Alexandra Hoy

The appellants brought a motion before the Court of Appeal.

The court dismissed the motion as unfounded, noting that the moving party would have the opportunity to challenge the lower court's decision at the scheduled appeal hearing.

Costs of $1,000 were awarded to the respondents, payable before the appeal is heard.

The appellant failed to appear in court for the hearing of his appeal, claiming he was advised by court staff that the appeal was not proceeding.

The court rejected this explanation but granted the appellant's request to withdraw the appeal.

The court noted the appeal would have failed on its merits regardless, and awarded costs of $13,000 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting his step-daughter while she was sleeping.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his testimony due to its lack of clarity and in drawing an unreasonable inference that his admitted 'thoughts' about the complainant were sexual in nature.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessment and inferences were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding it had constructively dismissed the respondent employee and awarding him $80,911.88 in damages.

The employee, a dock supervisor for 25 years, was reassigned to a newly created 'freight analyst' position with significantly reduced supervisory functions and prestige.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that this unilateral change constituted a substantial alteration of essential employment terms.

The Court also affirmed that the employee was not required to accept the new position to mitigate his damages, given the unfriendly work environment, acrimonious relationships with supervisors, and the loss of dignity associated with the demotion.

The appellant law firm performed collection work for the respondent bank under a written agreement.

Following the termination of the agreement, the parties disputed the interpretation of a provision regarding invoicing for services performed up to the termination date.

The motion judge agreed with the respondent's interpretation and granted summary judgment dismissing the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or extricable question of law in the motion judge's interpretation of the contract.

The court also held that the general duty of honesty in contractual performance recognized in Bhasin v. Hrynew did not affect the interpretation.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in his application of the Grant framework after finding a section 8 Charter breach due to the failure to disclose a confidential informant's criminal record in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The appellant also argued the trial judge misapprehended inconsistencies in the surveillance evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence.

The trial judge reasonably accepted that the officer omitted the record to protect the informant's anonymity, and the surveillance evidence consistently described activities indicative of drug transactions.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's risk assessment and disposition were reasonable and supported by reasons that bear a somewhat probing examination.

The respondent pleaded guilty to trafficking in a substance held out to be cocaine and faced a mandatory minimum sentence of one year.

The sentencing judge imposed the mandatory minimum but illegally granted 2:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Crown appealed the illegal sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, correcting the pre-sentence custody credit to the maximum permitted 1.5:1 ratio.

However, considering the Crown's failure to raise the error at sentencing, the delay in the appeal, and the fact that the respondent had already served the imposed sentence, the Court permanently stayed the execution of the remaining balance.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment in favour of the respondent bank for a credit card debt and the dismissal of his counterclaim.

The appellant argued that documents he sent to the bank constituted an accord and satisfaction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant could not unilaterally dictate the terms of repayment and finding no procedural unfairness in the denial of cross-examination where no notice of examination was served.

The appellants appealed from a judgment made at an undefended trial, arguing they were not properly served with notice of two preceding orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants had actual knowledge of the proceedings and had failed to move to set aside the underlying orders.

The court noted that an order made without notice is not a nullity but remains an order of the court until set aside.

The appellant, a resident of the United States, appealed the dismissal of her motion to dismiss or stay an action on a debt for lack of jurisdiction.

The respondent, an Ontario resident, sued the appellant for repayment of a loan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the contract was made in Ontario when the respondent received telephone confirmation of the acceptance of her offer to lend funds.

This established a presumptive connecting factor for jurisdiction simpliciter under the Van Breda framework, which the appellant failed to rebut.

The appellant appealed a spousal support order, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to impute income to the respondent and failing to consider the disposition of her business.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's decision not to impute income due to the respondent's health issues and lack of skills was a finding of fact supported by the record.

The court held there was no palpable and overriding error or error in principle to justify interfering with the discretionary support award.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for an assessment of her former family law lawyer's legal fees.

The application judge denied the application because it was filed after the 12-month statutory deadline and no special circumstances existed under s. 4(1) of the Solicitors Act.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held that the finding of special circumstances is a fact-driven exercise of judicial discretion entitled to deference.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing a motion to set aside a Consent Certificate of Assessment and Minutes of Settlement regarding $7,500 in legal fees owed to the respondent.

The respondent argued, and the appellant conceded, that the appeal lay to the Divisional Court pursuant to s. 19(1.2)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act, as the order was for a single payment of not more than $50,000.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following a motion to review an order dismissing a motion as abandoned.

Costs were fixed at $3,000 all inclusive in favour of the respondents.

The appellants advanced funds to Cash Store, a payday lending company operating under CCAA protection.

They appealed a motion judge's dismissal of their claim that they were the sole legal and beneficial owners of loan payments and accounts receivable from Cash Store's customers.

The motion judge found that the actual practices of the parties, including the payment of interest and commingling of funds, reflected a debtor-creditor relationship rather than the principal-broker relationship set out in their agreements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's factual determinations.

The moving party condominium corporation brought a motion to quash an appeal of an application judge's order appointing an arbitrator.

The responding parties sought to appeal the appointment, arguing the application judge erred in referring all issues to the arbitrator without assessing their arbitrability.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that section 10(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1991 explicitly precludes any appeal from a court's appointment of an arbitral tribunal.

The appellant, a judgment creditor of a beneficiary of an estate, sought to secure an interest in a house bequeathed by the deceased.

The deceased had granted the beneficiary only a life interest in the house.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's dismissal of the claims, finding that the beneficiary had no proprietary interest in the house for the creditor to attach.

Furthermore, the Fraudulent Conveyances Act did not apply because the deceased was never indebted to the appellant.

The appeal and costs appeal were dismissed.

Following a successful appeal, the parties were unable to resolve the costs of the motion below.

The Court of Appeal fixed the costs of the motion below at $4,500 in favour of the appellants, payable out of the proceeds of the sale of the property, noting that much of the time claimed related to necessary housekeeping matters regarding the sale.

The appellant appealed an order finding him in contempt of court, imposing a $10,000 fine payable to the estate, and dismissing his request for a passing of accounts in Brampton.

The Court of Appeal upheld the contempt finding, noting the appellant's repeated attempts to re-litigate venue constituted an abuse of process and subverted the administration of justice.

The Court also held that the lack of personal service did not invalidate the contempt finding as the appellant had actual knowledge and a full opportunity to be heard.

However, the Court set aside the $10,000 fine, ruling that civil contempt fines should be payable to the Provincial Treasurer rather than a party, and found no fine was necessary for deterrence given the three-day imprisonment already served.

The prohibition on further litigation was varied to allow steps with leave of the court.