COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
RE:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN (Respondent) v. AARON BEDFORD (Appellant)
BEFORE:
DOHERTY, SHARPE and LANG JJ.A.
COUNSEL:
Jonathan Dawe
for the appellant
Benita Wassenaar
for the respondent
HEARD: December 6, 2005
RELEASED ORALLY: December 6, 2005
On appeal from the order of Justice W. Whalen of the Superior Court of Justice dated February 22, 2005.
E N D O R S E M E N T
1We will assume for the purposes of disposing of the appeal that the committing judge and the reviewing judge made one or more of the errors alleged by counsel for the appellant.
2We are satisfied that the committal for trial should be quashed only if on our review of the evidence, we are satisfied that there was no basis upon which a reasonable jury properly instructed could convict on the offence charged.
3On the facts of this case, the appellant’s committal for trial on the charge of first degree murder turned on whether a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could conclude that the appellant knew that the deceased’s death was likely as a result of the assault inflicted on the deceased by the appellant and his co-accused.
4According to the appellant’s girlfriend, the appellant admitted that he and another person beat the deceased and left him alone hogtied on the floor in his home. The girlfriend testified that the appellant said that he did not know whether the victim was still alive when he left the scene, although he “assumed” that the victim was still breathing.
5The appellant’s statements to the girlfriend, considered in combination with the evidence as to the nature of the assault, provide a basis upon which the necessary inference as to the appellant’s knowledge of the likelihood of death could be made by a reasonable jury. A jury could infer from this evidence that the appellant left this 62 year old victim beaten and tied up, knowing that the victim was sufficiently injured so the appellant could not say whether he was still alive. A jury could take from that evidence that the victim was in very dire circumstances when the appellant left the scene and a jury could draw the further inference that the appellant knew because of the deceased’s dire condition that death was a probable consequence of the assault perpetrated by the appellant and his accomplice.
6The appeal must be dismissed.
“Doherty J.A.”
“Robert J. Sharpe J.A.”
“S.E. Lang J.A.”