Paul S. Rouleau

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing death following a judge-alone trial.

After a hockey game in Pembroke, Ontario, the appellant accelerated from a traffic light at a high rate of speed on a city street where heavy pedestrian traffic was crossing mid-block.

His vehicle struck two pedestrians, killing one.

The trial judge found the appellant was driving at approximately 60 km/h in a 50 km/h zone and that the manner of driving was dangerous to the public.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that while the trial judge properly analyzed the actus reus of dangerous driving, he failed to adequately analyze the mens rea element by not explaining how and in what way the appellant's driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the circumstances.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for threats to cause death and bodily harm to his biological mother, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition requiring him to remain detained in the secure forensic unit of the Brockville Mental Health Centre with only supervised access to the hospital grounds.

The appellant accepted the detention requirement but objected to the supervised access restriction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding it was within the range of reasonable outcomes based on the appellant's high risk to reoffend, anti-social behaviour, serious criminal record, high psychopathy score, and potentially unassessed sadistic paraphilia.

Appeal of a motion to change order concerning spousal support and a contempt motion.

The trial judge terminated spousal support for approximately two years and awarded support below the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAGs) range, relying on an unimplemented settlement agreement reached during trial.

The trial judge also dismissed a contempt motion regarding the cancellation of a required life insurance policy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by departing from the SSAGs without adequate justification and by using the negotiated settlement as a reference point.

The court also found the respondent in contempt for deliberately cancelling the life insurance policy without consent or court order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the sentence imposed.

The appellant argued that the guilty verdict was unreasonable, that the photographic identification procedure was flawed, that the DNA evidence was weak and that the trial judge misunderstood its limitations, and that it was unreasonable for the judge to conclude that the appellant's two-hour flight from police could not be explained by a license plate issue or traffic violation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly considered the identification issues, correctly understood the limitations of DNA evidence, and reasonably concluded there was no plausible alternative to the appellant's guilt based on the totality of the evidence.

The Children's Lawyer for Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an Information and Privacy Commissioner's order that the Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) had custody or control of the Children's Lawyer's litigation records relating to child clients, and therefore such records were subject to freedom of information access requests under FIPPA.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Children's Lawyer operates independently from MAG with respect to her core functions of representing children, and therefore MAG does not have custody or control of child client records.

The court emphasized the importance of confidentiality in the Children's Lawyer-child relationship to the proper functioning of the legal system and the best interests of children.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding him in breach of a real estate purchase and sale agreement for a property in Niagara-on-the-Lake.

The appellant, who was the tenant in possession and assignee of a third mortgage, argued he was entitled to extend the closing date beyond the agreed closing time of 2:30 p.m. on February 24, 2017.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that time was of the essence in the agreement and the appellant was not ready, willing, and able to close at the agreed time.

The court rejected the appellant's argument that he could unilaterally extend the closing date after failing to complete at the specified time.

The appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant, a dangerous offender, appealed his sentence of 10 years imprisonment followed by 10 years long-term supervision.

He argued that the custodial portion was unfit because the hearing judge improperly determined its length based on the time needed for rehabilitative programming rather than applying traditional sentencing principles of proportionality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that in dangerous offender proceedings under Part XXIV of the Criminal Code, hearing judges may impose fixed-term sentences exceeding the normal range for the predicate offence to ensure access to necessary treatment programs in a penitentiary, subject to three constraints: the statutory maximum for the predicate offence, applicable sentencing principles, and evidence-based nexus to public protection.

The appellants appealed an order of Justice Price of the Superior Court of Justice dated September 28, 2017.

Following questioning from the appellate panel, the appellants abandoned their appeal.

The respondents were awarded costs of the appeal in the all-inclusive amount of $5,000.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board declaring him unfit to stand trial and ordering his detention at the Brockville Mental Health Centre.

The appellant did not contest his unfitness or the finding that he posed a significant risk to the community due to serious mental illness, but argued he should be transferred to the Royal Ottawa Mental Health Centre instead.

The Court of Appeal found the Review Board erred by failing to investigate when the complainant would be discharged from the Royal Ottawa Centre, which was the primary basis for the transfer order.

The court also identified unresolved questions regarding the appellant's linguistic rights under the Criminal Code and the French Language Services Act.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the Review Board for a new hearing.

A lessor of vehicles sought to establish that it was entitled to third-party liability insurance coverage under an automobile insurance policy issued by the respondent insurer.

The dispute centered on whether an OPCF 5 endorsement, which permits lessors to lease vehicles and provides coverage to both lessors and lessees, was part of the Certificate of Automobile Insurance.

The application judge found the endorsement was not part of the policy.

The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the Certificate contained the phrase "AS PER OPCF 5 FORMS" which the insurer had added to its standard form, and that this language, combined with the commercial context of the transaction, demonstrated the insurer's intent to provide liability coverage to both the lessor and lessee.

The appellant was charged with speeding contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act following a motor vehicle collision that resulted in a fatality.

At the first appearance, the justice of the peace noticed that the information contained a defective date (November 18, 2017 instead of November 18, 2016) and quashed the information of his own motion without considering amendment procedures or granting the Crown an opportunity to make submissions.

The Crown sought certiorari, and the Superior Court judge found the justice of the peace had committed jurisdictional error.

The appellant appealed, arguing the circumstances were analogous to London v. Young and that sections 34 and 36 of the Provincial Offences Act did not apply at a first appearance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the justice of the peace erred in law by quashing the information without following the statutory amendment and quashing procedures, and by failing to afford the Crown procedural fairness.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order denying her motion to set aside a summary judgment award of $466,420.22 granted against her for fraud and theft.

The appellant argued she was not properly served with the Statement of Claim and therefore lacked an opportunity to defend.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to deny the motion to set aside, finding the appellant was responsible for failing to update her address for service and had actual notice of the proceedings.

However, the Court of Appeal found merit in the appellant's challenge to the quantification of damages and reduced the award to $289,740.39 by correcting three calculation errors relating to the appellant's fractional ownership interest in property and personal expense claims.

Two appellants were convicted following a jury trial for their roles in an armed robbery of a drug dealer's residence in Barrhaven.

During the robbery, one of the perpetrators shot and killed the resident.

The first appellant was convicted of first degree murder; the second appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

On appeal, the first appellant's conviction was upheld.

However, the second appellant's conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered due to errors in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the mens rea requirement for party liability to murder under section 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed its negligence claim against multiple defendants for delay in service.

The claim involved construction defects discovered in 2012 and issued in 2014 but not served within the required six-month period.

The appeal judge reversed the master's decision, finding palpable and overriding errors of fact and law.

However, the Court of Appeal found that the appeal judge's decision was based on a transcription error in the master's reasons (where "institutional" was incorrectly transcribed as "individual"), which created a false inconsistency.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the master's decision, finding that the master properly applied the legal principles regarding delay and prejudice.

The appellant appealed an order of Justice Petersen dismissing the entire action against multiple defendants.

All respondents except Mr. Rabie consented to setting aside the order.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge had misapprehended the status of the action against Mr. Rabie, incorrectly believing he was no longer a defendant.

A default judgment against Mr. Rabie had been set aside in July 2017 regarding the breach of fiduciary duty claim, which was ordered to proceed to trial.

Mr. Rabie had not opposed the status motion or the litigation timetable order.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the dismissal order, and ordered the parties to attend a status hearing to establish a litigation timetable.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their negligence action arising from an injury sustained at a municipal winter festival.

The plaintiff was injured when she struck a piece of hardened ice protruding from a snow slide at the City of Barrie's Winterfest event.

The trial judge found that while the injury was caused by the ice, the municipality had not breached the standard of care in maintaining the slide.

The appellants raised three grounds of appeal challenging the characterization of the ice as "small" the trial judge's inference from hearsay evidence, and the standard of care analysis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment on all grounds, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The appellant appealed from trial decisions determining unresolved issues in a family law matter, including spousal support duration and quantum, child and spousal support arrears, equalization of post-valuation-day increases in corporate shares, disposition of a recreational property, and costs.

The trial judge determined the appellant's income for support purposes by excluding losses from a corporation used to fund his personal lifestyle, assessed the value of corporate shares considering personal benefits provided by the corporation, ordered payment for a recreational property, and awarded substantial costs to the respondent based on the appellant's unreasonable conduct and inadequate disclosure.

The Court of Appeal upheld all findings.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of historical sexual assault against two teenage nieces committed between 1976 and 1986, and received a global sentence of six years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's admission of similar fact evidence regarding his 2009 convictions for sexual offences against his step-daughters.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis that the probative value of the similar fact evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, particularly given the striking similarities in the circumstances of the incidents despite some dissimilarities in the nature of the acts.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing its application for compensation regarding Block 203, a land parcel transferred to the City of Brampton pursuant to a Subdivision Agreement.

The appellant argued that Block 203 was conveyed on condition that it be used as a road and sought compensation after the City did not use it for that purpose some 20 years later.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the Subdivision Agreement contained no condition requiring reconveyance or compensation for Block 203, unlike other parcels covered by the agreement.

The court also dismissed the appellant's challenge to the costs award of $53,667.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision and costs order from the Superior Court.

The motion judge had awarded the appellant $118,954.95 in damages for breach of contract arising from the respondents' refusal to close on a property purchase, but awarded no costs.

The appellant challenged both the calculation of the $43,000 property value difference and the denial of costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on damages but allowed the appeal on costs, finding the motion judge erred in principle by depriving the successful party of all costs without exceptional circumstances justifying such a punitive order.