Bradley W. Miller

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual assault, assault, choking, and forcible confinement.

He argued the trial judge relied on stereotypical notions of common sense and conducted an unbalanced credibility analysis.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or reliance on common sense, noting the trial judge meticulously reviewed the evidence, including security video and independent witness testimony.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the sentence of 18 months minus a day was upheld as fit.

The appellant appealed his indeterminate sentence and dangerous offender designation, arguing the sentencing judge failed to properly apply the principles from Gladue and Ipeelee regarding Aboriginal offenders.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge had thoroughly reviewed the appellant's history, the Gladue report, and expert psychiatric evidence.

The court concluded the sentencing judge properly applied the relevant principles and reasonably found no evidence that the appellant's risk to reoffend could be controlled in the community.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision that set aside a stay of proceedings granted for a section 8 Charter breach.

The breach occurred when the appellant was videotaped using the toilet in a police holding cell.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, noting that the police force had since changed its policy to protect prisoner privacy, and a stay of proceedings is only appropriate in the clearest of cases.

The court found no clear error in the summary conviction appeal judge's decision and determined the issue no longer had significance to the administration of justice generally.

The appellants appealed a Crown wardship order without access regarding their two children.

They argued the trial judge erred by failing to identify the mother as Indian or native, failing to apply Gladue principles, drawing negative inferences from the mother's flat affect, and failing to consider the children's best interests regarding access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the children did not meet the statutory definition of Indian or native person under the Child and Family Services Act, and that an access order was statutorily precluded because it would impair adoption prospects.

The Court also strongly condemned the systemic delays in the child protection proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine and oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 8 Charter application to exclude evidence seized during a search incident to arrest, contending that the confidential informant's tip lacked sufficient corroboration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the Debot test and was justified in determining that the arrest was subjectively and objectively reasonable given the informant's proven reliability and the specific information provided.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted to the respondent tenant for breach of a commercial lease.

The motion judge had found that the parties made an oral agreement to extend the lease commencement date and that the appellants terminated the lease in bad faith.

The Court of Appeal set aside the summary judgment, finding that the motion judge's factual conclusions regarding the oral agreement were not supported by the evidence, and that he erred by relying on the unpleaded doctrine of part performance.

The Court deferred deciding whether to remit the matter or determine the issues itself, requesting further written submissions from the parties.

The appellant struck a pedestrian with his vehicle and left the scene without assisting.

A tractor trailer subsequently struck and killed the unconscious victim.

The appellant was committed to stand trial for failing to stop, manslaughter, and criminal negligence causing death.

He applied for certiorari to quash the committal for manslaughter and criminal negligence, which was dismissed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the application judge properly applied the 'reasonably foreseeable' approach to legal causation from Maybin, and that leaving the scene carried a reasonably foreseeable risk of immediate and substantial harm.

The appellant municipality appealed an application judge's interpretation of a development agreement regarding the costs of operating a pumping station.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's conclusion that the costs of operation, as distinct from maintenance and repair, are to be borne by the municipality and not the developer.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict that apportioned liability 90% to the appellant and 10% to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal applied the rigorous test for setting aside a civil jury verdict, which requires the verdict to be so plainly unreasonable and unjust that no jury acting judicially could have reached it.

Finding the apportionment decision did not meet this threshold, the court dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant cashed a bank draft for a mortgagor who turned out to be a fraudster.

The appellant sued the mortgagee and the solicitor who drew the draft.

The trial judge dismissed the claims.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in refusing to allow an amendment to the pleadings after closing arguments, and in failing to recognize a new duty of care owed by the solicitor to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the discretionary refusal to amend pleadings and affirming that no new duty of care should be recognized in the context of bills of exchange.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for damages arising from the purchase of a defective wind turbine from one of the defendant corporations.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against two affiliated corporations, arguing they were separate legal entities.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs' claims regarding lifting the corporate veil, agency, and pure economic loss for negligent manufacture raised genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly given the conflicting evidence on the degree of control and integration among the corporations.

The applicant sought to set aside an arbitration award under s. 46 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, alleging procedural unfairness and bias by the arbitrator in a construction dispute arbitration.

The applicant also sought leave to appeal the award on a question of law under s. 45 of the Act.

The court held that the alleged deficiencies concerned substantive disagreements with the arbitrator’s reasoning rather than procedural fairness and therefore did not meet the narrow grounds for setting aside an award.

The court further held that the arbitration agreement incorporated rules providing that the award would be final and binding with no appeal, thereby excluding any right to seek leave to appeal.

The application to set aside the award and the request for leave to appeal were dismissed.

The respondent brought a motion to vary his spousal support obligations, arguing that his business revenue had declined and the applicant's health and earning capacity had improved.

The applicant opposed the motion and sought an increase in support.

The court found that the respondent's net income had only decreased by 25%, which was offset by his new spouse's contributions to household expenses.

The court also found that the applicant's improved health and new qualifications were contemplated at the time of the original order.

The motion to vary was dismissed, as no material change in circumstances was established.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside an administrative dismissal of their action, which arose from a real estate transaction.

The action was dismissed by the Registrar after the plaintiffs failed to set the matter down for trial in accordance with a court-ordered timetable.

The court applied the four-part test for setting aside a dismissal and found that the plaintiffs' delay was intentional, as they had prioritized an alternative resolution through the Ministry of the Environment over the litigation.

Given the significant delay in bringing the motion and the prejudice to the defendants, the court refused to set aside the dismissal.

In a refusals motion arising from discovery in a pharmaceutical product liability action, the court addressed one remaining question concerning whether related United States claims involving the same drug were similar to the claims advanced in Ontario.

The court held the question, as pressed in submissions, was vague and in substance sought disclosure of the criteria used in case-specific settlement analyses of U.S. claims.

That information was protected by settlement privilege, which extends to subsequent unrelated proceedings.

Although the moving party was unsuccessful on the argued refusal, it obtained costs on the motion because most refusals were answered only after the motion became necessary.

The moving parties sought distribution of funds held in court to the estate trustee so that estate accounts could be passed.

The responding party opposed the motion and attempted, through his factum, to revive damages claims against the estate arising from lost income associated with estate rental properties.

The court held that the prior motion had been dismissed by the Court of Appeal and could not be reheard on a supplemented record because the matter was res judicata.

The funds were ordered paid out to the estate trustee in trust for the estate, while any remaining personal damages claim against the individual defendant could proceed to trial or by summary procedure.

The applicant commercial tenant sought relief from forfeiture and an injunction against eviction, arguing the landlord orally agreed to defer rent payments until the tenant resolved third-party litigation.

The respondent landlord denied the agreement and relied on a subsequent written settlement agreement negotiated by counsel, which the tenant breached.

The court found no indefinite oral agreement to defer rent and held that the written settlement agreement, despite missing a word, was unambiguous in context and binding.

The court also held the tenant was bound by his solicitor's ostensible authority.

The application was dismissed and the interim injunction dissolved.

The defendant brought a motion for security for costs and a stay of previous costs orders made against him.

The plaintiff had previously obtained summary judgment for indemnification regarding an estate administration and intended to withdraw the remaining claims.

The court found that ordering security for costs would have no practical significance, as the only remaining step was the plaintiff's motion to withdraw the claim.

The court also found no reason to stay the previous costs orders.

The defendant's motions were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for criminal harassment.

He argued the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to call reply evidence on a collateral issue regarding how he obtained an invitation to the complainant's dinner party.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that the reply evidence was admissible because the issue took on new significance during the defence case.

The court also found the sentence, which included a suspended sentence and three years' probation, was not clearly unreasonable given the persistent nature of the harassment.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with excess alcohol, arguing his roadside admission to being the driver was statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act and therefore inadmissible.

The summary conviction appeal court agreed the statement was compelled and its use to form reasonable grounds for a breath demand violated section 8 of the Charter.

However, the court upheld the trial judge's alternative conclusion that the breath samples were admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter, noting the driver's identity was discoverable through other witnesses.

The appeal was dismissed.