Bradley W. Miller

The respondents sought partial indemnity costs of $7,500 following an appeal.

The appellants argued no costs should be awarded due to divided success on the appeal's two issues.

The Court of Appeal awarded the respondents their requested costs, finding that they succeeded on the more significant issue regarding restrictions on the sale of shares to a third party.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on drug trafficking charges, which followed the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Police executed a search warrant at a multi-unit building but entered the respondent's basement apartment by mistake, as the warrant targeted a different unit and suspect.

Despite realizing the error, police continued searching for over an hour before obtaining a second warrant, which was also found to be facially invalid for failing to specify the unit.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the warrants were invalid and that the serious Charter breaches warranted exclusion of the evidence.

The appellant pled guilty to aggravated assault, choking, break and enter, and kidnapping, and was sentenced pursuant to a joint submission to 8 years, with 1:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Summers, the appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the principle of parity required he receive enhanced credit at a rate of 1.5:1, as his co-accused had received on appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to credit the 261 days of pre-sentence custody at a ratio of 1.5:1.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and was sentenced to one year imprisonment and two years' probation.

He appealed his conviction, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed because he expected a 45-day sentence based on his counsel's advice.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing insufficient weight was given to his traumatic brain injury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the plea was valid as the appellant knew he faced a custodial sentence, and the sentencing judge had properly considered his medical condition as a mitigating factor.

The applicant, convicted of assault, sexual assault, and uttering a death threat, applied for an order under s. 683(1)(b) of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant (his ex-wife) in aid of a potential fresh evidence application on appeal.

The applicant sought to question her about documents obtained from Citizenship and Immigration Canada post-trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding this was not an exceptional case justifying the renewed questioning of a sexual assault complainant.

The court noted the complainant had already admitted at trial to contacting immigration to have the applicant deported, and the fresh evidence argument could be made without further cross-examination.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision affirming his convictions for assault and assault with a weapon against his daughter.

He argued the trial judge erred in law by invoking the collateral facts rule to curtail cross-examination of the complainant regarding internet postings.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that second appeals in summary conviction proceedings are exceptional and the proposed ground of appeal did not raise a question of law of general significance or demonstrate a clear legal error.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals for marijuana production, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and theft of electricity.

The trial judge had excluded evidence under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter, finding police lacked reasonable grounds to arrest the passenger in the respondent's car.

On appeal, the Crown argued the police had grounds for an investigative detention, a position not advanced at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it would be unfair to allow the Crown to rely on a new factual scenario and legal theory not raised before the trial judge.

The appellant, a mature recidivist, appealed a 10-year penitentiary sentence imposed after pleading guilty to seven counts of bank robbery and one count of failing to stop at the scene of an accident.

The offences were committed while he was unlawfully at large.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to award credit for pre-sentence custody and by misapplying the principles of proportionality and totality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant was not entitled to pre-sentence custody credit under s. 719(3) because he was serving sentences for other offences during that time, and the trial judge made no error in principle regarding proportionality and totality.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for failing to stop a vehicle while being pursued by police.

He argued the summary conviction appeal judge erred in widening the offence to include momentary movement and finding that flight on foot constitutes vehicular flight.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding the appellant misstated the record regarding the vehicular stop and that the flight on foot was properly used as evidence of mens rea, not as an element of the offence.

The appellant, detained in the forensic mental health system after being found not guilty by reason of insanity, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering his continued detention.

He argued the ORB erred in finding he posed a significant threat to public safety and in failing to direct the hospital regarding a sleep deprivation issue caused by hourly bed checks.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB's decision was reasonably supported by evidence of the appellant's threatening behaviour and paranoia, and that the ORB's recommendation for an independent third-party opinion on the bed check issue was appropriate.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and related offences, as well as his 14-year sentence.

The convictions arose from a home invasion where the victim was shot in the chest.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in his treatment of a Vetrovec witness, in admitting a gun under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

He also argued the sentence violated the principle of restraint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the witness or the s. 24(2) analysis, and rejected the fresh evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the shooting was a cold-blooded assault resulting in near-fatal injuries.

The appellants appealed a judgment granting a permanent injunction restraining the appellant wife from selling her shares in her personal holding company without the consent of her former husband, and dismissing her motion for corporate governance relief.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that an implied term restricting the sale of shares was necessary to give business efficacy to the parties' separation agreement.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that under s. 148 of the Business Corporations Act, the appellant's holding company was entitled to receive audited financial statements from the specific corporation in which it held shares.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the summary conviction appeal court, arguing that the judge erred in inferring an agreement under s. 786(2) of the Criminal Code to regularize proceedings instituted beyond the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the judge had an adequate evidentiary foundation to infer the agreement.

The court held that the correctness of this conclusion raised a question of mixed fact and law, which cannot be appealed under s. 839(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appellants appealed an order recognizing the respondents' common user rights over narrow parcels of land fronting Lake Simcoe, known as the 'Slivers'.

The application judge found that the respondents, as owners of lots in the subdivision, had openly and continuously used the Slivers since 1950, satisfying the requirements under the Registry Act and Land Titles Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's assessment of the uncontradicted affidavit evidence and declining to restrict the user rights to bathing purposes.

The appellant appealed a final family law order regarding the sale of the matrimonial home, child and spousal support, and section 7 expenses.

She argued the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment, exhibiting bias, and making unconscionable substantive findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary refusal of an adjournment or in her substantive findings, and rejecting the allegations of bias.

A minor transposition error regarding the proportionate sharing of section 7 expenses was corrected.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict finding them liable for internet defamation, awarding $42,000 in damages, and a trial judge's orders granting a permanent injunction and substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions to the jury regarding defamatory meanings or malice.

The Court upheld the permanent injunction, noting the appellants' continued publication of the defamatory statements and refusal to remove them.

The jury's awards for aggravated and punitive damages were also upheld as reasonable.

The appellant and respondent, who are sisters, were involved in a long-running dispute over their deceased mother's estate.

The appellant sought to replace the respondent as Estate Trustee to pursue a claim against the respondent for breach of fiduciary duty.

A previous motion to replace the trustee with the appellant or a named friend had been dismissed.

The appellant brought a new application to appoint an unnamed independent trustee.

The motion judge dismissed the application under Rule 21, finding it was barred by issue estoppel.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming the appellant was not entitled to a second attempt to litigate substantially the same issue and that discretionary relief from issue estoppel was not warranted.

The respondent acted as an agent to assist a client in collecting insurance proceeds, agreeing to a percentage fee.

To resolve issues with clearing cheques, the appellant solicitor agreed to have the insurance cheques made payable to his firm in trust and provided an undertaking to protect the respondent's fee.

The appellants argued the undertaking applied only to a single payment and was given on behalf of the client, not personally.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the undertaking extended to future payments and was a personal promise of the solicitor, dismissing the appeal.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing their claim against the respondent bank and granting judgment to the bank on its counterclaim.

The appellants argued their procedural rights were denied because the motions judge did not follow a prior endorsement by another judge regarding a mini-trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the parties had agreed to proceed before the motions judge and the prior order was not binding.

The court upheld the finding that there was no genuine issue for trial, as the appellants had defaulted on their line of credit and mortgage loan.

The appellant, a member of a not-for-profit housing co-operative, appealed the dismissal of his application for the appointment of an inspector and a compliance order under the Co-operative Corporations Act.

He alleged a pattern of mismanagement by successive boards of directors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence of mismanagement or malfeasance to warrant intervention.

A motion to adduce fresh evidence was also dismissed as it related to issues not raised in the initial application.