date available to defence counsel should have been apportioned rather than treated entirely as defence delay, but held that the time from the July 2022 proposed trial date to the second trial date was properly defence delay.

With the corrected apportionment, the net delay fell just under 30 months, below the presumptive ceiling, and no stay was warranted.

The appellant appealed conviction and sentence on charges of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm in a vehicle, possession of MDMA, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in Charter rulings regarding arbitrary detention under s. 9 and unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8, and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on a driving prohibition, the search of a satchel near the appellant's leg was a valid search incident to arrest, and the trial judge's findings on knowledge and control for possession were supported by the record.

On sentence, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to address anti-Black racism principles from Morris.

The court found the failure did not impact the sentence, which was at the low end of the range for a second firearm offence.

The appellants appealed from a summary judgment dismissing their claim for non-vested stock options under a consulting agreement.

The motion judge found the agreement was not a fixed term contract and that entitlement to unvested options was contingent on the appellants remaining engaged with the respondents on each vesting date.

The appellants raised a new argument on appeal regarding breach of the duty of good faith, which was not advanced below.

The appellants also challenged the costs award.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their negligence action against a school board and school officials for failing to protect their child from bullying.

Although the trial judge found that the respondents breached the standard of care by failing to investigate a prior bullying incident and misplacing related documentation, he concluded that none of these breaches caused the subsequent incident in which the child was injured.

The appellants argued that proper investigation of the earlier incident would have prevented the later injury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's causation analysis and factual findings.

The appellants sought an application for prohibition to prevent a provincial offence prosecution under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002.

The respondent brought a motion to dismiss the prohibition application as frivolous and an abuse of process.

The motion judge granted the motion and dismissed the application.

The appellants appealed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that prohibition is a remedy for jurisdictional issues only, and the appellants' arguments were non-jurisdictional matters properly decided at trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent.

The appellant, a property developer, purchased contaminated land in 1990 and commenced an action in January 2004 seeking damages for soil contamination.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding the action was statute-barred because the appellant had actual knowledge of the contamination by April 1991, triggering a six-year limitation period that had expired long before the action was commenced.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in principle, made palpable and overriding errors of fact, and failed to consider whether its continuing nuisance claim was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's knowledge of contamination in 1991, albeit to an uncertain extent, was sufficient to trigger the limitation period, and the appellant was not required to know the full extent of the contamination for the period to begin running.

The appellant appealed a judgment interpreting the will of Eleanor Martha Devonport.

The application judge found that a specific bequest of the Hopewell Avenue property to the testator's predeceased son passed to the son's wife pursuant to section 31 of the Succession Law Reform Act (the anti-lapse provision), rather than lapsing into the residue of the estate.

The appellant argued the will showed a contrary intention and that the solicitor's evidence should have been admitted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's interpretation of the anti-lapse provision or the will's terms.

The court also upheld the occupation rent requirement, finding it was properly raised and calculated.

This is a costs decision following the respondent's successful appeal of orders certifying an action as a class proceeding and granting leave to proceed under the Securities Act.

The respondent sought $120,000 in total costs ($20,000 for the Divisional Court leave to appeal motion and $50,000 for each of two appeals to the Court of Appeal).

The court awarded $70,000 in total costs ($20,000 for the leave to appeal and $50,000 for the appeals), finding that while there were technically two separate appeals, the issues and arguments were inextricably bound together in substance.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sexual interference against his stepdaughter, contrary to sections 271 and 151(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the trial judge improperly used the complainant's lack of embellishment as a credibility factor, contrary to Supreme Court precedent, and that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient for appellate review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reference to the complainant being a careful and cautious witness was a proper credibility assessment, and that the reasons, though brief, adequately explained the trial judge's findings when read in context and as a whole.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order dismissing her wrongful dismissal claim.

The motion judge dismissed the claim on two independent grounds: first, that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because the claim arose from the interpretation and application of a collective agreement; and second, that the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the limitation period issue alone, finding that although the appellant's claim was discoverable in late April or mid-May 2020, limitation periods were suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic until September 14, 2020.

The two-year limitation period therefore commenced on September 14, 2020, and expired on September 14, 2022.

The appellant commenced her claim on October 27, 2022, which was outside the limitation period.

A land developer appealed the dismissal of his civil action against the City of Toronto as an abuse of process.

The developer had sought site plan approval and variance applications for a property development, all of which were denied through administrative processes including the Committee of Adjustment and the Toronto Local Appeal Body.

Rather than pursuing judicial review, the developer sued the City alleging impropriety and misconduct, seeking damages and costs.

The motion judge dismissed the action as a collateral attack on administrative decisions and refused leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no reviewable error and no basis to interfere with the discretionary decision to refuse amendment.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's decision dismissing its motion to dismiss or stay the respondents' claim for non-payment under a promissory note.

The appellant argued that Delaware was the appropriate forum based on a forum selection clause in a related agreement of purchase and sale.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that Delaware had no appropriate connection to the dispute and that Ontario was the clearly more appropriate forum.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The Crown appealed from the respondent's acquittal on a charge of sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient under the legal standards established in R. v. R.E.M. and R. v. Sheppard.

The appellate court found that the trial judge's reasons, while brief and delivered orally, were sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review.

The trial judge clearly explained that she was left with a reasonable doubt because, faced with conflicting versions of events from the complainant and the respondent's text messages, she could not determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court emphasized that in credibility-based trials, a reasonable doubt can arise when the trial judge is unable to resolve conflicting evidence.