George R. Strathy

The Court of Appeal for Ontario addressed whether "termination of employment for any reason that does not relate to a breach of discipline or misconduct" in s. 236(3) of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act (FPSLRA) includes constructive dismissal.

The appellant, an undesignated separate agency, sought to dismiss the employee's constructive dismissal claim for lack of jurisdiction, arguing it should be resolved via grievance.

The Court affirmed the motion judge's decision, holding that constructive dismissal falls within the broad meaning of "termination for any reason" under s. 236(3), thereby preserving the employee's right to sue in court, as undesignated separate agency employees lack access to third-party adjudication for non-disciplinary terminations under the FPSLRA.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, Peter and Anka Georgakopoulos, appealed a summary judgment from the Superior Court of Justice in favour of the Bank of Montreal.

The judgment ordered them to repay over $342,000 in unauthorized line of credit advances and Peter to pay a $28,000 credit card debt, and declared an equitable mortgage over Peter's Toronto property.

The appellants argued the motion judge lacked jurisdiction, the evidence was insufficient for summary judgment, the equitable charge was improperly declared, and their counterclaim was wrongly dismissed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the Superior Court's jurisdiction and finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusions regarding the evidence, the equitable mortgage, or the dismissal of the counterclaim.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant, Yong Yeow Tan, was ordered to pay costs to the respondents, C & K Mortgage Services Inc. and the Receiver for Camilla Court Homes Inc. and Elite Homes Inc. C & K Mortgage Services Inc. was awarded $20,000, and the Receiver was awarded $7,500, inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

Roch Longueépée, largely successful in his appeal, sought partial indemnity costs from the University of Waterloo and the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO).

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found Longueépée entitled to costs against the University, fixing them at $25,000.

The court also awarded costs against the HRTO, fixed at $7,500, because its arguments on the standard of review and request for a five-judge panel expanded the scope of the appeal, even though its position was not taken in bad faith.

The appellant, Bevon Marshall, appealed a cumulative sentence of 21.5 years for various criminal offences, including robbery, firearms offences, drug trafficking, and aggravated assault, imposed by three different judges.

He also appealed the duration of a ten-year long-term supervision order (LTSO).

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming that the sentencing judges properly applied the totality principle and that the sentences were fit.

The court upheld the 10-year LTSO, concluding that the expert evidence and the appellant's extensive criminal history established a substantial risk of violent re-offence, justifying the order's maximum duration.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder and offering an indignity to human remains, appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal grounds included the trial judge's ruling on solicitor-client privilege over seized notes, the dismissal of an alternate suspect application, and the failure to leave manslaughter as an available verdict to the jury.

The sentence appeal sought a reduction in the 17-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the conviction and the imposed sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's rulings or the sentencing decision.

The appellant appealed a spousal support order of $125,000 per month following a 24-year marriage.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the respondent's needs and means, misapplied the Halliwell principle for high-income earners, and erred in awarding indefinite support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the respondent's compensatory entitlement, needs, and means, and confirming that the trial judge properly conducted an individualized fact-specific analysis.

The successful respondent on appeal sought costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded the respondent $5,000 in costs, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, noting the principle of proportionality as the proceeding originated in Small Claims Court for $25,000.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The underlying action involved a defamation claim by the respondent regarding statements made by the appellants during a union election campaign.

The Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge erred in concluding the statements did not relate to a matter of public interest, the action survived the merits-based and public interest hurdles under s. 137.1(4).

The appeal was dismissed, allowing the defamation action to proceed.

The appellant, a permanent resident, appealed his convictions for drug and credit card offences, arguing his guilty pleas were uninformed due to erroneous advice from trial counsel regarding immigration consequences.

A prior deportation order had been stayed but was lifted following these convictions.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence, found that trial counsel had misadvised the appellant, leading to an uninformed plea and subjective prejudice.

The court emphasized the duty of defence counsel to advise on collateral immigration consequences.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants, Conroy and Kharla Rose, appealed their convictions for possession of proceeds of crime and money laundering.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals from conviction and ordered a new trial on two main grounds: the trial judge erred in dismissing an additional juror without random selection, thereby improperly constituting the jury, and erred in admitting evidence of Conroy's prior convictions in the form of judicial reasons without proper balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect and inadequate jury instructions.

Kharla Rose's separate appeal regarding unreasonable trial delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter was dismissed, as the delay was deemed reasonable under the pre-Jordan Morin framework.

The appellant, Thanh Tung Phan, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The appeal raised two main grounds: an alleged error in the disposition of a Garofoli application concerning the judicial authorization for surveillance and tracking, and an error in admitting evidence of a history of violence between rival gangs (Chin Pac and Asian Assassinz) to establish motive.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Garofoli ruling, concluding that the authorizing justice had reasonable and probable grounds even after excising inaccurate information from the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court also found no error in admitting the gang evidence, determining its probative value for narrative, animus, and motive outweighed its prejudicial effect, especially given the trial judge's careful instructions and the manner of admission.

The appellant, O'Neil Thompson, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the trial judge erred in not finding an arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter when police boxed in the appellant's car without reasonable grounds.

The Court also confirmed a serious breach of s. 10(b) due to a systemic issue within the Peel Regional Police regarding the immediate provision of the right to counsel.

Applying the s. 24(2) Charter analysis, the Court concluded that the serious nature of the Charter breaches, particularly the arbitrary detention and the systemic delay in advising of the right to counsel, outweighed society's interest in the admission of the evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal directed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault of his daughter, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence concerning his sex offender treatment.

The majority of the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's factual error regarding the date of the appellant's treatment was material, impacting the assessment of his propensity to re-offend and the weight given to similar fact evidence.

This misapprehension played an essential part in the reasoning leading to the conviction.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

A dissenting judge argued the error was not material to the overall reasoning.

Joseph Haddad appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, which ordered his detention at a forensic mental health centre subject to conditions, specifically challenging a condition prohibiting him from attending within 250 metres of his mother's home.

Haddad was found not criminally responsible for an index offence involving discharging a shotgun.

The Board's decision to impose the condition was based on concerns for public safety, psychological harm to neighbours, and the appellant's transition to community living.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, deferring to the Board's reasonable decision, noting that the condition served to address victim safety and was not a significant restraint on the appellant's liberty, especially as his physician did not recommend visits to the family home.

The applicant, Clara Eva Boros, sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order to surrender her to Romania for extradition.

The Minister's decision regarding the significant delay in the extradition process, spanning over 18 years, was found to be unreasonable due to a lack of transparent investigation into when Romanian authorities became aware of the applicant's presence in Canada and an insufficient explanation for the delay on the Canadian side.

The Court of Appeal allowed the application, remitting the matter back to the Minister for reconsideration with specific directions for further inquiry and explanation regarding the delays.

Ara Koundakjian appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering his detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, having sought a conditional discharge.

The appellant argued the Board misstated the governing legal test by using "appropriate" instead of "necessary and appropriate" and failed to meaningfully consider a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board understood the correct standard despite the shorthand, and that its determination of continued detention was reasonable and entitled to deference given the appellant's history of mental illness, substance abuse (cocaine), lack of insight, frequent breaches of disposition conditions, and the significant risk of serious harm to the public.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, appealed on the grounds that his re-election of trial mode was invalid due to non-compliance with s. 561(7) of the Criminal Code and that the trial judge erred in concluding he was functus officio.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge was not functus officio but agreed with the trial judge's alternative finding that the appellant, through counsel, had validly waived his right to have the re-election words read to him.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the respondents as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge found the appellants discovered their potential cause of action in May 2006, but did not commence the action until April 2018, well beyond the applicable limitation periods.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion regarding the discovery date and dismissed the appeal, affirming the application of the Limitations Act.

This appeal concerned the validity of codicils to a will and the application of the Limitations Act, 2002, to an application seeking purely declaratory relief.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision that an application for a declaration on the validity of codicils, without seeking consequential relief, is not subject to a limitation period under s. 16(1)(a) of the Act.

The court also affirmed the finding that the codicils were invalid due to insufficient evidence of proper execution and suspicious circumstances, and that summary judgment was appropriate.