Alexandra Hoy

The appellant brought two motions seeking to review orders relating to security for costs, an extension of time to perfect its appeal, and a dismissal of the appeal for delay.

The underlying action involved allegations that the respondent bank was negligent for failing to notify the appellant of fraud suspicions communicated by a Polish bank.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action.

The Court of Appeal set aside the security for costs order, the order denying a further extension of time, and the Registrar's dismissal of the appeal, granting the appellant a final extension to perfect its appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order dismissing her claims against TD Canada Trust and Dan Arcand.

The appellant failed to demonstrate any error in the motion judge's conclusion that TD Canada Trust was entitled to terminate its banking relationship with the appellant.

The appellant also failed to point to any evidence sustaining her other claims for defamation and unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment and dismissed both the motion for leave to appeal and the appeal itself, awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order awarding sole custody of the parties' twelve-year-old son to the respondent, along with ancillary orders.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) that the trial judge failed to give proper weight to the son's expressed preferences; (2) that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate because they did not specifically refer to the factors in section 24(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act; and (3) that the trial judge misunderstood or misapplied the law relating to joint custody in parallel parenting mode.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no substantiation for any of the appellant's contentions and affirming the trial judge's fact-based decision.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion for leave to proceed with a motion to change a 2010 child support order and to reduce a 2012 security for costs order.

The motion judge had dismissed both requests without adequate explanation.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge's reasons were insufficient for meaningful appellate review.

The court determined that the appellant had established a prima facie case of change in circumstances warranting review of the child support order, including significant income reduction and bankruptcy.

The court allowed the appeal, granted leave to proceed with the motion to reduce security for costs, and reduced the security requirement from $59,500 to $10,000, enabling the appellant to pursue his motion to change the child support order.

The appellant appealed a sentencing order imposing 15 days in jail, to be served on weekends, for contempt of an order relating to the passing of accounts of his aunt's estate.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by considering that the appellant had not put forward a plan for adequate supervision of house arrest terms in concluding that a conditional sentence was not appropriate.

The court noted that the appellant had purged his contempt, was a lawyer with over 45 years of practice, was 73 years old with no prior convictions or contempt findings, and that his non-compliance arose from a failure to understand and appreciate the importance of complying with the order rather than callous disregard for court authority.

The sentence was suspended and set aside.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing her motion to set aside her noting in default and granting default judgment to the respondent.

The appellant argued that the motion judge erred in his assessment of the merits of her defence.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court decision, finding the appeal to be without merit and that there was no basis to interfere with the discretionary decision of the motion judge.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their negligence claim arising from a personal injury sustained during a fitness class at the respondent's facility.

The plaintiff stepped on a round dumbbell and fell.

The motion judge found that the respondents were not negligent, that the round dumbbell did not pose an unusual hazard, and that the risk of a round dumbbell rolling was obvious.

The motion judge also rejected the appellants' argument regarding a duty to warn.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment and dismissed the appeal.

On appeal from trial judge Sutherland's orders regarding spousal support and property division in a separation agreement dispute.

The trial judge found no basis to set aside the separation agreement under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act but applied the Miglin test under s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act to award modest lump sum spousal support of $143,933 despite a spousal support waiver in the agreement.

The trial judge concluded the waiver did not substantially comply with the objectives of the Divorce Act.

The father appealed seeking to set aside the property provisions; the mother cross-appealed seeking to uphold the agreement in its entirety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's application of the law to the facts.

The vendor of commercial condominium units sought a declaration that the purchaser had anticipatorily breached an agreement of purchase and sale and that the vendor was entitled to retain the deposit.

The application judge found that the agreement came to an end when both parties were unable to close on the appointed date and ordered the deposit returned.

On appeal, the vendor argued that the purchaser had anticipatorily repudiated the agreement and sought to hold the purchaser's signatory personally liable as a guarantor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the purchaser had anticipatorily repudiated the agreement, the vendor's insistence on strict performance on the scheduled date, combined with its own failure to be ready, willing and able to close on that date, resulted in the agreement terminating.

The court also rejected the personal guarantee claim against the signatory.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of human trafficking, procuring a person to offer or provide sexual services for consideration, and advertising sexual services for consideration.

The trial judge misdirected the jury on the interpretation of the statutory provisions governing these offences.

Specifically, the trial judge erred by: (1) instructing the jury to read the disjunctive conduct elements conjunctively, requiring proof of near-total control over the complainant's movements; (2) failing to distinguish between "direction" and "influence" as different degrees of coercion; and (3) improperly extending the immunity provision for advertising one's own sexual services to those who assist in such advertising.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

A judgment released on May 27, 2019 in this appeal was withdrawn due to a procedural error.

One member of the three-judge panel that heard the appeal, Justice Huscroft, was not provided with either the draft or final judgment for review or signature.

The judgment was signed in error by a justice who was not a member of the hearing panel.

The court determined that the judgment was of no force or effect and that the appeal must be re-heard by a differently constituted panel.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision striking out paragraphs from its statement of defence that pleaded the respondents' ulterior motive in bringing the action.

The respondents alleged breaches of representations and warranties and fraudulent conduct arising from a share purchase agreement for the acquisition of a European auto parts manufacturing business valued at $410 million.

The defendant claimed the respondents' true motive was to obtain an after-the-fact reduction in the purchase price due to their own financial difficulties, rather than to recover genuine damages for genuine wrongs.

The motion judge struck these allegations as irrelevant and frivolous and vexatious under rule 25.11(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and refused leave to amend.

The appellant appealed from a trial judge's orders relating to the division of net family property and spousal support in a family law matter.

The principal issues were: (1) whether the trial judge erred in discounting a $5,000,000 promissory note by 90% for equalization purposes, where the note was signed on behalf of the appellant's holding company in favour of his parents for a condominium project loan; and (2) whether the trial judge erred in awarding indefinite spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld both decisions, finding that the trial judge properly applied the law regarding contingent liabilities and exercised reasonable discretion in awarding indefinite spousal support based on the respondent's health issues and the compensatory nature of support.

A father appealed an order denying him leave to bring a motion to change a custody and access order.

The lower court had imposed a leave requirement after the father defaulted on procedural requirements.

The Court of Appeal found that the case management judge erred in denying leave after the father cured his default, particularly where the temporary order had effectively become final without a determination on the merits.

The court noted that custody and access orders require participation of both parties and consideration of the child's best interests.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was returned for a motion to change before a different judge.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for six offences committed during a shooting incident in Hamilton.

The trial judge imposed a total sentence of five years imprisonment before pre-sentence custody credit.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed material legal errors: (1) improperly reducing the sentence based on time served for related but distinct Thunder Bay offences; (2) imposing a concurrent rather than consecutive sentence for possession of a firearm while prohibited; and (3) considering irrelevant mitigating factors.

The Court allowed the appeal and substituted a sentence of seven years for the discharging offence and one year consecutive for the firearm prohibition offence, resulting in a total sentence of eight years imprisonment.

The father appealed from the dismissal of his appeal from four family law orders relating to custody and access of three children.

The lower court orders had modified the father's access from unsupervised to supervised, citing concerns about the father's conduct in disparaging the mother to the children and the sporadic nature of his visits.

The father failed to obtain required transcripts for the appeal hearing and insisted on proceeding without them.

The appeal judge dismissed the appeal as having no merit.

The father appealed, arguing denial of procedural fairness and inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness and confirming that the appeal had no merit based on the materials before the lower court judge.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a Settlement Agreement requiring payment of USD $200,000 upon satisfaction of a condition regarding the withdrawal of criminal charges in Panama.

The motion judge interpreted the condition as satisfied when the prosecutor provided written confirmation that charges were discontinued, despite an outstanding detention order/arrest warrant.

The appellant argued the motion judge misapprehended evidence and that the condition required both dismissal of charges and withdrawal of the detention order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation, finding no error in the textual analysis of the Settlement Agreement and rejecting the appellant's application to adduce fresh evidence.

The appellants appealed the motion judge's order striking their statement of claim and amended statement of claim against the Law Society of Upper Canada as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The appellants alleged that the Law Society's practice of requiring lawyers facing negligence claims to provide client files to the professional indemnity insurer violated confidentiality, privacy, and solicitor-client privilege.

The motion judge struck the pleadings without leave to amend, finding that section 9 of the Law Society Act provides statutory immunity for actions taken in good faith in the performance of statutory duties.

The appellants did not plead bad faith, which is necessary to overcome the statutory immunity.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following the breakdown of a 15-year cohabitation and 14-year marriage, the parties settled parenting issues but disputed financial matters.

After a nine-day trial, the trial judge made orders regarding equalization of net family property, post-separation adjustments, and spousal and child support, but declined to order disposition of a cottage property on First Nation land.

The father appealed nearly all orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the father's lack of candor and dishonesty were entitled to deference, and that her decisions on equalization, support, and section 7 expenses were properly reasoned and supported by evidence.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing her motion to set aside a settlement regarding property in Highland Falls, New York and finding respondents in contempt.

The motion judge had granted the respondents' cross-motion for relief permitting implementation of the settlement terms.

The appellant raised four main grounds of appeal: (1) the motion judge erred in requiring leave to bring the motion; (2) the motion judge erred in rejecting her argument that the Final Order should be set aside due to environmental dumping issues; (3) the motion judge erred in approving a Deed Transfer that created an easement not contemplated by the Final Order; and (4) the motion judge erred in approving a Conservation Easement that was substantially more restrictive than agreed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the motion judge's decision.