Peter D. Lauwers

The appellant appealed a decision upholding a municipal by-law that restricted the operating hours of licensed body rub parlours.

The appellant argued the City acted unreasonably and lacked sufficient evidence connecting the nuisance to licensed operations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that under section 213 of the City of Toronto Act, 2006, the by-law is not reviewable on the ground of reasonableness, and finding no palpable or overriding error in the application judge's evidentiary findings.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's reasons, noting that the appellants essentially reargued the motion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The applicant, charged with accessory after the fact to murder, was denied bail on the secondary ground.

After a year in pre-trial custody, she brought a second bail application based on a change in circumstances, which the Superior Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, holding that only the Court of Appeal could review the decision under s 680 of the Criminal Code.

On review, the Court of Appeal held that the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal have concurrent jurisdiction to hear a second bail application based on a change in circumstances.

The Court found a material change in circumstances due to the significant trial delay and the applicant's changed personal circumstances, and ordered her release on strict conditions.

The appellants brought an action against a mortgage broker and its professional liability insurer for damages arising from the broker's alleged fraud.

The insurer rescinded the policy due to material misrepresentations made by the broker during the application process.

The appellants appealed the summary judgment dismissing their action against the insurer, arguing that an undertaking given by the insurer to the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) to provide fraud coverage negated the right of rescission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the misrepresentations were material, the FSCO undertaking was predicated on a valid policy, and relief from forfeiture was unavailable because the misrepresentations constituted non-compliance with a condition precedent.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their application to assess the legal accounts rendered by the respondent law firm.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in concluding there were no special circumstances to permit the assessment.

The court noted the application judge failed to account for an admitted 15% discount that may not have been honoured and the existence of an escrow agreement securing the disputed amount.

Leave was granted to assess all accounts rendered by the respondent.

The appellants appealed an order granting an injunction.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellants presented a plausible explanation for their failure to file materials in Hamilton, thereby meeting the second branch of the Lenskis test.

The appeal was allowed, and the injunction and the lower court's order were set aside.

The appellants appealed an order permanently staying their Counter Application.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's determination that the Counter Application had no reasonable prospect of success and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court judgment recognizing an international commercial arbitral award in favour of the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's reasons.

Although the appellant's proposed fresh evidence met the Palmer test for admission, the Court found it unnecessary to consider it to reach its conclusion.

Costs of $7,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for an annulment.

The parties agreed the marriage was never consummated, but the application judge required independent evidence of incurability.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a reasonable inference of the respondent's psychological inability to consummate the marriage was sufficient to grant the annulment.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision regarding amendments to their Statement of Defence, the issuance of a Third Party claim, and the discharge of Certificates of Pending Litigation (CPLs).

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's rulings on the pleadings and third party claim, agreeing that the proposed limitation defence had already been rejected by the court in a prior proceeding.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred in concluding he lacked jurisdiction to consider discharging the CPLs on the ground of non-disclosure due to res judicata.

The Court held that the issue had not been squarely dealt with and permitted the appellants to bring the motion before the case management judge.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision striking her statement of claim as an abuse of process.

The underlying action was an attempt to re-litigate a boundary dispute that had been resolved by minutes of settlement and mutual releases in 2006.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment on a promissory note related to the sale of a business.

The motion judge had found the appellant in default, struck the Statement of Defence, and ordered a trial of an issue to determine the net amount owing, to be heard with a related injunction application regarding the seizure and sale of assets.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was not precluded from arguing that the seizure and sale were unlawful.

The Court found that striking the Statement of Defence was inconsistent with ordering a trial of an issue.

The appeal was allowed in part to reinstate the Statement of Defence and substitute an order finding the appellant in default.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the lower court's decision to dismiss the application without prejudice to the appellant's right to bring an action.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding it had constructively dismissed the respondent employee by transferring him from Vice President of Operations to Purchasing Manager.

The trial judge awarded 24 months' notice and found the employee was not required to mitigate by accepting the new role.

The Court of Appeal upheld the constructive dismissal finding and the notice period.

On mitigation, the Court held that while the principle of efficient breach might apply, the employer failed to trigger the mitigation duty because it did not offer the employee a clear opportunity to work out the notice period after he claimed constructive dismissal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a family law judgment, arguing the trial judge erred in handling a child's statement regarding inappropriate sexual conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the Children's Aid Society had fully investigated the concerns and closed its file.

The court also declined to admit fresh evidence relating to events after the original order, advising the appellant to bring a motion to change if circumstances had altered.

The respondent was acquitted at trial of several driving offences causing death and bodily harm, with the trial judge finding reasonable doubt as to whether the respondent or his passenger was driving at the time of the fatal collision.

The Crown appealed the acquittals, arguing the trial judge made errors of law in his treatment of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge misapprehended key eyewitness testimony and failed to consider the totality of the evidence, instead applying the reasonable doubt standard in a piecemeal fashion to individual pieces of evidence.

The appellant challenged an order refusing to stay an Ontario application for spousal support and a beneficial ownership declaration respecting Ontario cottage properties.

Applying the real and substantial connection framework, the court held that Ontario had jurisdiction because the property was located in Ontario and the parties were ordinarily resident in Ontario as well as Florida during the final years of the relationship.

The court further held that the appellant failed to establish that Florida was clearly the more appropriate forum, including because the respondent would lose a legitimate juridical advantage on support under Florida law.

Ontario law was also properly applied to both the unjust enrichment and support claims.

The appellants appealed from an order dismissing claims arising from the alleged creation of individual employment contracts after expiry of a collective agreement.

The Court of Appeal substantially agreed with the motion judge's reasons and held that the Employment Standards Act claim, advanced on the same contractual premise as the other claims, was no more tenable on the pleaded facts or in law.

The court noted that the motion judge had not determined any specific statutory entitlement under the Act.

The appeal was dismissed with agreed costs to the respondent.

The appellant secured creditor appealed an order permitting the respondent lien claimant to realize on proceeds from the auction sale of horses despite giving less than the two weeks' newspaper notice required by the Innkeepers Act.

The Court of Appeal held that estoppel by convention was available as a matter of law and was compatible with the statutory purpose of preserving a lien for unpaid horse-care charges.

The owner had notice and an opportunity to redeem, no public complaint arose, and the appellant knew of and was content with the sale proceeding as scheduled while intending to claim excess funds.

In those circumstances, the notice defect did not nullify the respondent's lien and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged a motion judge’s ruling that Ontario courts had jurisdiction over an action alleging conspiracy to commit fraud.

The Court of Appeal held that the record disclosed tortious conduct with an essential part occurring in Toronto, including a renegotiation agreement and losses arising from it, thereby engaging the presumptive connecting factors that the tort was committed in Ontario and that a contract connected with the dispute was made in Ontario.

The court also accepted evidence linking the appellant to the movement of the respondent’s funds through a company partly owned by the appellant and into the appellant’s personal account.

The appeal was dismissed and costs were fixed in favour of the respondent.