Alexandra Hoy

The appellant, a general contractor, appealed a summary judgment dismissing its breach of contract action against a sprinkler system subcontractor as statute-barred.

The appellant argued the limitation period began when the respondent refused to pay an invoice for repair costs under a 'save harmless' clause, rather than when the water damage occurred 3.5 years prior to the lawsuit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the cause of action arose, and was discovered, when the water damage occurred and the appellant put the respondent on notice of its responsibility.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible (NCR) for a 2007 sexual assault and appealed his annual review by the Ontario Review Board, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias.

In parallel proceedings, the Superior Court overturned the NCR verdict and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the current appeal as moot, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal as the bias issue was highly fact-specific.

The appellant appealed a ruling under s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act that denied disclosure of information sought by defence counsel on the basis of informer privilege.

The incident leading to the appellant's arrest for drug possession occurred in a small community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the requested information might tend to identify the informant.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking a reduction based on fresh evidence including his assertion of Métis status, rehabilitation efforts, and time spent on bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence did not warrant a reduction.

The court noted that Aboriginal Legal Services could not confirm his status, his troubled background was already considered, and the sentence imposed for violent and sexually exploitative crimes was already at the low end of the range.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual touching and sexual assault of a young child.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the first incident occurred in his truck and that this error tainted the credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the trial judge erred regarding the location of the first incident, it did not play an essential part in the reasoning process or taint the overall credibility assessment.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to sufficiently scrutinize a key witness's evidence for reliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was aware of the weaknesses in the witness's evidence but explained why he accepted it.

The court held that the trial judge's credibility determination was entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his conviction for three historical sexual offences against a minor, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility and reliability.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's application of legal principles, noting the trial judge properly considered demeanour, level of detail, and explanations for delayed disclosure.

The appeal against conviction was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over .80, arguing that the intoxilyzer was not proven to be functioning properly because the technician used an external printer and did not check the internal printer.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the intoxilyzer was in proper working order.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere and dismissed the appeal.

Following a family law appeal in which the court removed a ten-year cap on spousal support and made support indefinite subject to variation on a material change in circumstances, the parties disputed the wording of the resulting order.

The respondent sought to preserve a deeming provision from the trial order that remarriage or three years of cohabitation would automatically constitute a material change.

The court refused to include that provision, holding that its order should track its reasons and should not fetter the discretion of a future judge on a variation application.

The appellant, a former condominium director, appealed a decision that upheld the validity of a condominium by-law allowing the board to disqualify a director for violating the Directors' Code of Ethics.

The appellant argued the by-law was unreasonable and inconsistent with the democratic principles of the Condominium Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the by-law valid as it was passed by a majority of owners and the board's power to determine ethics violations was not unreasonable.

The court also upheld the application judge's discretionary decision not to immediately reinstate the appellant, noting the issue was moot as his term had expired.

The appellant, who was 17 at the time of the offences, appealed the imposition of an adult sentence following his conviction for second degree murder and offering an indignity to a dead body.

He argued that the sentencing judge mischaracterized the jury’s implied factual findings and erred in concluding that the presumption of diminished moral culpability under the Youth Criminal Justice Act had been rebutted.

The court held that, on the evidentiary record and jury instructions, the finding that the appellant inflicted at least one stab wound reasonably flowed from the verdict.

The court further held that the sentencing judge undertook a full and balanced analysis under s. 72 of the YCJA and properly concluded that a youth sentence would not be sufficient to hold the appellant accountable.

Fresh evidence concerning rehabilitation, institutional placement, and possible transfer to Germany did not alter that conclusion.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his action against an insurer and counsel retained to defend a small claims proceeding arising from a motor vehicle accident.

He alleged intentional torts and harm arising from defence trial tactics and notice of reliance on allegedly embarrassing and irrelevant information.

The court held the action was an abuse of process, constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the small claims decision, and disclosed no cause of action because opposing counsel owed no duty of care to the opposing party.

The appeal on the merits was dismissed, leave to appeal costs was denied, and appeal costs were fixed.

The appellants, who provided personal indemnities to the respondent insurer for a Tarion bond on a condominium project, appealed a partial summary judgment ordering them to pay unpaid premiums, legal fees, and bond demands.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court rejected the appellants' arguments regarding unjust enrichment and the respondent's alleged obligation to release the bond.

The court also found no procedural error in the motion judge's decision to allow a second reply affidavit, noting the procedure was consistent with the Supreme Court's guidance in Hryniak.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for an assessment of his former solicitor's bills under the Solicitors Act.

The application judge found no 'special circumstances' to justify assessing the 12 paid bills, which were rendered over four years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or unreasonable result in the application judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption that payment indicated acceptance of the accounts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession and distribution of child pornography, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his whereabouts on a specific date when illegal content was accessed on his home computer.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence supporting the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant was home on that date.

Furthermore, the court held that even if an error occurred, it was not essential to the conviction, as the distinctive pattern of internet browsing pointed to the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for importing 1.18 kilograms of cocaine concealed in frozen fish in suitcases brought from Jamaica.

The sole issue at trial was whether the accused knew about the cocaine, as he claimed he had been duped into transporting the fish.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge improperly relied on his false customs declaration and misapprehended evidence concerning surrounding circumstances.

The Court of Appeal held that the false declaration was conduct occurring during the commission of the offence and could properly be considered as circumstantial evidence and in assessing credibility.

The court further found no misapprehension of evidence in the trial judge’s findings and upheld the inference that the appellant knew about the cocaine.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of nine years in custody for possession of cocaine, methamphetamine, and MDMA for the purpose of trafficking, and conspiracy to traffic cocaine.

He argued the sentence exceeded the range for a first offender, violated the parity principle compared to his co-accused, and overemphasized denunciation and deterrence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was justified by the totality principle, the appellant's role as a supplier with a higher quantum of drugs, and the trial judge's proper consideration of mitigating factors.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault following a group swarming attack and was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by finding he was a direct participant rather than merely a party to the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge was entitled to make independent factual findings where the jury's verdict was ambiguous, and that the 12-month sentence was entirely proper given the planned and organized nature of the attack.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge's decision dismissing his appeal against convictions for criminal harassment, uttering threats, and failure to comply with a recognizance, and reducing his sentence to nine months.

The appellant argued the appeal judge erred regarding the application of W.(D.) and the test for an unreasonable verdict.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding no errors of law, and dismissed the fresh evidence application as the proposed evidence could not reasonably be expected to change the verdict.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and sought leave to appeal his 10-month sentence.

He argued that the trial judge was biased, the verdict was unreasonable, and his trial counsel was incompetent for failing to call him or other witnesses to testify and for abandoning a section 8 Charter application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, that the verdict was reasonable based on the evidence, and that trial counsel's decisions fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance.