Bradley W. Miller

The plaintiff vendor commenced an action after the defendant purchaser failed to complete a commercial real estate transaction governed by an amended agreement of purchase and sale.

The purchaser argued that the contract was void due to an unmet third‑party condition and alleged failure to produce a long‑form lease.

The court found the amended agreement was a firm contract without conditions precedent and that the purchaser breached it by failing to pay the additional deposit and refusing to close in an attempt to renegotiate price.

Specific performance was denied because damages were an adequate remedy in the context of a commercial property transaction.

The court assessed damages at $300,000 based on the difference between the agreed purchase price and the market evidence available, and ordered release of the deposit to the vendor.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for damages arising from the purchase of a defective wind turbine from one of the defendant corporations.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against two affiliated corporations, arguing they were separate legal entities.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs' claims regarding lifting the corporate veil, agency, and pure economic loss for negligent manufacture raised genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly given the conflicting evidence on the degree of control and integration among the corporations.

The respondent brought a motion to vary his spousal support obligations, arguing that his business revenue had declined and the applicant's health and earning capacity had improved.

The applicant opposed the motion and sought an increase in support.

The court found that the respondent's net income had only decreased by 25%, which was offset by his new spouse's contributions to household expenses.

The court also found that the applicant's improved health and new qualifications were contemplated at the time of the original order.

The motion to vary was dismissed, as no material change in circumstances was established.

The applicant sought to set aside an arbitration award under s. 46 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, alleging procedural unfairness and bias by the arbitrator in a construction dispute arbitration.

The applicant also sought leave to appeal the award on a question of law under s. 45 of the Act.

The court held that the alleged deficiencies concerned substantive disagreements with the arbitrator’s reasoning rather than procedural fairness and therefore did not meet the narrow grounds for setting aside an award.

The court further held that the arbitration agreement incorporated rules providing that the award would be final and binding with no appeal, thereby excluding any right to seek leave to appeal.

The application to set aside the award and the request for leave to appeal were dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel his former solicitor to transfer his file to his new solicitor.

The former solicitor asserted a solicitor's lien and demanded immediate payment of outstanding disbursements before releasing the file.

The court reviewed the contingency fee retainer agreement and found it did not require immediate payment of disbursements upon termination.

Given the plaintiff's impecuniosity and the former solicitor's ability to protect its interests via a charging order against future settlement proceeds, the court ordered the file transferred subject to a $300 copying fee.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside an administrative dismissal of their action, which arose from a real estate transaction.

The action was dismissed by the Registrar after the plaintiffs failed to set the matter down for trial in accordance with a court-ordered timetable.

The court applied the four-part test for setting aside a dismissal and found that the plaintiffs' delay was intentional, as they had prioritized an alternative resolution through the Ministry of the Environment over the litigation.

Given the significant delay in bringing the motion and the prejudice to the defendants, the court refused to set aside the dismissal.

In a refusals motion arising from discovery in a pharmaceutical product liability action, the court addressed one remaining question concerning whether related United States claims involving the same drug were similar to the claims advanced in Ontario.

The court held the question, as pressed in submissions, was vague and in substance sought disclosure of the criteria used in case-specific settlement analyses of U.S. claims.

That information was protected by settlement privilege, which extends to subsequent unrelated proceedings.

Although the moving party was unsuccessful on the argued refusal, it obtained costs on the motion because most refusals were answered only after the motion became necessary.

The moving parties sought distribution of funds held in court to the estate trustee so that estate accounts could be passed.

The responding party opposed the motion and attempted, through his factum, to revive damages claims against the estate arising from lost income associated with estate rental properties.

The court held that the prior motion had been dismissed by the Court of Appeal and could not be reheard on a supplemented record because the matter was res judicata.

The funds were ordered paid out to the estate trustee in trust for the estate, while any remaining personal damages claim against the individual defendant could proceed to trial or by summary procedure.

The applicant commercial tenant sought relief from forfeiture and an injunction against eviction, arguing the landlord orally agreed to defer rent payments until the tenant resolved third-party litigation.

The respondent landlord denied the agreement and relied on a subsequent written settlement agreement negotiated by counsel, which the tenant breached.

The court found no indefinite oral agreement to defer rent and held that the written settlement agreement, despite missing a word, was unambiguous in context and binding.

The court also held the tenant was bound by his solicitor's ostensible authority.

The application was dismissed and the interim injunction dissolved.

The defendant brought a motion for security for costs and a stay of previous costs orders made against him.

The plaintiff had previously obtained summary judgment for indemnification regarding an estate administration and intended to withdraw the remaining claims.

The court found that ordering security for costs would have no practical significance, as the only remaining step was the plaintiff's motion to withdraw the claim.

The court also found no reason to stay the previous costs orders.

The defendant's motions were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for criminal harassment.

He argued the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to call reply evidence on a collateral issue regarding how he obtained an invitation to the complainant's dinner party.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that the reply evidence was admissible because the issue took on new significance during the defence case.

The court also found the sentence, which included a suspended sentence and three years' probation, was not clearly unreasonable given the persistent nature of the harassment.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with excess alcohol, arguing his roadside admission to being the driver was statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act and therefore inadmissible.

The summary conviction appeal court agreed the statement was compelled and its use to form reasonable grounds for a breath demand violated section 8 of the Charter.

However, the court upheld the trial judge's alternative conclusion that the breath samples were admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter, noting the driver's identity was discoverable through other witnesses.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party (respondent in the family proceeding) brought a motion to reopen a final order made in default, arguing that his severe illness prevented him from participating in the litigation and instructing counsel over a three-year period.

The court found that the moving party had engaged in a history of delay and obstructive behaviour, including actively resisting the sale of family property, which contradicted his claims of incapacity.

The court held that disagreement with findings of fact does not constitute a 'mistake' under Family Law Rule 25(19) and dismissed the motion, awarding costs to the responding party.

The moving party (respondent in the main action) brought an interlocutory motion for the partition and sale of two jointly owned family cottages.

The responding party opposed the motion, arguing that the Partition Act was not specifically pleaded and that he might be able to buy out the moving party's interest after the equalization of net family property at trial.

The court held that the failure to specifically plead the Partition Act was not a bar to relief, as there was no unfairness or surprise.

The court granted the motion, finding that the responding party failed to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial or that a forced sale would be vexatious, malicious, or oppressive.

On a motion by counsel of record to be removed shortly before trial in a long-standing medical negligence action, the court held that an objective loss of client confidence and a dispute over the retainer constituted justifiable cause for withdrawal under Rule 2.09 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The court continued the sealing order over affidavits containing solicitor-client privileged material.

Because all parties acknowledged the action could not proceed to trial without replacement counsel, the trial was adjourned on strict terms, including a peremptory late-autumn trial date and no further expert reports or examinations.

Summary conviction appeal from an impaired driving conviction under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the investigating officer arbitrarily detained him and unlawfully searched him when the officer stopped his vehicle while looking for another individual suspected of trespass and driving under suspension.

The appeal court held the officer had articulable cause and reasonable grounds to detain and question the driver based on the specific location, vehicle description, and surrounding circumstances, and that the subsequent arrest for impaired driving was supported by reasonable and probable grounds.

No breach of ss. 8 or 9 of the Charter was established, and the evidence would not have been excluded under s. 24(2) in any event.

On a summary conviction sentence appeal arising from a road rage assault, the appellant challenged a no-weapons probation condition and a five-year firearms prohibition imposed after a conditional discharge.

The court admitted fresh evidence concerning the appellant’s competitive shooting activities, firearm ownership, training, and post-sentence completion of anger management, applying the Palmer framework flexibly in the interests of justice.

The court held the sentencing judge applied the proper public safety test under s. 110 of the Criminal Code and that both the probation term and firearms prohibition remained reasonable despite the fresh evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, except that the appellant was given 30 days to lawfully transfer or surrender firearms and ammunition.

In a family law motion arising within a broader motion to change concerning custody, access, and child support, the moving party sought a restraining order and a contempt finding.

The court held the contempt allegations could not fairly be determined on conflicting affidavit evidence and adjourned that aspect sine die pending disclosure from the Children’s Aid Society, the police, and the involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

The request for a restraining order under s. 46 of the Family Law Act was dismissed because the evidence of present risk was insufficient and largely speculative, particularly given the absence of recent contact.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The appeal centred on whether breath samples were admissible where the accused responded “No, not right now” when asked if he wished to contact counsel after arrest.

The court held that this response did not constitute a clear and unequivocal waiver of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

Police obtained breath samples before providing a meaningful opportunity to consult counsel, and the failure to reiterate and facilitate access at the station constituted a Charter breach.

Applying the exclusion analysis under s. 24(2), the court found the breach deliberate and significant and excluded the breath evidence.

The accused brought a third party records application seeking cellphone records associated with a number subscribed to by the complainant.

The defence argued the records could confirm or refute alleged post‑incident communication between the complainant and the accused, relevant to credibility and full answer and defence.

Applying the two‑stage framework under ss. 278.3 and 278.5 of the Criminal Code and the jurisprudence in Mills and O’Connor, the court considered likely relevance, privacy interests, and the probative value of the requested records.

The court held that the accused met the threshold of likely relevance, noting the limited but potentially probative timeframe and the relatively lower privacy interest in call‑log records compared to counselling records.

The records were ordered produced to the court for judicial review, with further submissions scheduled on whether disclosure to the defence should follow.