Bradley W. Miller

The appellants appealed a summary judgment ordering them to pay the outstanding balance on a second mortgage.

They argued the mortgage action should be considered alongside a construction dispute involving the respondent, claiming duress, bad faith, and equitable set-off.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's findings that the appellants were sophisticated parties with independent legal advice, the construction project was completed within budget, and there was no bad faith or fraud.

The appeal was dismissed, and the refusal to consolidate or stay the proceedings was upheld.

The plaintiff expert witness sued the defendant law firm for unpaid fees and subsequently served a Rule 49 offer to settle for $50,000 plus HST 'in full and complete satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim'.

The defendant accepted the offer days before trial and argued the settlement amount was inclusive of costs.

The motion judge agreed, finding the offer unambiguous.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the motion judge erred by adopting a literal interpretation and failing to consider the factual matrix, including the Rule 49 context and the timing of the offer.

The Court concluded the offer did not dispose of costs, entitling the plaintiff to costs under Rule 49.07(5)(b).

The appellant sought to set aside a negotiated family law settlement agreement reached during mediation, alleging duress and failure to comply with the objectives of the Divorce Act.

The respondent successfully moved for summary judgment to enforce the agreement.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court applied the Miglin framework and concluded that the circumstances of the negotiation were satisfactory and the appellant failed to show the agreement departed significantly from the objectives of the Divorce Act.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to set aside an administrative dismissal of their personal injury action.

The action was dismissed in 2007 due to the inaction of their former counsel, and a motion to set aside the dismissal was not brought until 2013.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the appellants failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice caused by the significant delay, and that actual prejudice to the respondent's ability to defend the action had been established.

The appellant brought a motion for summary judgment against the respondents on an alleged guarantee of a $30,000 loan.

The motions judge dismissed the motion and granted the respondents' cross-motion for summary judgment, dismissing the action against them.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's findings that there was no agreement to guarantee the loan and that, in any event, an oral guarantee would be unenforceable under section 4 of the Statute of Frauds.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the judgment of Justice Sidney N. Lederman.

On consent, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $35,000.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing that his statements to police were involuntary and that his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was violated.

The appellant contended that police failed to facilitate his right to counsel of choice, failed to offer a second consultation when new allegations of child abuse were raised, and improperly induced a confession by suggesting consensual sex with a minor was not a crime.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter breaches and upholding the trial judge's ruling that the confession was voluntary.

The appellant appealed his convictions, raising issues regarding the disclosure of police protocols for confidential informants, the validity of a search warrant, and the finding of possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the protocols were not relevant when requested, the search warrant was properly granted based on compelling information, and there was ample evidence to support the finding of possession.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual assault, assault, choking, and forcible confinement.

He argued the trial judge relied on stereotypical notions of common sense and conducted an unbalanced credibility analysis.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or reliance on common sense, noting the trial judge meticulously reviewed the evidence, including security video and independent witness testimony.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the sentence of 18 months minus a day was upheld as fit.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible for assault with a weapon and was detained at a secure forensic unit.

The Ontario Review Board granted a conditional discharge, concluding the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety despite the hospital's recommendation for an absolute discharge.

The appellant appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable as the evidence did not support a finding of significant risk to the public.

An absolute discharge was substituted.

The appellant appealed his indeterminate sentence and dangerous offender designation, arguing the sentencing judge failed to properly apply the principles from Gladue and Ipeelee regarding Aboriginal offenders.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge had thoroughly reviewed the appellant's history, the Gladue report, and expert psychiatric evidence.

The court concluded the sentencing judge properly applied the relevant principles and reasonably found no evidence that the appellant's risk to reoffend could be controlled in the community.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine and oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 8 Charter application to exclude evidence seized during a search incident to arrest, contending that the confidential informant's tip lacked sufficient corroboration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the Debot test and was justified in determining that the arrest was subjectively and objectively reasonable given the informant's proven reliability and the specific information provided.

The appellants appealed a Crown wardship order without access regarding their two children.

They argued the trial judge erred by failing to identify the mother as Indian or native, failing to apply Gladue principles, drawing negative inferences from the mother's flat affect, and failing to consider the children's best interests regarding access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the children did not meet the statutory definition of Indian or native person under the Child and Family Services Act, and that an access order was statutorily precluded because it would impair adoption prospects.

The Court also strongly condemned the systemic delays in the child protection proceedings.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision that set aside a stay of proceedings granted for a section 8 Charter breach.

The breach occurred when the appellant was videotaped using the toilet in a police holding cell.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, noting that the police force had since changed its policy to protect prisoner privacy, and a stay of proceedings is only appropriate in the clearest of cases.

The court found no clear error in the summary conviction appeal judge's decision and determined the issue no longer had significance to the administration of justice generally.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted to the respondent tenant for breach of a commercial lease.

The motion judge had found that the parties made an oral agreement to extend the lease commencement date and that the appellants terminated the lease in bad faith.

The Court of Appeal set aside the summary judgment, finding that the motion judge's factual conclusions regarding the oral agreement were not supported by the evidence, and that he erred by relying on the unpleaded doctrine of part performance.

The Court deferred deciding whether to remit the matter or determine the issues itself, requesting further written submissions from the parties.

A property developer sued a municipal fire department and its officials alleging negligence and misfeasance in public office after inspectors issued fire safety inspection orders requiring upgrades to fire alarm audibility levels in residential buildings.

The orders were based on an Office of the Fire Marshal guideline recommending a 60 dBA audibility level, though that standard was not prescribed by statute or regulation.

The plaintiff argued the inspectors exceeded their statutory authority under the Fire Protection and Prevention Act and enforced a non‑binding guideline as if it were law.

The court held the inspectors acted in good faith, relied on guidance from the Office of the Fire Marshal, and believed they had authority to address potential fire safety risks.

The plaintiff failed to prove deliberate unlawful conduct or knowledge of lack of authority required for misfeasance, and negligence was also not established.

The appellant struck a pedestrian with his vehicle and left the scene without assisting.

A tractor trailer subsequently struck and killed the unconscious victim.

The appellant was committed to stand trial for failing to stop, manslaughter, and criminal negligence causing death.

He applied for certiorari to quash the committal for manslaughter and criminal negligence, which was dismissed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the application judge properly applied the 'reasonably foreseeable' approach to legal causation from Maybin, and that leaving the scene carried a reasonably foreseeable risk of immediate and substantial harm.

The appellant municipality appealed an application judge's interpretation of a development agreement regarding the costs of operating a pumping station.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's conclusion that the costs of operation, as distinct from maintenance and repair, are to be borne by the municipality and not the developer.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict that apportioned liability 90% to the appellant and 10% to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal applied the rigorous test for setting aside a civil jury verdict, which requires the verdict to be so plainly unreasonable and unjust that no jury acting judicially could have reached it.

Finding the apportionment decision did not meet this threshold, the court dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant cashed a bank draft for a mortgagor who turned out to be a fraudster.

The appellant sued the mortgagee and the solicitor who drew the draft.

The trial judge dismissed the claims.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in refusing to allow an amendment to the pleadings after closing arguments, and in failing to recognize a new duty of care owed by the solicitor to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the discretionary refusal to amend pleadings and affirming that no new duty of care should be recognized in the context of bills of exchange.