Robert J. Sharpe

The appellant appealed the Superior Court's dismissal of his habeas corpus application challenging the revocation of his day parole by the Parole Board of Canada.

The appellant had been released on day parole in April 2016 after serving a sentence for robbery and firearm offences, but his parole was revoked in April 2017 on the basis that he presented an undue risk to society.

The appellant contended he was detained during a parole disciplinary meeting without being informed of his right to counsel, contrary to section 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the appellant had been released on statutory release while the appeal was pending.

The court also set aside the costs order, finding that the habeas corpus application challenging parole revocation was criminal in nature rather than civil, and therefore costs could not be awarded.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a reference question regarding the constitutionality of the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, Part 5 of the Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 1.

The Act establishes a federal carbon pricing scheme applicable to provinces that have not adopted sufficiently stringent carbon pricing mechanisms.

The majority held that the Act is constitutional under the national concern branch of the Peace, Order, and Good Government power, as establishing minimum national standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is a matter of national concern.

The fuel charge and excess emissions charge were found to be valid regulatory charges, not taxes.

Justice Huscroft dissented, arguing that the Act improperly expands federal jurisdiction over greenhouse gas emissions, which are generated by virtually all provincial activities.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal negligence causing death under s. 219(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found the appellant negligent in failing to conduct a thorough daily inspection of his semi-trailer, resulting in a dual wheel detaching and striking a vehicle, fatally injuring the occupant.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in applying the legal standard for criminal negligence, and (2) the trial judge erred in using the appellant's prior compelled testimony in violation of s. 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal accepted the second ground, finding the trial judge improperly used the appellant's prior incriminating testimony to undermine his credibility and reject his defence at trial.

Appeal from a motion judge's order varying child and spousal support orders from a 1999 judgment.

The respondent sought to vary support based on changed circumstances, including health issues and reduced income.

The motion judge terminated spousal support as of December 31, 2002, based on the appellant's material change in circumstances (employment and remarriage), and reduced child support from 2004 onwards due to the respondent's declining income.

The appellant appealed the variation of support orders and the dismissal of a fraudulent conveyance application.

The respondent cross-appealed the refusal to award costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part regarding child support, dismissed the appeals regarding spousal support and fraudulent conveyances, and dismissed the cross-appeal on costs.

An appeal from a costs order against Legal Aid Ontario (LAO) as a non-party funder in a family law dispute.

The application judge found that LAO engaged in an abuse of process by failing to adequately monitor and assess the merits of the defence it was funding in a case involving a vulnerable individual.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the costs award, holding that LAO's role as a statutory funder does not expose it to non-party costs awards absent evidence of bad faith or improper purpose, and that requiring LAO to monitor litigation would impermissibly invade solicitor-client privilege and frustrate the statutory legal aid scheme.

The appellant appealed his indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender, arguing that the sentencing judge erred by rejecting a joint sentencing submission for a determinate sentence followed by a long-term supervision order.

The appellant had pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting four children in 2004 and received a determinate sentence.

While on probation, he sexually assaulted two of his own children and breached a prohibition order.

The sentencing judge imposed an indeterminate sentence based on psychiatric evidence that the appellant's pedophilia could not be managed in the community and that he posed a danger to children.

The Court of Appeal upheld the indeterminate sentence, finding that the sentencing judge properly applied the legal test and that the evidence supported the conclusion that the appellant could not be managed in the community.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his sentence of 15 years' parole ineligibility.

The victim was fatally stabbed in the head with a screwdriver during a car break-in.

The Crown's case relied on testimony from an associate that the appellant struck the fatal blow, while the appellant claimed the associate was responsible.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: admission of similar fact evidence, failure to give a proper limiting instruction on such evidence, permitting lengthy re-examination of a witness, and admission of an autopsy photograph.

The appellant also appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon following an incident on July 23, 2014, where she stabbed and bit the complainant with scissors.

The appellant was acquitted on the count of unlawful entry.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds: (1) that the trial judge failed to consider her defence of lawful ejection of trespassers under s. 35 of the Criminal Code; (2) that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of her discreditable conduct; and (3) that her assault convictions conflicted with her acquittal on the unlawful entry count.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 10 years' imprisonment imposed following his guilty plea to two counts of operating a motor vehicle while impaired and causing death, two counts of criminal negligence causing death, two counts of operating a motor vehicle while impaired and causing bodily harm, and two counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm.

The collision occurred when the appellant, heavily intoxicated and driving at 187 km/hr, ran a red light and struck another vehicle, killing two passengers and seriously injuring two others.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to seven years, finding the original sentence demonstrably unfit.

The court also set aside victim surcharges and varied the driving prohibition to eight years commencing at the end of imprisonment.

A dissenting opinion would have reduced the sentence to six years, placing greater weight on Gladue factors relating to intergenerational trauma.

The appellants failed to appear at the appeal hearing before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

Despite receiving notice of the adjournment, they did not contact the court regarding the status of the appeal.

The court reviewed the written materials and determined that the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success.

The appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed their convictions for human trafficking and procurement into prostitution.

The trial judge found that while the complainant voluntarily entered the sex trade, the appellants subsequently exercised control over her, withheld her earnings, and forced her to work against her wishes.

The appellants challenged the verdicts as unreasonable, alleging the trial judge misapprehended evidence, failed to reconcile inconsistencies, and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding ample evidence supported the verdicts and the trial judge properly addressed credibility issues and deficiencies in the complainant's evidence.

The appellant, a biological mother, sought access to her child who was adopted by the appellant's mother and her husband in 2015.

The appellant had consented to the adoption and sought no openness agreement at that time.

The application judge dismissed the application on the basis that the appellant lacked standing under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding that the appellant failed to establish either of two recognized exceptions to the rule preventing biological parents from accessing adopted children: (1) establishing a relationship with the child after adoption, or (2) receiving assurances of continued contact from the adoptive parents.

The court also found no evidence that permitting the application to proceed would be in the best interests of the child.

The appellant sought to set aside a decision by Justice Pardu refusing to extend the time to appeal a Superior Court decision.

Justice Pardu had found that the appellant demonstrated intention to appeal within the prescribed time and accepted his explanation for the delay, with no prejudice to the respondent.

However, she dismissed the motion on the sole ground that the grounds of appeal were devoid of merit.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding that the appellant's claims were directly related to his employment and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of an arbitrator under the settlement agreement.

Appeal from a Superior Court judgment dismissing claims for liability arising from the failure of a daycare business and for unjust enrichment.

The appellants alleged that the respondents caused the failure of their daycare enterprise and sought damages for losses.

The appellants also claimed unjust enrichment based on renovations made to the leased premises.

The trial judge found that the appellants failed to prove the respondents caused the business failure and that the appellants' testimony was less credible than that of the respondent.

The appellants were in default of four months' rent when the lease was terminated.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact and dismissed the appeal.

A commercial cold storage lease dispute concerning the interpretation of an energy cost pass-through clause and the tenant's right to renew.

The tenant failed to pay claimed increased energy costs, which the landlord characterized as a default preventing lease renewal.

The application judge found the tenant in breach and declined to grant relief from forfeiture due to lack of due diligence.

On appeal, the tenant challenged only the relief from forfeiture decision, arguing the wrong legal test was applied.

The appellate court upheld the decision, confirming that relief from forfeiture in lease renewal contexts requires a narrower test than the standard three-pronged approach, and that the tenant must demonstrate diligent efforts to comply with lease terms.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their claim against the respondent by way of summary judgment.

The claim arose from a management buyout of Xtreme Labs, where the appellants were directors and shareholders.

The respondent had been engaged to provide a valuation of the company, which the appellants alleged significantly undervalued the business, causing them loss.

The motion judge dismissed the claim on the basis that the engagement letter excluded any duty of care owed to the appellants in their capacity as shareholders.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's analysis of the engagement letter, the evidentiary burden, or the appropriateness of summary judgment.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent mortgagee enforcement of a mortgage following the appellants' default in transferring and further encumbering the mortgaged property without consent.

The appellants argued that the mortgagee waived the default by accepting three months of payments after giving notice of default.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that accepting payments did not constitute waiver under the mortgage terms or at law.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of a concession regarding pre-judgment interest on a line of credit.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application to annul the bankruptcy of Katherine Anne Fast under section 181(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The respondents were neighbours who obtained a Small Claims Court judgment against the appellants for water damage.

Mrs. Fast filed for voluntary bankruptcy shortly after the appellants attempted to enforce the judgment.

The application judge dismissed the annulment application, finding that despite the appellants' evidence that Mrs. Fast's property was worth significantly more than disclosed and that her assets exceeded her liabilities, she had a monthly income-expense deficit.

The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that Mrs. Fast was not an insolvent person as defined by the BIA because her substantial assets were available to satisfy all her liabilities and there was no evidence she could not meet her obligations as they came due.

The appellants failed to appear at the appeal hearing and did not comply with the court's previous endorsement directing specific steps to be taken.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal with costs fixed at $21,234.33, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant, a teacher at a private school, appealed the dismissal of her constructive dismissal claim by way of summary judgment.

She alleged that the respondent school altered the terms of her employment by failing to protect her from a confrontation with a student's parents over a mark, undermining her authority by having another teacher read and mark assignments, and assigning passing grades to students who had not completed all assignments.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissal, finding no evidence that the school altered the terms of employment or breached any policy, and that the school's response to the appellant's complaints was measured and reasonable.