Robert A. Blair

An appeal from a trial judgment finding that the respondents had established title to a disputed strip of land by adverse possession.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's factual findings regarding the presence of a chain link fence that defined the boundary during the relevant ten-year period.

The appellants also sought to introduce fresh evidence consisting of expert opinion based on aerial photographs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the factual findings and rejecting the motion to adduce fresh evidence as late-filed and insufficiently reliable.

The appellant, acquitted of all charges after a jury trial, appealed a summary judgment dismissing his civil claim against the Toronto Police Services Board and police officers for negligent investigation and perjury.

The motion judge found several claims statute-barred and determined the appellant adduced no evidence capable of supporting the remaining claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that while acquittal is a necessary condition for a negligent investigation claim, it is not sufficient; there must also be evidence of a breach of the standard of care of a reasonable police officer.

The appellant failed to adduce such evidence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a conviction for dangerous driving that was upheld on summary conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that neither proposed ground of appeal met the merits threshold.

The first ground challenged the trial judge's rejection of expert evidence regarding reaction time, which the trial judge was entitled to reject and which was irrelevant to the facts as found.

The second ground challenged the reasonableness of the verdict, which also failed the merits test.

The court noted that dangerous driving law is well-settled and each case turns on its own facts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old complainant, claiming he believed she was 16.

The trial judge found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant did not take all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age.

The sole ground of appeal was ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging trial counsel should have forensically examined a MicroSD card containing a purported message indicating the complainant was 16.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice from counsel's alleged incompetence.

The Court also struck the s. 161(1)(c) order on sentencing appeal as the relevant provisions came into effect after the offences were committed.

Appeal from conviction for robbery and sentence imposed by Justice Eugene Ewaschuk on June 14 and June 29, 2010.

The appellant was convicted of robbery but acquitted of using an imitation firearm.

The appeal raised five grounds challenging the trial judge's conduct during cross-examination of the Crown's key witness, jury instructions on memory loss due to fear, absence of motive to fabricate, elements of the offence, and criticism of defence counsel's closing analogy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in applying the Truth in Sentencing Act to calculate pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellants (Iran and related entities) appealed orders of the Superior Court of Justice recognizing and enforcing U.S. judgments obtained by victims of terrorism against Iran for its sponsorship of terrorist attacks.

The respondents sought to enforce these judgments in Ontario under the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (JVTA) and amendments to the State Immunity Act (SIA).

Iran challenged the recognition and enforcement of the judgments on multiple grounds, including arguments regarding state immunity, the temporal scope of the JVTA, proof requirements, limitation periods, jurisdiction, public policy, diplomatic immunity, and the appropriateness of costs awards.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Iran's appeal, save for judgments arising from terrorist attacks that occurred prior to January 1, 1985, which could not be enforced under the JVTA.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking.

The trial judge had refused to exclude evidence of cocaine and cash seized during a vehicle stop for a Highway Traffic Act offence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in his analysis of whether the appellant's detention became unlawful (s. 9 breach) after the HTA investigation concluded and a groundless criminal investigation commenced.

The court also found a prolonged s. 10(b) breach (right to counsel) lasting over 30 minutes.

Applying the Grant factors for s. 24(2) exclusion analysis, the court determined that the serious Charter breaches and their impact on the appellant's rights outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal.

The appellant appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice dated March 24, 2016.

The Court of Appeal, in accordance with the agreement of counsel, awarded costs to the respondents in the amount of $10,000, all inclusive.

The appellant appealed his convictions for theft, robbery, uttering threats, breach of recognizance, and choking to overcome resistance, as well as seeking leave to appeal his sentence of 30 months imprisonment less two months pre-trial custody credit.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on eyewitness testimony and the complainant's evidence regarding an altercation in which the appellant kicked and punched the complainant, demanded his wallet, and threatened to "rip his throat out." The appellant's self-defence claim was rejected.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions and the sentence, finding no palpable or overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or legal analysis.

The appellant Ledore Investments Limited appealed from a Superior Court judgment that set aside a commercial arbitration award.

The underlying dispute arose from final subcontract accounting in a major bridge construction project, where the respondent Ellis-Don Construction Ltd. was the general contractor and the appellant was a subcontractor supplying steel.

The central issue concerned whether Ellis-Don had made a written claim for delay costs within the time required by Article 15.1(a) of the subcontract.

The arbitrator found that Ellis-Don had not made an actual claim in writing, distinguishing between an intention to claim and an actual claim.

The appeal judge reversed the arbitrator's award, finding the arbitrator had misapplied legal principles from Doyle Construction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the arbitrator's interpretation of Article 15.1(a) was eminently reasonable and reinstated the arbitration award.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her civil action against the Toronto Police Services Board and Detective Constable Andrew MacPhail for wrongful arrest and negligent investigation.

The appellant had been charged with threatening death and intimidation in connection with threatening letters and harassing phone calls made to a school, but was ultimately acquitted at trial and required to enter into a Peace Bond.

The motion judge found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and charge the appellant, and therefore granted summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the motion judge properly applied the summary judgment test and that ample evidence supported the finding of reasonable and probable grounds.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment upholding a Sharia Law-based arbitration award rendered in Iran regarding a property dispute between brothers.

The trial judge found that the appellants had clearly agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's judgment, all four conditions for a binding Sharia Law ruling had been met, and the appellants were estopped from relitigating the same issues in Ontario.

The appellants argued the International Commercial Arbitration Act should apply, but the trial judge found the application was out of time and, in any event, there was no unfairness in the arbitral proceeding.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding no error and deferring to the trial judge's factual findings.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's dismissal of its claims for conversion, detinue, passing off, unjust enrichment, and unlawful interference with economic interests.

The appeal concerned equipment purchased by the respondent under a licence agreement that contained a first option to purchase clause.

The appellant failed to serve written notice of its intention to purchase the equipment within the required 60-day period following termination of the agreement.

The court upheld the trial judge's dismissal, finding that the appellant's claims for conversion and detinue could not succeed and that there was insufficient evidence to support the damages claims.

The appellant did not attend for argument of the appeal and advised the respondents' counsel that she would not be attending.

The appellant was self-represented, having filed a Notice of Intention to Act in person.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned, and the respondents were awarded costs in the amount of $9,000, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a jury trial.

The complainant, a child, testified at trial but became unresponsive during cross-examination and refused to answer defence counsel's questions.

The trial judge declined to declare a mistrial or grant a stay of proceedings, instead admitting the complainant's testimony from the preliminary inquiry and providing a cautionary jury instruction regarding the absence of cross-examination.

The appellant appealed on two grounds: (1) that the trial judge erred in not declaring a mistrial, and (2) that the trial judge erred in excluding expert evidence regarding false subjective memory in children.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to balance the accused's right to make a full answer and defence with the special needs of a young witness in a sexual abuse case.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision enforcing a settlement agreement between the parties.

The respondent had lent $6,000,000 to the appellant via a vendor take-back mortgage that matured on May 7, 2016.

Upon default, the respondent offered a settlement for $6,162,950.45, which included principal, interest, three months' interest compensation, receivership costs, and legal fees.

The appellant paid the full amount and received a discharge of the mortgage.

Three days later, the appellant disputed the amount charged and sought relief from certain costs.

The motion judge enforced the settlement, finding the terms were clear and the appellant had accepted them without condition or protest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the enforceability of the settlement agreement and rejecting arguments regarding unconscionability and violations of the Interest Act.

Motions for leave to appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing a motion to require Algoma to resume payments under a Cargo Handling Agreement in the context of CCAA proceedings.

The applicants sought to invoke section 11.01(a) of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to compel payment for post-filing services.

The motion judge had dismissed the motion three times on the same legal grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the leave motions, finding no prima facie merit due to issue estoppel and no significance to the practice, as the issues were specific to the unique agreements underlying the Port Transaction.

An appellant appealed a disposition decision of the Ontario Review Board dated June 7, 2016, which declined to modify the conditions of his detention order to provide broader community access privileges.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for second degree murder and was detained at a mental health facility.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the Board failed to consider readily available and relevant information from the original NCR hearing; and second, that the disposition was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was reasonable and that the NCR hearing information was not material to the narrow issue before the Board regarding whether the appellant's risk could be managed through modified detention terms.

The appellant appealed his sentence for break and enter to commit theft and break and enter with intent.

He had pleaded guilty and received a suspended sentence with two years' probation, with pre-sentence custody credited at 1.5:1 (198 days from 132 days).

The enhanced credit resulted in a custodial sentence exceeding 180 days, triggering mandatory deportation as a convention refugee and barring him from appealing the deportation order.

Fresh evidence on appeal demonstrated that trial counsel failed to appreciate the immigration consequences of the enhanced credit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on consent of the Crown and reduced the pre-sentence custody credit by 19 days to 179 days, thereby avoiding the immigration consequences.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug trafficking offences and firearm-related offences, as well as seeking leave to appeal his sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the application judge's Charter ruling regarding the sufficiency of the information to obtain for a search warrant and the application of s. 24(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the application judge's analysis.

On the sentence appeal, the Court granted leave and allowed the appeal in part, reducing the sentence for the s. 86(1) firearm offence from two years to one year imprisonment concurrent, as the original sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for a first offender.

The Court upheld the trial judge's characterization of the appellant as a mid-level drug dealer based on the evidence.