Nader Raymond Hasan

This complex motion involved the defendants, Dr. Saad and the Canadian Companies, seeking to set aside ex parte Mareva injunctions, Norwich orders, and receivership orders previously granted to the plaintiffs.

The defendants argued material non-disclosure by the plaintiffs, particularly regarding the political motivations behind the litigation and the legitimate commercial relationships between the parties.

The plaintiffs sought to continue and vary the orders.

The court found no material non-disclosure sufficient to set aside the Mareva order against Dr. Saad, continuing it.

However, the Norwich and Receivership orders against the Canadian Companies were set aside due to non-material but impactful non-disclosure that changed the factual landscape, making the orders overly broad.

The court also addressed the application of the deemed undertaking rule for documents obtained through Norwich orders.

The defendant, Nicholas Walker, was charged with first-degree murder in a retrial following a Court of Appeal order.

The trial proceeded without a jury.

The Crown alleged Walker was the shooter and that the killing was planned and deliberate, stemming from prior acrimony with the victim, Clifenton Ford.

The defence primarily challenged identification and the elements of planned and deliberate murder.

The court, relying on circumstantial evidence including video footage, DNA, and witness testimony, found beyond a reasonable doubt that Walker was the shooter.

The court also concluded that the murder was planned and deliberate, leading to a conviction for first-degree murder.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action.

The plaintiff, a self-represented individual, sued after the defendant complained to a community organization about his alleged harassing behavior.

The court found that the defendant's expression related to a matter of public interest (character and integrity of mentors in a volunteer organization).

While the plaintiff's claim had substantial merit, the defendant had valid defenses (justification, fair comment, qualified privilege).

Furthermore, the harm suffered by the plaintiff was not sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting the defendant's expression.

The action was dismissed, and the defendant was awarded full indemnity costs and damages for bad faith.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for aggravated assault.

He sought to admit fresh evidence, a hospital report confirming broken fingers, to support his self-defence argument.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the fresh evidence were admitted, it would not change the result because there was no basis for a self-defence claim during the second altercation, which was the basis of the charge.

The trial judge had already found that the appellant escalated the conflict and that his actions were not in response to a threat.

The appellant, Wayne Thomas Hill, appealed his conviction and sentence for two counts of attempted abduction of a child and two counts of breaching a prohibition order.

The appeal raised two issues: a request to vary a blanket lifetime internet ban imposed as part of his sentence, and the requirement for registration in the sex offender registry.

The Court of Appeal varied the internet prohibition order to a more specific set of restrictions, aligning with the nature of the order granted in R. v. Brar, but dismissed the appeal regarding the sex offender registry and all other issues.

The defendant ANI Media Private Ltd. moved to dismiss or permanently stay the action brought by Sikhs for Justice (SFJ) on grounds of lack of jurisdiction or *forum non conveniens*.

SFJ, an Ontario-incorporated not-for-profit, alleged a defamation campaign orchestrated by the Republic of India and carried out by Indian media outlets, including ANI Media.

The court found that while a presumptive connecting factor (tort committed in Ontario due to online access) was arguable, it was rebutted because the claims were not sufficiently connected to Ontario to reasonably expect ANI Media to respond there, especially given the Republic of India's immunity and the broad nature of the alleged campaign.

Consequently, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice declined jurisdiction and dismissed the action.

The court also briefly addressed *forum non conveniens* for completeness, noting that India was not clearly a more appropriate forum due to significant impediments for SFJ to litigate there.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a respondent charged with committing indictable offences for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a terrorist group under section 83.2 of the Criminal Code.

The respondent was the sole member of his own terrorist group.

The trial judge found the respondent not guilty of the section 83.2 offences but found him not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (schizophrenia) for the underlying predicate offences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation that section 83.2 does not apply to a lone wolf terrorist acting as the sole member of a terrorist group, as the provision contemplates a bilateral relationship between the principal committing the offence and a separate terrorist group.

The court dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed a disposition order from the Ontario Review Board regarding a respondent found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for violent offences committed at a Canadian Forces recruiting centre.

The respondent was diagnosed with schizophrenia and found incapable of knowing his conduct was morally wrong.

The Board ordered detention on a secure forensic unit but granted limited indirectly supervised privileges to attend a local college for educational purposes within a two-kilometre radius of the hospital.

The Crown challenged both the indirect supervision privilege and the Board's failure to prohibit all contact with uniformed military personnel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding the Board did not err in law and its disposition was reasonable.

The appellant was convicted of using an imitation firearm while committing assault with a weapon and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The trial judge grounded the conviction on accessorial liability under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge misconstrued the basis of liability, the conviction was firmly grounded in law and fact on aiding or abetting under ss. 21(1)(b) and 21(1)(c).

The conviction was upheld.

The sentence appeal was partially successful, with the victim surcharge being set aside, but the custodial and probation portions were upheld.

The appellant appealed his convictions on three counts each of trafficking in crack cocaine and possession of the proceeds of crime, as well as his sentence of 12 months in custody.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the seller.

The appellant challenged the photo lineup procedure on the grounds that it failed to include photos replicating distinguishing features and was not video or audiotaped.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was cognizant of these deficiencies and properly considered them in reaching a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, noting the undercover officer's consistent identification across three transactions over a three-week period and evidence that the appellant frequented the relevant location.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, though the Court set aside the victim surcharge and directed remittance of any payments made.

The appellant appealed his conviction for unauthorized possession of a firearm that was found heavily wrapped under a bed in the bedroom he occupied.

The appellant argued the conviction was unreasonable because the circumstantial evidence did not meet the standard established in R. v. Villaroman.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly applied the relevant legal principles, did not misapprehend the evidence, and provided cogent reasons for rejecting the appellant's claim that a third party was in possession of the firearm.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the victim surcharge was set aside, but the sentence appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual assault with a weapon following a jury trial, but acquitted of three counts of uttering threats and one count of assault.

All charges involved the same complainant, the appellant's former common law spouse.

The appellant was sentenced to 22 months less one day of imprisonment plus two years' probation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the conviction appeal on the basis that the trial judge erred by failing to provide the jury with meaningful guidance about assessing credibility, particularly regarding prior inconsistent statements made by the complainant.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the significance of the complainant's initial denial of sexual abuse during her first police interview, which was inconsistent with her later allegations.

The Court found this error was reversible and went to the heart of the complainant's allegations.

A new trial was ordered on the sexual assault charges.

This criminal trial involved three accused (Adeel Safdar, Shaheen Safdar, and Aatif Safdar) charged with various assaults and uttering threats against Sara Salim, Adeel's wife.

The central issue was whether Sara's extensive injuries were inflicted by the accused or were self-inflicted due to mental illness, as she initially claimed.

The court found Adeel Safdar guilty of two counts of aggravated assault related to breaking Sara's jaw and permanently disfiguring her ear, based on Sara's testimony corroborated by expert medical evidence.

Shaheen Safdar and Aatif Safdar were found not guilty of all charges due to reasonable doubt, as Sara's testimony against them lacked sufficient corroboration and suffered from inconsistencies.

This mid-trial ruling addresses the Crown's application regarding alleged violations of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Crown contended that the defence adduced evidence without first confronting Crown witnesses, particularly the complainant, Sara Salim, during cross-examination.

The court found four specific instances where the defence's failure to cross-examine on substantial matters constituted a breach of the rule, while dismissing the majority of the Crown's 16 alleged violations as either insubstantial or generally covered by the extensive cross-examination.

As a remedy, the court permitted the Crown to recall the complainant or other witnesses for reply testimony, declining the Crown's request for an adverse inference against the accused's credibility.

The applicant, Ryan Alford, challenged the Law Society of Upper Canada's requirement for licensees to adopt a Statement of Principles promoting equality, diversity, and inclusion.

The Law Society brought a motion challenging the Superior Court's jurisdiction, arguing the matter should be heard as an application for judicial review in the Divisional Court.

The court found that the Law Society's decision was an exercise of statutory power, falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Divisional Court for judicial review.

The motion to transfer the application to the Divisional Court was granted.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 18 months incarceration (less pre-sentence credit) imposed for multiple offences including making false documents, possessing identity documents, using forged documents, possession of property obtained by crime, and trafficking in identity information.

Duty counsel argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider serious immigration consequences, specifically that the appellant faced deportation to the United Kingdom as a permanent resident.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was fit given the appellant's extensive criminal record of 24 convictions for dishonesty and multiple failures to comply with community supervision orders.

The court rejected the argument that a conditional sentence should be imposed to preserve immigration appeal rights, holding that sentencing flexibility should not be misused to avoid collateral statutory consequences.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault of his neighbor and sentenced to two years less a day imprisonment followed by three years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on multiple grounds, including that the trial judge erred in finding no air of reality to a mistaken belief in consent defense, that the trial judge placed undue emphasis on the complainant's demeanor and mental health history, that the verdict was unreasonable, and that the trial judge improperly used prior consistent statements.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility findings were reasonable, the defense arguments were properly addressed, and the sentence was fit.

The appellant appealed convictions for possession of marijuana, cocaine and MDMA for purposes of trafficking, and possession of a prohibited weapon, challenging the lawfulness of his arrest on the basis that police lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that police had received a detailed tip from a confidential informant that was corroborated through vehicle registration searches, and that subsequent surveillance observations of suspicious interactions consistent with drug trafficking provided reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The search incident to arrest was therefore lawful.

Crown appeal from the acquittal of Aasif Patel on charges of first degree murder and second degree murder in connection with the fatal shooting of Lorenzo Martinez.

The Crown argued that the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on party liability under section 21(2) of the Criminal Code (common unlawful purpose) and in his instructions regarding section 21(1) liability (aiding and abetting).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown had materially changed its legal theory between trial and appeal, which would be unfair to the respondent and offend double jeopardy principles.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's instructions on causation or on the relationship between the liability of the principal and the party.

The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the National Energy Board authorization for offshore seismic testing in Baffin Bay and Davis Strait.

It held that the Board’s approval process triggered the Crown’s duty to consult, and that the Crown may rely on a regulatory process to fulfill consultation obligations where that process is adequate.

On these facts, consultation was inadequate given the significance of Inuit treaty harvesting rights, the potential impacts of testing, limited participation opportunities, and insufficient accommodation.