J. David Harris-Lowe

Tracy Lee Teeple applied for dependant relief against the estate of Stephen Thomsen.

The claim was settled for $225,000.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) moved for approval of the settlement and for an order that it be funded rateably by beneficiaries under both the primary and secondary wills.

The court approved the settlement but ordered that it be funded rateably only by the legatees of the primary estate, finding that a reasonable testator would have intended the shares of the company (governed by the secondary will) to pass separately and unaffected by primary will bequests.

The applicant mother sought sole decision-making responsibility and permission to relocate with the parties' seven-year-old child from Innisfil to Brooklin, Ontario.

The respondent father opposed the relocation and sought primary residence if the mother moved.

The court found a history of high conflict and poor communication, largely driven by the father, making joint decision-making unworkable.

Relying on the Office of the Children's Lawyer's recommendations and the mother's history as the primary caregiver, the court granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility and permitted the relocation.

The parenting schedule was adjusted to provide the father with alternate weekends and shared holidays.

The court also resolved child support issues, setting ongoing support and crediting the father for past overpayments.

The appellant, Anne Elizabeth Fair, appealed the dismissal of her action against BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc. and the estate/children of her deceased husband, Lloyd Fielder Fair.

She alleged BMO Nesbitt had a duty to inform her of a change in beneficiary designations on her husband's investment accounts (from her to his children) and sought a constructive trust over the proceeds based on an alleged agreement with her husband.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no duty on BMO Nesbitt to disclose beneficiary changes to a third party and insufficient evidence to establish a clear agreement with the deceased husband to maintain beneficiary designations, distinguishing the case from Moore v. Sweet.

The respondent mother brought a motion to vary a final custody order to permit her to relocate with the child, Charlee, to Wisconsin to live with her new husband and their infant child.

The applicant father opposed the move, requesting Charlee reside with him if the mother relocated.

The court found a material change in circumstances and, applying the best interests of the child test under the Divorce Act and Children's Law Reform Act, permitted the mother to relocate with Charlee.

The court found the mother's detailed plan for Charlee's care and access to the father superior to the father's vague proposal, emphasizing the importance of Charlee's primary attachment to the mother and the sibling relationship.

The parties reached a consent order regarding temporary relief and the matrimonial home prior to the return of a motion.

The applicant sought costs for the initial motion where she achieved partial success, while the respondent argued each party should bear their own costs.

The court awarded the applicant $3,000 in costs, noting her partial success on the contested motion before the previous judge.

The parties separated after a brief cohabitation.

They had one biological child together, and the respondent mother had an older child from a previous relationship.

The court awarded joint custody of the biological child, with primary residence to the respondent mother due to the geographical distance between the parents and the strong sibling bond.

The court also found that the applicant father had demonstrated a settled intention to treat the older child as his own during the relationship, and ordered him to pay a reduced amount of step-parent child support.

Residents of a life lease seniors’ residence sought a declaration restoring a contractual rule designating their floor as “pet‑free.” The residents argued the housing corporation breached the life lease agreement and failed to act in good faith when it amended the rules to remove the pet prohibition.

The court held that the agreement expressly authorized the corporation to amend the rules and regulations, subject only to consultation with the residents’ advisory association while retaining final decision‑making authority.

On the evidentiary record, the corporation consulted residents and considered objections before confirming the change.

The court found the decision was not arbitrary and was made in good faith.

The applicant Children's Aid Society sought judicial review of a decision by the Child and Family Services Review Board.

The Board had rescinded the Society's decision to refuse an adoption application by the respondent foster parents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board's mandate under s. 144 of the Child and Family Services Act allows it to make substantive determinations regarding the best interests of the child, rather than being limited to procedural fairness.

The Court determined the standard of review was reasonableness and found the Board's decision to place the children for adoption with the respondents was reasonable.

The appellant and respondent entered into a separation agreement where the respondent agreed to buy the appellant's interest in the matrimonial home for $225,000.

The respondent paid $100,000 but went bankrupt before paying the remaining $125,000.

The appellant sought to characterize the remaining debt as spousal support.

The motion judge refused, finding the agreement clearly characterized the payment as property division.

The Court of Appeal agreed and dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant was not precluded from bringing a variation motion on proper materials.