Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, found not criminally responsible, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition that continued his detention.

He sought an absolute discharge or, alternatively, a transfer to a less secure psychiatric facility.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's conclusion that the appellant continued to pose a significant threat to public safety was reasonable, supported by expert evidence.

The request for transfer was also denied as the proposed facilities lacked all-male units, a necessary condition given the appellant's history.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed on the respondent for sexual offences, arguing the sentencing judge erred in granting 2:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

The sentencing judge had found that the retrospective application of the Truth in Sentencing Act, which capped credit at 1.5:1, violated the respondent's s. 11(i) Charter right to the benefit of the lesser punishment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that pre-sentence custody constitutes punishment under s. 11(i) and that the statutory cap varied that punishment.

The Court further held that the Crown failed to justify the Charter violation under s. 1, as the transitional provision did not minimally impair the respondent's rights.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for offences including robbery with a firearm and aggravated assault.

The trial judge had erred by failing to apply the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 344(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Despite this error, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, declining to interfere with the sentence.

The Court noted the respondent's youth, the co-offender's sentence, and fresh evidence demonstrating substantial rehabilitative gains during his time in the reformatory system.

The self-represented appellant applied to review two orders: one fixing the date for his appeals and another dismissing his application for the appointment of specific counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant had previously dismissed or refused to cooperate with three appointed counsel, leading to the appointment of amicus curiae.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the applications, finding that the appointment of amicus was appropriate to control the court's process and prevent further frustration of the proceedings, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers' Association.

The appellant pleaded guilty to 12 offences, including possession for the purpose of trafficking in methamphetamine and cocaine, and dangerous driving involving ramming police cars.

He appealed his sentence, arguing it was manifestly excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was not manifestly excessive given the seriousness of the offences and the appellant's extensive prior criminal record of over 45 convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant's spontaneous complaint and in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the complaint was properly admitted as part of the narrative to provide context for assessing credibility, and that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence or unfairly scrutinize the defence evidence.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing his application for certiorari to set aside a committal order following a preliminary inquiry.

The appellant argued there was insufficient evidence of identification and the type of plant.

The Court of Appeal held that the preliminary inquiry judge did not commit a jurisdictional error, as there was some evidence connecting the appellant to the property and the 9,000 marijuana plants, including his admitted ownership and the testimony of a police officer.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of common assault and aggravated assault following a bar fight.

They appealed their aggravated assault convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to properly instruct the jury on the doctrine of common purpose under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code, despite the Crown heavily relying on it.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge's brief reference to a 'joint criminal enterprise' without a full explanation of the elements of common purpose left the jury without adequate guidance.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions for aggravated assault were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence.

The Crown agreed that the sentence appeal should be allowed and the sentence reduced to 15 months, which equated to the time the appellant had already served.

The Court of Appeal agreed and allowed the appeal on that basis.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in his analysis of past signification by misapprehending the evidence and failing to provide clear reasons.

Furthermore, the trial judge failed to make a necessary ruling under s. 10(b) of the Charter, rendering his s. 24(2) analysis invalid.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the grounds of appeal were weak and had no significance beyond the immediate case.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that dismissed his appeal from conviction.

The appellant argued that the summary conviction appeal judge misstated the fourth branch of the Palmer test for admitting fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the judge misstated the test by using 'would' instead of 'could', the fresh evidence was ultimately inadmissible.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on the respondent by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the sentence, noting the trial judge gave exemplary reasons.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder in a contract killing.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury that lies told by one of the appellants to the police could be used to infer his participation in a murder scheme, rather than merely a carjacking scheme as the defence argued.

The Court of Appeal held this was a misdirection, as the post-offence conduct had no probative value in determining the level of culpability between manslaughter and murder.

The error tainted the convictions of all three appellants.

The appeals were allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder, applied under s. 680(1) of the Criminal Code for a review of his detention order.

The court found no realistic likelihood that a panel would interfere with the lower court's decision, particularly regarding the tertiary ground for detention under s. 515(10)(c).

The court noted the strong circumstantial case, including motive, opportunity, and gunshot residue, as well as the egregious circumstances of the planned killing.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of armed robbery, sought to reopen and reconsider a sentence appeal decision that reduced his life sentence to 16 years but imposed a 7-year period of parole ineligibility.

Duty counsel argued the court incorrectly applied its discretion under the Criminal Code regarding the length of the parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal denied the request, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to reopen an appeal once it had been heard on the merits and the final order had been entered.

The court noted that such a challenge to the correctness of the decision must be directed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States on charges of fraud and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender him.

He argued that the extradition judge and the Minister erred by failing to order disclosure of Canadian investigative materials, alleging Charter breaches and illegalities by Canadian and American authorities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application for judicial review, finding that the requesting state did not rely on the Canadian evidence, there was no air of reality to the Charter claims, and the limited right to disclosure in extradition proceedings was not violated.

The appellant was convicted of possession of property obtained by crime relating to stolen motor vehicles.

During the investigation, a police officer searched a briefcase found in a stolen van incident to the arrest of a co-accused.

The appellant claimed ownership of the briefcase, but the officer continued the search, finding incriminating documents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the search as a valid incident to arrest, finding the officer had a duty to discover and preserve evidence.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal in part, setting aside a $20,000 restitution order due to insufficient proof of loss.

The appellant appealed her committal for surrender and applied for judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

She challenged the constitutionality of the new Extradition Act, which the Court of Appeal dismissed based on its previous decision in United States of America v. Yang.

She also argued that the surrender would be unfair and oppressive and that the Minister's reasons were inadequate.

The Court found no substance to her allegations and held that the Minister's reasons were adequate.

The appeal and application for judicial review were dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for pointing a firearm at her two children during an incident that occurred 19 years prior.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on the testimony of the complainants, despite the appellant's denial and inconsistencies in the complainants' evidence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed credibility and applied the burden of proof.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and a one-year conditional sentence was imposed.