David M. Paciocco

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision that dismissed their Rule 59.06 motion as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and imposed a leave requirement for any further motions in the underlying action.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision, concluding that the Rule 59.06 motion was a third attempt to re-litigate issues already decided, which constituted vexatious conduct and an abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent.

D.D. appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the adult complainant.

The trial judge improperly evaluated the complainant's testimony, given when she was 18, as if she were a child, inferring truthfulness from "childlike details" rather than applying adult credibility criteria while considering the childhood context of the events.

The appellant, J.N., appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions, and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient for meaningful appellate review.

Specifically, the trial judge failed to adequately address the complainant's prior inconsistent allegation and other material inconsistencies in her evidence, which were central to her credibility and reliability.

The appellant, Patrick Gregory Ellis, appealed support and related orders made after an uncontested trial, which was uncontested because his pleadings were struck due to wilful non-compliance and refusal to provide financial disclosure.

The respondent, Amy Dawn Lamothe, brought a motion to quash the appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion on two bases: first, courts typically do not hear appeals from unopposed proceedings, and no exception was warranted; second, the appellant had chronically and wilfully breached numerous court orders, causing prejudice.

The appeal was quashed, and the appellant was barred from initiating further financial proceedings without paying outstanding amounts or obtaining leave.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on an elevated scale.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's decision to dismiss an action for damages related to alleged improper transactions undertaken by the respondents while administering an estate.

The appellants raised three grounds of appeal: errors in credibility assessment, reliance on inadmissible hearsay, and an incorrect finding that respondents could act as attorneys under a Power of Attorney (POA) while the principal was still capable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, affirming the motion judge's credibility findings, finding no reliance on inadmissible hearsay, and confirming that the standard form POA allowed attorneys to act before incapacity, as it had no conditions or postponed effective date.

Full indemnity costs were awarded to the respondents due to the appellants' frivolous allegations.

The appellant, Thomas John Hronowsky, sought a panel review of a motion judge's decision that dismissed his request for a stay of orders from a lower court and other relief, as well as an extension of time to file an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal, applying the standard of review for a motion judge's decision, found no error in principle, misapprehension of material evidence, or unreasonableness in the original decision.

Consequently, the appellant's motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, Denise Henn, appealed a 12-month custodial sentence for fraud over $45,000.

The Court of Appeal found two errors in principle by the sentencing judge: erroneously treating lack of restitution as an aggravating factor and failing to consider relevant mitigating factors (diagnosed mental health issues and financial distress, not greed, as the cause of the fraud).

The appeal was allowed, and a conditional sentence of two years less a day with house arrest and a standalone restitution order was imposed, followed by three years' probation.

The Court also found a fine in lieu of forfeiture inappropriate.

The appellant, a former high school teacher, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation involving two former students (D.R. and L.G.).

The appeal focused on alleged misapprehensions of evidence by the trial judge concerning L.G.'s and a corroborating witness's testimony, and a misdirection on the reasonable doubt standard, particularly regarding the R. v. W.(D.) principles.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's errors in summarizing evidence were not material and that, despite a misstatement of the W.(D.) steps, the trial judge properly applied the reasonable doubt standard to all allegations.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, B.C., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings on consent and the defence of honest, mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion on non-consent was unassailable and that any alleged errors regarding the honest mistaken belief defence could not have affected the verdict, as the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent, particularly given the complainant's intoxicated and ill state.

The appellant, Tyrell Stewart, appealed convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm with ammunition and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The central issue at trial was the appellant's possession of a handgun and ammunition found during a search warrant execution at a basement apartment.

The trial judge inferred knowledge and control based on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant having keys to the premises and a "lived-in quality" of his possessions there.

The appeal raised arguments concerning misapprehension of evidence, reversal of the burden of proof, unreasonableness of the verdict, and lack of formal arraignment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions reasonable and that any procedural irregularities did not cause prejudice.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR), appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care, a high-secure facility.

The Board had recommended a transfer to a high-security facility in Quebec but rejected the appellant's request for an interim transfer to a medium-security facility in Ontario.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable given the appellant's history of elopement, violent behaviour, and refusal of medication, which posed a significant threat to public safety.

The court upheld the Board's acceptance of the psychiatrist's opinion that the appellant was not suitable for a medium-security transfer at that time, emphasizing public safety as the paramount consideration.

The appellant, Anne Elizabeth Fair, appealed the dismissal of her action against BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc. and the estate/children of her deceased husband, Lloyd Fielder Fair.

She alleged BMO Nesbitt had a duty to inform her of a change in beneficiary designations on her husband's investment accounts (from her to his children) and sought a constructive trust over the proceeds based on an alleged agreement with her husband.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no duty on BMO Nesbitt to disclose beneficiary changes to a third party and insufficient evidence to establish a clear agreement with the deceased husband to maintain beneficiary designations, distinguishing the case from Moore v. Sweet.

The appellant, Gurkirat Rai, appealed his conviction following guilty pleas to multiple driving-related offences, including dangerous operation and driving while disqualified, which resulted in a permanent licence suspension by the Ministry of Transportation under the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant argued his pleas were uninformed because his counsel erroneously advised him that his licence could be reinstated after 10 years, and he was unaware of the automatic lifetime suspension under the HTA or the cumulative effect of consecutive two-year suspensions.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to admit fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish subjective prejudice.

The court concluded that it was not credible that the appellant would have acted differently had he received accurate advice, given his primary motivation to be released from pre-trial custody quickly, his willingness to plead guilty despite knowing a lifetime Criminal Code prohibition was possible, the strong Crown case, and his subsequent conduct of re-offending.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court order granting certiorari.

The decision itself is subject to a statutory non-publication order under section 539 of the Criminal Code, pending the outcome of the trial.

The full text of the reasons is not publicly available.

The appellant, found Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) for assault, mischief, and probation breach, appealed the Ontario Review Board's (ORB) decision to continue his detention.

The ORB had found he still posed a significant threat due to schizophrenia and substance use disorder, despite no recent assaultive behaviour, because of his inability to manage distress and potential for volatility.

The appellant sought an absolute or conditional discharge, or a new hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB's assessment of significant risk and its decision not to grant a conditional discharge were reasonable, supported by the evidence, and met the standard of review.

The appellant, Michael Weber, failed to surrender into custody as required by a court order and did not appear in court for his appeal.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed his appeal as abandoned.

The appellant, William Joles, appealed his second-degree murder conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction on the use of bad character evidence and by failing to provide guidance to the jury on permissible inferences from after-the-fact conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no real risk that the jury would misuse the bad character evidence and that the jury had a functional understanding of the permissible inferences from the after-the-fact conduct, especially given the clear submissions by counsel and the single live issue of intention.

Trade Capital Finance Corp. (TC) and Buduchnist Credit Union Limited (BCU) filed opposing motions in an insolvency appeal.

TC sought an extension of time and leave to appeal a lower court's final disposition order concerning the distribution of receivership proceeds, arguing the order allowed BCU to enforce judgments arising from transactions in breach of a Mareva order.

BCU sought to lift the automatic stay of proceedings and security for costs.

The Court of Appeal granted TC's motions for extension of time and leave to appeal, finding the appeal prima facie meritorious and raising issues of general importance regarding Mareva orders and creditor enforcement in insolvency.

The court denied BCU's motions to lift the stay and for security for costs, concluding that the BIA governed the appeal and that lifting the stay would render TC's appeal moot, and that security for costs was not fitting given BCU was the applicant below and TC's insolvency stemmed from the alleged fraud.

This motion concerned an application for security for costs brought by the Estate Trustee against an appellant who had previously objected to the probate of a will and then withdrew her objection, but subsequently appealed the validity of the will.

The court found that the appeal appeared devoid of merit and vexatious, noting the appellant's lack of evidentiary support for her claims and her non-residency in Ontario with insufficient assets.

The motion for security for costs was granted, requiring the appellant to deposit $20,000, and costs of the motion were awarded to the Estate Trustee.

This motion concerned an application for judicial interim release pending an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The applicant, convicted of robbery in a home invasion, sought release under s. 679(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown opposed, arguing detention was necessary in the public interest due to the unlikelihood of leave to appeal and the seriousness of the offence.

The court found the applicant met the "not frivolous" and "surrender" criteria.

While acknowledging the seriousness of the offence, the court distinguished the "immediate enforceability" principle from R. v. Drabinsky by noting the applicant was effectively seeking a first appellate review of an unaddressed ground.

Given the applicant's consistent compliance with previous release conditions and lack of public safety risk, the court granted the release.