Bradley W. Miller

The appellants, a lawyer and his professional corporation, appealed an order dismissing their motion to quash a Registrar's order for the assessment of 51 accounts rendered to the respondent client.

The appellants argued the accounts were for management services, the retainer was in dispute, and the requisition was untimely.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the accounts were for legal services, the retainer was not in dispute, and the overlapping nature of the interim accounts constituted special circumstances justifying the timing of the assessment.

The appellant landlord appealed a trial judgment finding it had wrongfully terminated a commercial lease.

The trial judge found the parties had agreed on the quantum of rent arrears and the landlord had waived any additional amounts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusions on waiver, credibility, tax credits, or compensation for the tenant's equipment left on the premises.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision granting the respondent College declaratory and injunctive relief for unauthorized practice and unauthorized use of protected titles.

The appellants argued that the language proficiency requirement in the Registration Regulation was discriminatory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that the appellants were barred from advancing the constitutional argument due to issue estoppel and abuse of process, as the same issue had been previously decided against them by the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed an order of a Superior Court judge resolving a priority issue between two mortgages registered under the Land Titles Act.

The Court of Appeal held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeals, as section 27 of the Land Titles Act provides that appeals from orders made under the Act lie to the Divisional Court.

The appeals were transferred to the Divisional Court pursuant to section 110 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The parties reached a settlement in principle regarding the bankruptcy proposal of Enroute Imports Inc. but required time to finalize specific terms.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal on consent, to be restored to the list if the settlement was not finalized by December 23, 2015.

The appellant estate appealed a decision finding that the joint tenancy of a matrimonial home had not been severed before the deceased's death.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that, despite the deteriorating relationship between the parties, there was no mutual intention to treat their interests as a tenancy in common.

A motion to introduce fresh evidence was also dismissed, as it did not materially change the evidence regarding mutual intention.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent.

The appellant mother appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing her appeal from a trial judgment that made her child a Crown ward without access.

She argued the Children's Aid Society breached its statutory duty to provide services and that the trial judge erred by not extending the period of CAS wardship.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the CAS made numerous attempts to assist the mother, which were frustrated by her own conduct, and that an extension of wardship was not justified given the child's best interests.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and possession of a loaded restricted firearm.

At trial, the Crown cross-examined the appellant extensively about his knowledge of four other shootings in his neighbourhood to test his memory of when he heard about the shooting in this case.

The appellant appealed, arguing the cross-examination was unfair and amounted to trial by innuendo.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the cross-examination had very low probative value but high prejudicial effect, as it insinuated the appellant was involved in a violent subculture.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered, with the court declining to apply the curative proviso because the unfair cross-examination resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment ordering them to pay the outstanding balance on a second mortgage.

They argued the mortgage action should be considered alongside a construction dispute involving the respondent, claiming duress, bad faith, and equitable set-off.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's findings that the appellants were sophisticated parties with independent legal advice, the construction project was completed within budget, and there was no bad faith or fraud.

The appeal was dismissed, and the refusal to consolidate or stay the proceedings was upheld.

The appellant sought to set aside a negotiated family law settlement agreement reached during mediation, alleging duress and failure to comply with the objectives of the Divorce Act.

The respondent successfully moved for summary judgment to enforce the agreement.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court applied the Miglin framework and concluded that the circumstances of the negotiation were satisfactory and the appellant failed to show the agreement departed significantly from the objectives of the Divorce Act.

The plaintiff expert witness sued the defendant law firm for unpaid fees and subsequently served a Rule 49 offer to settle for $50,000 plus HST 'in full and complete satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim'.

The defendant accepted the offer days before trial and argued the settlement amount was inclusive of costs.

The motion judge agreed, finding the offer unambiguous.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the motion judge erred by adopting a literal interpretation and failing to consider the factual matrix, including the Rule 49 context and the timing of the offer.

The Court concluded the offer did not dispose of costs, entitling the plaintiff to costs under Rule 49.07(5)(b).

The appellants appealed an order refusing to set aside an administrative dismissal of their personal injury action.

The action was dismissed in 2007 due to the inaction of their former counsel, and a motion to set aside the dismissal was not brought until 2013.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the appellants failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice caused by the significant delay, and that actual prejudice to the respondent's ability to defend the action had been established.

The appellant brought a motion for summary judgment against the respondents on an alleged guarantee of a $30,000 loan.

The motions judge dismissed the motion and granted the respondents' cross-motion for summary judgment, dismissing the action against them.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's findings that there was no agreement to guarantee the loan and that, in any event, an oral guarantee would be unenforceable under section 4 of the Statute of Frauds.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the judgment of Justice Sidney N. Lederman.

On consent, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $35,000.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing that his statements to police were involuntary and that his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was violated.

The appellant contended that police failed to facilitate his right to counsel of choice, failed to offer a second consultation when new allegations of child abuse were raised, and improperly induced a confession by suggesting consensual sex with a minor was not a crime.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter breaches and upholding the trial judge's ruling that the confession was voluntary.

The appellant appealed his convictions, raising issues regarding the disclosure of police protocols for confidential informants, the validity of a search warrant, and the finding of possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the protocols were not relevant when requested, the search warrant was properly granted based on compelling information, and there was ample evidence to support the finding of possession.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible for assault with a weapon and was detained at a secure forensic unit.

The Ontario Review Board granted a conditional discharge, concluding the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety despite the hospital's recommendation for an absolute discharge.

The appellant appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable as the evidence did not support a finding of significant risk to the public.

An absolute discharge was substituted.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual assault, assault, choking, and forcible confinement.

He argued the trial judge relied on stereotypical notions of common sense and conducted an unbalanced credibility analysis.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or reliance on common sense, noting the trial judge meticulously reviewed the evidence, including security video and independent witness testimony.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the sentence of 18 months minus a day was upheld as fit.

The appellant appealed his indeterminate sentence and dangerous offender designation, arguing the sentencing judge failed to properly apply the principles from Gladue and Ipeelee regarding Aboriginal offenders.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge had thoroughly reviewed the appellant's history, the Gladue report, and expert psychiatric evidence.

The court concluded the sentencing judge properly applied the relevant principles and reasonably found no evidence that the appellant's risk to reoffend could be controlled in the community.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine and oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 8 Charter application to exclude evidence seized during a search incident to arrest, contending that the confidential informant's tip lacked sufficient corroboration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the Debot test and was justified in determining that the arrest was subjectively and objectively reasonable given the informant's proven reliability and the specific information provided.