A. Shatto

The accused was sentenced following guilty pleas to sexual offences against a person under 16 years of age.

The court accepted a joint submission for a custodial sentence after considering aggravating factors including breach of trust and multiple incidents, and mitigating factors including the guilty plea and relatively limited criminal record.

The court emphasized the heightened mitigating value of guilty pleas in cases involving child victims because they avoid the trauma of trial.

The accused received 18 months’ imprisonment and two years’ probation with strict no‑contact conditions.

Additional orders included a DNA order, a ten‑year weapons prohibition, lifetime sex offender registry registration, and a five‑year prohibition order under s. 161 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The appeal centred on whether breath samples were admissible where the accused responded “No, not right now” when asked if he wished to contact counsel after arrest.

The court held that this response did not constitute a clear and unequivocal waiver of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

Police obtained breath samples before providing a meaningful opportunity to consult counsel, and the failure to reiterate and facilitate access at the station constituted a Charter breach.

Applying the exclusion analysis under s. 24(2), the court found the breach deliberate and significant and excluded the breath evidence.

The accused applied under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to adduce evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual activity in a prosecution for sexual interference, sexual assault, and invitation to sexual touching involving a person under 16 years old.

The proposed evidence concerned a later sexual assault allegedly committed against the complainant by another individual and earlier alleged assaults by unknown persons.

Applying s. 276(2)–(3), the court held that the specific instance involving the later alleged assault was relevant to issues of credibility and possible confusion of events and had probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice.

However, broader allegations of unspecified prior sexual activity were rejected for lack of specificity.

The application was therefore granted in part.

The accused was tried on 11 criminal charges, including assault, attempting to choke, uttering threats, and criminal harassment, relating to his former partner.

The Crown's case relied almost entirely on the complainant's testimony.

The trial judge found significant credibility and reliability issues with the complainant's evidence, including inconsistencies with other witnesses, prior untruths to authorities, internal inconsistencies, and contradictions with her own journal.

Consequently, the court was left with a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all charges.

During a criminal trial involving multiple assault, uttering threats, and criminal harassment charges, the defence sought to compel a mediator to testify about communications during a confidential family mediation session between the accused and the complainant.

The mediator objected based on a contractual confidentiality clause and settlement privilege.

The court considered the Wigmore criteria for privilege and the doctrine of settlement privilege.

It held that privilege had been waived when the complainant testified about the mediation and alleged threatening conduct by the accused during the session.

The court further found that the accused’s right to make full answer and defence outweighed concerns about the confidentiality of mediation and ordered the mediator to answer the defence’s questions.

The accused applied for a bail review after a justice of the peace ordered detention on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds following charges including procuring a young person for prostitution, sexual assault, sexual interference, possession of child pornography, and breach of probation.

The Superior Court determined that a material change in circumstances existed because the accused proposed a significantly stricter bail plan including electronic monitoring and supervision by a surety.

Conducting a fresh hearing, the court concluded that detention was not necessary to ensure attendance in court or to protect the public under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code.

Despite the seriousness of the allegations and the accused’s prior record for breaches and failures to attend court, the enhanced supervision and monitoring conditions sufficiently mitigated the risks.

The accused was released on a recognizance with a surety and numerous restrictive conditions including electronic monitoring.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit, arguing that the verdicts were unsupported by the evidence and that the trial judge erred in credibility findings, the application of the W.(D.) test, and the dismissal of a Charter application under ss. 10(b) and 24(2).

The appellant also argued that the absence of video recording equipment in the police breath room should have led to adverse inferences against the Crown’s evidence.

The appeal court held that the trial judge made no palpable or overriding errors of fact and correctly applied the relevant burdens and standards of proof.

The court found that credibility findings and the assessment of the absence of video evidence were matters within the trial judge’s discretion and entitled to deference.

The convictions were supported by the evidence, and no miscarriage of justice was established.

The accused was charged with multiple offences, including robbery and using an imitation firearm, arising from two home invasions.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the perpetrator.

The victim identified the accused, but the court found the identification evidence to be weak due to poor lighting, the use of disguises, and the victim's limited prior knowledge of the accused.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court believed the accused's denials and found that the Crown failed to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.