Bradley W. Miller

The appellant municipality appealed a trial judgment finding it liable under the Occupiers' Liability Act for catastrophic injuries sustained by the respondent at a municipal mountain bike park.

The respondent fell from a wooden obstacle and was rendered quadriplegic.

The trial judge found the municipality breached its duty of care by failing to post proper warning signs, negligently promoting the park, failing to monitor risks, and failing to provide an adequate progression of qualifiers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's application of the duty of care, standard of care, causation, or assessment of contributory negligence.

The appellant, Coliseum Inc., appealed a Superior Court decision that overturned an arbitrator's award in its favour regarding a commercial lease dispute with the City of Ottawa.

The dispute centered on the interpretation of Minutes of Settlement concerning the provision of an alternative site following the termination of Coliseum's lease at Frank Clair Stadium.

The Court of Appeal held that it had no jurisdiction to review the application judge's decision to grant leave to appeal the arbitral award.

However, the Court found that the application judge erred by substituting her own interpretation of the Minutes of Settlement, as the arbitrator's interpretation was reasonable and owed deference.

The appeal was allowed, and the arbitrator's award of $2,240,000 in damages was reinstated.

The appellants obtained a default judgment against Grocery Dayton for $980,200 after discontinuing their action against Wakefern Food Corporation.

Upon discovering Grocery Dayton was not a legal entity, the appellants moved to amend the judgment to add Wakefern as a judgment debtor, arguing Grocery Dayton was merely an alias for Wakefern.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding insufficient evidence that the two were the same entity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing there was insufficient evidence and that it would be unfair to add Wakefern without allowing it to defend the action on its merits.

However, the Court exercised its jurisdiction to set aside the discontinuance against Wakefern.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their counterclaim and granting judgment to the respondent on two mortgages.

The appellants argued the summary judgment violated res judicata because a previous motion for summary judgment in the original action had been dismissed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge was entitled to conduct a mini-trial under the new Hryniak framework, and that changes in pleadings and law meant the second motion was not inconsistent with the first.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing the terms of a settlement of his action against the respondents.

The appellant had made a written offer to withdraw his claim, which the respondents accepted.

The appellant later claimed he had withdrawn the offer before acceptance and demanded an apology.

The motion judge found the offer was not clearly and unequivocally withdrawn and enforced the settlement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings, concluding the offer was validly accepted and binding, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant wife appealed an order granting her an equalization payment of $60,000 following a short marriage with less than five years of cohabitation.

She argued the motion judge erred by not adopting a mathematical formula for unequal division and by misstating her alternative position.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge was not required to use a mathematical formula and properly applied s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act to determine that equal division would be unconscionable based on the parties' respective contributions.

The appellants (lawyers) appealed a judgment finding that they had agreed to represent the respondent on a pro bono basis and ordering them to repay funds improperly applied to legal fees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge made no errors in allowing the matter to proceed by application, in finding that the retainer was pro bono, or in resolving ambiguity in the retainer in favour of the client.

The court also rejected the appellants' argument that the application judge's conduct raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The respondent sold a marina to the appellant, who subsequently defaulted on payments.

The parties entered into Minutes of Settlement, which the appellant also breached.

The respondent successfully moved for summary judgment.

The appellant appealed, arguing she was entitled to a set-off for snow storm damage that occurred while the respondent remained in possession, claiming he owed a duty as a mortgagee in possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no duty to maintain or insure the property was pleaded or established in the Minutes of Settlement.

Following an appeal decision regarding child and spousal support, the parties were directed to submit joint calculations of arrears.

As the parties failed to agree and submitted separate calculations, the Court of Appeal reviewed the submissions and adopted the appellant's calculations, fixing the total spousal and child support arrears owing by the respondent at $277,853.81 as of December 31, 2013.

Following a successful appeal in an estate litigation matter, the appellants sought costs for both the motion below and the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants their full requested costs for the motion below, totaling approximately $319,000, noting these were less than the costs originally awarded to the respondents.

For the appeal, the court awarded partial indemnity costs of $100,000 and $75,000 to the respective appellants.

The court rejected the argument that the issues were sufficiently novel to depart from the normal costs rules, and held that the public policy considerations for a blended costs award payable from the estate were not engaged.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 3 years and 7 months for robbery, arguing the sentencing judge erred by crediting his pre-sentence custody at 1.25:1 instead of 1.5:1, and by placing undue weight on his criminal record.

The Crown conceded the error regarding pre-sentence custody credit.

The Court of Appeal applied the standard of review from Lacasse and found no other errors in principle, noting the appellant was a mature recidivist and the robbery was planned and involved an imitation weapon.

The court allowed the appeal in part, reducing the sentence by 94 days to reflect the 1.5:1 credit, but otherwise dismissed the appeal.

The applicant sought to set aside a 2008 order dismissing his conviction and sentence appeals as abandoned.

He claimed he never instructed his former appeal counsel to abandon the appeal, while counsel maintained he received clear instructions to do so.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the surrounding circumstances, including telephone records, the applicant's subsequent conduct, and counsel's vague recollection and lack of written confirmation.

The Court concluded the applicant did not instruct counsel to abandon the appeal and that it was in the interests of justice to set aside the dismissal and reinstate the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine, importing cocaine, and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his pre-trial motions alleging violations of his section 8 Charter rights.

The appellant challenged the search of a shipping container by customs officials, the issuance of a wiretap authorization, and the granting of search warrants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the customs search was authorized under the Customs Act, the wiretap authorization met the investigative necessity requirement, and the conduct of the Justice of the Peace in issuing the search warrants did not create a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant, representing Ontario grain farmers, applied under Rule 14.05(3)(d) for a declaration interpreting a regulation that restricted the use of neonicotinoid-treated seeds.

The appellant argued the regulation was unworkable and sought an interpretation that would effectively delay its implementation.

The motion judge struck the application for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulation was not ambiguous and the appellant was improperly seeking to rewrite the regulation rather than resolve a genuine interpretive dispute.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible for minor assaults and detained at a minimum forensic unit.

Despite his ongoing marijuana use, he had no history of aggression while detained.

The Ontario Review Board ordered his transfer to a medium security unit to restrict his access to drugs and help him develop insight.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the transfer unreasonable because it was more restrictive of his liberty and there was no evidence linking his marijuana use to a risk to public safety while detained.

The appellant purchased three apartment buildings from the respondent.

The agreement included an escrow provision holding $300,000 of the purchase price, to be released to the respondent if the gross rental income reached a $960,000 threshold at the end of a three-year performance period.

The application judge found the threshold was met and ordered the funds released to the respondent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the application judge erred in his approach to contractual interpretation by separating the words from their context, contrary to Sattva.

However, applying the correct framework, the Court concluded the parties intended to measure income performance by annualizing the rent roll at the end of the performance period.

As the threshold was met under this interpretation, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation, appealed a decision regarding the calculation of amounts payable to the respondent non-utility generators under long-term power purchase agreements.

The dispute centered on whether a new government regulation reallocating the Global Adjustment Mechanism (GA) altered the calculation of Total Market Costs (TMC) under the agreements.

The application judge found that the new GA calculation was inconsistent with the definition of TMC, which required costs to be allocated pro rata to consumption.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge did not decide the case on an unargued issue, made no palpable and overriding factual errors, and properly interpreted the agreements without improperly implying a term.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for the forcible seizure of a child and other offences, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at a secure forensic unit.

The appellant sought an absolute or conditional discharge, or a transfer to a different facility to access a larger gay community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the appellant posed a significant risk to the public was reasonable and supported by expert evidence indicating he remained untreated and unstable.

The court also upheld the Board's refusal to transfer the appellant, noting the request was premature and lacked therapeutic justification.

The appellant was employed under a five-year fixed-term contract and was terminated without cause after 23 months.

The motion judge found the early termination clause unenforceable and awarded common law reasonable notice damages subject to mitigation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that where an employment contract is for a fixed term and lacks an enforceable early termination provision, the employee is entitled to the salary and benefits for the unexpired portion of the term.

Furthermore, the court held that there is no duty to mitigate damages arising from the early termination of a fixed-term contract.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel and a breach of his section 14 Charter right to an interpreter.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence regarding the ineffective assistance claim but found no miscarriage of justice, noting trial counsel's strategic decisions were reasonable.

The Court rejected the section 14 claim, finding the appellant understood the proceedings and did not require an interpreter.

The appeal was dismissed.