Peter D. Lauwers

The appellants appealed an order under the Business Corporations Act setting the fair market value of shares in a corporation and directing a buyout.

The appellants argued the application judge erred in valuing a specific property at $400,000 without providing adequate reasons for selecting that figure among competing appraisals.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that meaningful appellate review was impossible due to the lack of explanation.

Furthermore, the application judge committed a palpable and overriding error by inserting the lower property value into a valuation model without adjusting the corresponding tax consequences.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new determination of the property's value.

The appellant appealed a trial decision dismissing his claim for $25,000 on a promissory note and awarding the respondent $10,030 on a counterclaim for construction defects.

The trial judge found the promissory note lacked consideration and was obtained by misrepresentation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or assessment of damages.

The appellant massage therapist appealed a decision of the Discipline Panel finding him guilty of professional misconduct for authorizing an employee to issue false receipts.

He argued the panel erred by convicting him on a different theory of liability than advanced by the prosecutor and erred in its factual findings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of procedural fairness as the appellant knew the case he had to meet, and holding that the panel's credibility findings and ultimate conclusion were reasonable.

The defendant lottery authority brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing an action in which the plaintiff alleged he was deprived of a $1 million instant lottery prize after leaving a purported winning ticket with a retailer clerk.

The plaintiff asserted breach of contract against the lottery authority and discontinued claims against the retailer defendants.

The court held that under the rules of the lottery game, a claimant must present the winning ticket to claim a prize and that a lost or stolen ticket is void unless the authority exercises its discretion to accept it.

The authority had conducted investigations and reasonably declined to exercise that discretion, and there was no evidence supporting the allegation that the retailer stole a winning ticket.

In any event, the action was statute‑barred under the applicable limitation periods.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the claim.

The Divisional Court determined it lacked jurisdiction over the cross appeal.

Because the appeal and cross appeal were intertwined, the court adjourned both matters without a fixed date so they could be heard together following a motion under section 6(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Enforcement of the payment order was stayed pending further order.

The appellant farmer appealed a decision of the Fire Safety Commission that upheld an inspection order imposing conditions on open air burning of brush on his property.

The appellant argued the Commission erred in its interpretation of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act by not requiring proof that a fire 'would seriously endanger' health and safety before imposing conditions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Commission's interpretation of the Act was correct and its factual findings regarding the necessity of the conditions were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The applicant sought judicial review to quash a Direction to Exclude issued by the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario.

The applicant argued that the Board lacked jurisdiction, breached procedural fairness by not holding an oral hearing, and made an unreasonable decision based on inadmissible evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had previously agreed to the rescission of an earlier direction and to proceed by written submissions.

The court held that the standard of review was reasonableness and that the Board's decision was reasonable given that the core allegations were undisputed.

The applicant, a registered nurse, sought judicial review of a decision by the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) of the College of Nurses of Ontario, which issued a Letter of Caution and required remediation.

The College conceded that the ICRC breached procedural fairness by relying on witness statements without disclosing them to the applicant or providing an opportunity to respond.

The Divisional Court quashed the ICRC's decision and remitted the matter for a fresh determination, while dismissing the applicant's other jurisdictional and Charter arguments.

The applicant, a paralegal candidate, sought judicial review of a Law Society Hearing Panel decision that quashed his motion challenging the constitutional validity of By-law 4 during his good character hearing.

The Hearing Panel had concluded it lacked institutional competence to conduct broad constitutional inquiries into the governance of the Society.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, agreeing that the Hearing Panel correctly held it had no jurisdiction to deal with the broad issue of the by-law's validity, and that such questions are appropriately raised before a court of original jurisdiction.

The applicant, a pipe fitter, was seriously injured in a gas explosion and commenced a civil action for damages.

The respondents brought a 'right to sue' application before the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT), which determined the applicant was a worker, not an independent contractor, and thus barred from suing.

The applicant sought judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the WSIAT's decision was reasonable, grounded in evidence, and properly applied the legal test for independent contractor status.

The appellant home builder appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent purchasers $2,147.64 for disputed closing costs.

The dispute centered on the interpretation of a schedule in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale regarding whether closing costs were capped and included in the purchase price or payable as an extra.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness in the trial judge's admission of parol evidence regarding misrepresentations by the builder's agents, as the issue was sufficiently raised in the pleadings.

The court also held that the agreement contained an ambiguity, justifying the trial judge's reliance on extrinsic evidence of the negotiating history to interpret the contract in favour of the purchasers.

The plaintiff appealed a decision upholding a Master's refusal to strike an affidavit.

During cross-examination on the affidavit, the witness's counsel adjourned the examination so the witness could consult with another lawyer.

When cross-examination resumed, the witness refused to answer questions about the consultation, claiming solicitor-client privilege.

The Divisional Court held that the Master erred by placing the onus on the plaintiff to prove interference with the witness's evidence without requiring the defendants to elect whether to waive privilege or withdraw the evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the decisions below set aside, and the matter remitted to the Master.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Racing Commission that reinstated the original results of a horse race, overturning a prior decision by the track Stewards regarding interference.

The applicants argued they were denied procedural fairness due to lack of notice, alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias, and challenged the tribunal's findings of fact.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding that actual notice was established, there was no evidence of bias, and the tribunal's factual findings were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The applicant brought a motion to set aside an order quashing his application for judicial review of a family arbitration award.

He argued that recent amendments to the Family Law Act meant family arbitrators exercise a statutory power of decision, giving the court jurisdiction under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, affirming that family arbitrators derive their authority from private consensual agreements, not statute, and therefore do not exercise a statutory power of decision.

The appellant sought leave to appeal two interlocutory orders that adjourned her motion to discontinue a civil action sine die pending a jurisdictional determination by the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal.

The Divisional Court heard the motion for leave and found that the appellant failed to satisfy the test under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

There was no conflicting decision on a legal principle, and no reason to doubt the correctness of the procedural order, which did not raise an issue of importance.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal directing the revocation of his motor vehicle dealer registration.

The Tribunal found the appellant demonstrated willful blindness regarding stolen vehicles found on his lot and noted several Highway Traffic Act convictions indicating a lack of honesty and integrity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Tribunal's credibility findings or its reliance on the appellant's past conduct.

The self-represented applicant sought an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a prior order.

The applicant had missed the deadline due to mistaken advice and confusion over obtaining case conference transcripts.

The court found the applicant had a continuous intention to appeal and that the delay was adequately explained.

The court granted a 30-day extension to file the leave motion materials, conditional upon the applicant first paying several outstanding costs orders from previous proceedings.

The mother sought leave to appeal an interim order that transferred the primary residence of the child to the father.

The motion judge had relied heavily on a report from the Office of the Children's Lawyer, which raised serious concerns about the mother's mental health, specifically her schizophrenia and medication non-compliance.

The mother argued that the motion judge erred in relying on the untested report to change the status quo prior to trial.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the interim decision and noting that the case was fact-driven and did not raise matters of public importance warranting appellate review.

The applicant father sought an extension of time to appeal a 2008 order finding his child in need of protection and making her a Crown ward.

The child had since been placed for adoption and the adoption finalized.

The respondent Society relied on section 69(5) of the Child and Family Services Act, which prohibits extending the time for an appeal where a child has been placed for adoption.

The court found no procedural unfairness or other basis to circumvent the statutory bar and dismissed the motion.

The respondent husband sought leave to appeal a temporary order requiring him to pay $2,700 per month in child and spousal support based on an imputed income of $60,000.

The husband argued the support amounts significantly exceeded the Child Support Guidelines and Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines for that income level, and that the motion judge improperly relied on previous 'without prejudice' consent orders.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the order and that the issues were of sufficient importance.

The court also granted a partial stay, reducing the ongoing support obligations pending the appeal, provided the husband paid the arrears.