James Duncan Lockyer

The appellant, Andrew Cowan, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The appeal was based on two primary grounds: inadequate disclosure by Crown counsel regarding the extent of his friendship with the trial judge, and the trial judge's post-conviction social interactions with the prosecution team.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's failure to fully disclose the nature of his relationship with the trial judge, including a prior agreement not to appear on the same cases, constituted a miscarriage of justice.

Additionally, the trial judge's decision to meet for drinks and dinner with the prosecution team immediately after the jury's verdict, and before sentencing, created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

This decision addresses two applications before the Ontario Court of Appeal: the Crown's application to revoke the appellant J.R.'s bail pending appeal due to a breach of conditions, and J.R.'s new application for release on bail pending appeal.

J.R. conceded the breach but argued for a new release order based on extenuating circumstances (illness of himself and his fiancée).

The court revoked the original bail order as required by the Criminal Code but granted J.R. a new bail order with stricter terms (weekly reporting and a personal pledge), finding that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The court also ruled that in these exceptional circumstances, J.R. was not required to be taken into custody before being released on the new bail.

The appellant, B.G., appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The main issue was whether Crown counsel invited the jury to rely on impermissible racial or cultural stereotyping during cross-examination of defence witnesses and in closing arguments.

The court found that the Crown's questioning and address created a risk of the jury applying negative stereotypes about Indian culture, particularly regarding women's agency and truthfulness, which was not supported by evidence.

The absence of a specific cautionary instruction from the trial judge resulted in an unfair trial.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

This is a Crown appeal concerning jury instructions on the mens rea for sexual assault, specifically when the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent is unavailable.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the Crown must prove the knowledge element (accused knew of, was wilfully blind or reckless as to, absence of consent) and allowed them to consider evidence of the respondent's mistaken belief.

The Court of Appeal held that while the knowledge element is always part of the Crown's burden, the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to disregard evidence of legally ineffective mistaken beliefs, effectively allowing an unavailable defence through the "back door." The court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, Miguel Chacon-Perez, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The appeal raised four grounds: unreasonable verdict, improper Crown closing address, failure to instruct the jury on manslaughter, and error in denying a jury request for witness testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first three grounds but allowed the appeal on the fourth ground, finding that the trial judge erred by effectively refusing the jury's request for a read-back of crucial witness testimony related to the identity of the assailant, which was the central contested issue.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Boris Panovski, appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and aggravated assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in the jury charge, specifically regarding the application of the W.(D.) rule to exculpatory eyewitness testimony, the overall inadequacy and imbalance of the charge, and the admission of certain non-recognition evidence.

The court determined that these errors were not curable by the proviso.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Cindy Ali, appealed her conviction for first-degree murder in the death of her profoundly disabled daughter.

The Crown alleged the appellant suffocated her daughter and fabricated a home invasion story to cover it up.

The defence argued the death was seizure-related or caused by a home invader, and that the home invasion was real.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in narrowing the jury's consideration of the cause of death to only suffocation and in unduly restricting the jury's consideration of alternative explanations for the fabricated home invasion narrative.

The trial judge's instructions effectively invited the jury to convict of murder if they found the home invasion story fabricated, without adequately considering other culpable acts (like failure to provide necessaries) or innocent explanations for the fabrication.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Nathan Tenthorey, appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the included offences of simple assault and assault causing bodily harm, and by failing to provide a *Soobrian* limiting instruction.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by concluding that assault causing bodily harm was not an included offence in a non-particularized aggravated assault charge, and erred factually by finding no air of reality for either included offence.

The court clarified the test for included offences in multi-mode charges.

The appeal on the *Soobrian* instruction was dismissed.

The conviction was set aside, and a new trial ordered.

An appellant, convicted in 1998 of administering a noxious substance to her child based on flawed Motherisk Drug Testing Laboratory (MDTL) hair analysis, successfully reopened her conviction appeal.

Fresh evidence, in the form of two Ministry of the Attorney General reports (2015, 2018) detailing the unreliability of MDTL testing, was admitted.

The Court of Appeal found that without the discredited MDTL evidence, the appellant would not have been convicted.

The conviction for administering cocaine and the stayed conviction for criminal negligence were set aside, and acquittals were entered.

The court also lifted a publication ban on the appellant's name at her request, acknowledging the wrongful conviction and allowing for public correction.

The appellant, Andrew Bielli, appealed his conviction for possession of proceeds of crime for the benefit of a criminal organization.

The case centered on a police ruse designed to search the appellant and his vehicle without disclosing the true nature of the investigation, leading to the seizure of evidence.

The application judge found breaches of the appellant's Charter rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2), finding no s. 8 or s. 9 breach and police good faith.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in concluding there was a de facto arrest, thus finding a s. 8 breach.

The Court also found errors in the s. 24(2) analysis, particularly regarding the police's good faith and reliance on prior case law, as the Charter violations were planned and deliberate.

The Court concluded that the impugned evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant, Thanh Tung Phan, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The appeal raised two main grounds: an alleged error in the disposition of a Garofoli application concerning the judicial authorization for surveillance and tracking, and an error in admitting evidence of a history of violence between rival gangs (Chin Pac and Asian Assassinz) to establish motive.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Garofoli ruling, concluding that the authorizing justice had reasonable and probable grounds even after excising inaccurate information from the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court also found no error in admitting the gang evidence, determining its probative value for narrative, animus, and motive outweighed its prejudicial effect, especially given the trial judge's careful instructions and the manner of admission.

The appellant, Stewart Pascal, appealed his conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm and his designation as a dangerous offender.

The appeal centered on the Crown's failure to disclose the criminal record and outstanding charges of a key Crown witness, Deidre Jarvis.

The Court found that the police knew about Jarvis's outstanding charges and had a disclosure obligation to provide this information to the Crown, who then had to disclose it to the defence.

The non-disclosure deprived the defence of crucial impeachment material, as Jarvis's second statement, given after charges were laid, was significantly more incriminating than her first.

The Court concluded that the non-disclosure impaired the appellant's right to make full answer and defence, affecting both the reliability of the verdict and the overall fairness of the trial.

The conviction appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants, Orville Campbell and Stanton David, appealed their convictions for first-degree murder.

They argued the verdict was unreasonable due to insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation and alleged errors in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal found the first-degree murder verdict unreasonable, concluding that the evidence did not establish planning and deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly given the rapid sequence of events.

The court substituted the convictions with second-degree murder.

It dismissed all grounds for a new trial on second-degree murder, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions regarding post-offence conduct, the Vetrovec warning for a key witness, pathology evidence, or the use of the deceased's criminal record.

The accused operated an escort service employing adult women and were charged with receiving material benefits from sexual services, procuring, and advertising sexual services.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of Criminal Code sections 286.2, 286.3, and 286.4 under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that all three provisions violated the Charter and were not justified under section 1.

The court determined that the provisions were arbitrary, overbroad, and grossly disproportionate in their effects on the liberty and security of the person, particularly as they prevented sex workers from accessing safety-enhancing measures and third-party support services.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of first degree murder and one count of attempted murder while using a firearm, arising from a planned drug robbery on July 16, 2005.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of two accomplices with significant credibility issues.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that while the verdicts were not unreasonable, the cumulative effect of errors in the trial judge's final instructions to the jury—particularly regarding post-offence conduct and the failure to adequately address alternative inferences—required a new trial.

Four co-accused appealed convictions arising from a large-scale police investigation into criminal gang activity in Toronto (Project Battery and Project Rx).

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of wiretap authorizations and general warrants, alleging violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The key issues involved: (1) material non-disclosure regarding the use of a Mobile Device Identifier (MDI); (2) warrantless police entries into common areas of condominium buildings; and (3) warrantless installation of hidden surveillance cameras in condominium hallways.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions but found that the warrantless installation of hidden cameras violated section 8 rights.

However, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellants' convictions were dismissed except for a one-year sentence reduction for one appellant due to the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence regarding drug quantities.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and life sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The victim was shot three times at close range at a busy Toronto intersection after exiting a TTC bus, resulting in permanent paralysis.

The appellant challenged the conviction on the basis of eyewitness identification concerns, arguing the trial judge failed to exercise appropriate caution regarding the reliability of the victim's identification.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh surveillance video evidence and argued the sentence was demonstrably unfit given his age at the time of the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the reliability of the identification evidence and that the life sentence was justified given the serious nature of the unprovoked attempted murder committed with a firearm in a public place.

The applicant sought judicial interim release pending conviction appeal after being convicted of multiple counts of assault, assault with a weapon, choking, sexual assault, and assault causing bodily harm.

He was sentenced to nine years imprisonment.

The court applied the three-part test under section 679(3) of the Criminal Code: whether the appeal is not frivolous, whether the applicant will surrender into custody, and whether detention is necessary in the public interest.

While the appeal was found to be not frivolous and the applicant demonstrated he would comply with release conditions, the court dismissed the bail application based on the public interest component, finding that the enforceability interest substantially outweighed the reviewability interest given the gravity and circumstances of the offences.

A 15-year-old appellant was convicted of first degree murder under sections 229(c) and 231(4)(a) of the Criminal Code after a police officer was killed during a traffic stop.

The officer attempted to remove the appellant from a stolen vehicle, became trapped as the vehicle accelerated, and was ejected and killed when the vehicle became airborne.

The appellant claimed he did not intentionally accelerate the vehicle and that pedal misapplication occurred.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider the appellant's age and level of maturity when assessing whether he knew his dangerous driving was likely to cause death.

The court also found errors regarding the Crown's closing address and the exclusion of a prior consistent statement.

The appellant was convicted of kidnapping his friend after a judge and jury trial.

He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment.

On appeal, he challenged the conviction on four grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in her instructions on the actus reus of aiding and abetting by not emphasizing the need for actual assistance when reviewing the evidence; (2) the trial judge erred in failing to leave with the jury the included offence of "attempt to aid" a kidnapping; (3) the trial judge erred in not linking her W.(D.) instruction to the defence of duress; and (4) the trial judge erred in failing to correct Crown counsel's improper reference to hearsay evidence in closing arguments.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.