Nader Raymond Hasan

This complex motion involved the defendants, Dr. Saad and the Canadian Companies, seeking to set aside ex parte Mareva injunctions, Norwich orders, and receivership orders previously granted to the plaintiffs.

The defendants argued material non-disclosure by the plaintiffs, particularly regarding the political motivations behind the litigation and the legitimate commercial relationships between the parties.

The plaintiffs sought to continue and vary the orders.

The court found no material non-disclosure sufficient to set aside the Mareva order against Dr. Saad, continuing it.

However, the Norwich and Receivership orders against the Canadian Companies were set aside due to non-material but impactful non-disclosure that changed the factual landscape, making the orders overly broad.

The court also addressed the application of the deemed undertaking rule for documents obtained through Norwich orders.

The defendant, Nicholas Walker, was charged with first-degree murder in a retrial following a Court of Appeal order.

The trial proceeded without a jury.

The Crown alleged Walker was the shooter and that the killing was planned and deliberate, stemming from prior acrimony with the victim, Clifenton Ford.

The defence primarily challenged identification and the elements of planned and deliberate murder.

The court, relying on circumstantial evidence including video footage, DNA, and witness testimony, found beyond a reasonable doubt that Walker was the shooter.

The court also concluded that the murder was planned and deliberate, leading to a conviction for first-degree murder.

In a retrial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to introduce lay opinion evidence from a restaurant owner who recognized the accused in poor-quality security footage of the shooting.

The defence opposed the admission, arguing the witness was not in a better position than the trier of fact and could not point to specific identifying features.

The court applied the Leaney test and ruled the evidence admissible, finding that the witness's long-standing acquaintance with the accused and his interactions with him at the restaurant shortly before the shooting put him in a better position than the court to make a comparison.

The applicants, seven youths residing in Ontario, brought an application challenging Ontario's cancellation of the Climate Change Act and its newly-enacted greenhouse gas reduction target under the Cap and Trade Cancellation Act, 2018.

They alleged that the target violates their rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

Ontario brought a motion to strike the application under Rule 21, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action, was not justiciable, was based on unprovable speculations, depended on positive obligations, and that the applicants lacked standing for future generations.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding that the target and plan are reviewable by the courts, the claims are capable of scientific proof, the matter is justiciable as it challenges specific government conduct, the issue of positive obligations should be decided on a full evidentiary record, and the applicants meet the test for public interest standing at this preliminary stage.

The appellant employer was convicted on appeal of an offence under the Occupational Health and Safety Act following a workplace fatality.

Before sentencing, the appellant brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, which the appeal judge summarily dismissed.

The Court of Appeal held that while the appeal judge had jurisdiction to hear the Charter application, he did not err in exercising his discretion to summarily dismiss it, as constitutional issues should only be raised for the first time on appeal in exceptional circumstances where there is no prejudice to the parties.

This decision concerns the costs of a successful motion brought by the plaintiffs.

The court reviewed the parties' submissions, considering factors such as the nature and complexity of the motion, the amount claimed in the action, the defendant's conduct (including fulfilling undertakings and making concessions), and the proportionality of the requested costs.

While finding the plaintiffs wholly successful, the court determined that the quantum of costs requested was disproportionately large and applied a discount to the partial indemnity costs.

The appellant, a young Indigenous woman, pleaded guilty to importing cocaine.

The sentencing judge rejected her s. 15 Charter challenge to s. 742.1(c) of the Criminal Code, which precluded a conditional sentence for her offence, and imposed a 17-month custodial sentence.

On appeal, the appellant argued that s. 742.1(c) and (e)(ii) violated ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the provisions violated s. 15 by discriminating against Aboriginal offenders and s. 7 by being overbroad.

The provisions were struck down, and a sentence of time served was substituted.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts each of sexual assault and sexual interference against the daughters of his former girlfriend, alleging numerous errors in the trial judge’s credibility assessments.

He argued that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny between the complainants’ testimony and his own, misapprehended evidence, improperly relied on demeanour, and failed to properly consider delayed disclosure and alleged motives to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge’s credibility findings were well supported by the evidentiary record and entitled to significant deference.

The court found no misapprehension of evidence, no improper reliance on demeanour, and no reversible error in the treatment of delayed disclosure or similar fact evidence.

The verdicts were not unreasonable and the appeal was dismissed.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action.

The plaintiff, a self-represented individual, sued after the defendant complained to a community organization about his alleged harassing behavior.

The court found that the defendant's expression related to a matter of public interest (character and integrity of mentors in a volunteer organization).

While the plaintiff's claim had substantial merit, the defendant had valid defenses (justification, fair comment, qualified privilege).

Furthermore, the harm suffered by the plaintiff was not sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting the defendant's expression.

The action was dismissed, and the defendant was awarded full indemnity costs and damages for bad faith.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for aggravated assault.

He sought to admit fresh evidence, a hospital report confirming broken fingers, to support his self-defence argument.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the fresh evidence were admitted, it would not change the result because there was no basis for a self-defence claim during the second altercation, which was the basis of the charge.

The trial judge had already found that the appellant escalated the conflict and that his actions were not in response to a threat.

The appellant, Wayne Thomas Hill, appealed his conviction and sentence for two counts of attempted abduction of a child and two counts of breaching a prohibition order.

The appeal raised two issues: a request to vary a blanket lifetime internet ban imposed as part of his sentence, and the requirement for registration in the sex offender registry.

The Court of Appeal varied the internet prohibition order to a more specific set of restrictions, aligning with the nature of the order granted in R. v. Brar, but dismissed the appeal regarding the sex offender registry and all other issues.

The defendant ANI Media Private Ltd. moved to dismiss or permanently stay the action brought by Sikhs for Justice (SFJ) on grounds of lack of jurisdiction or *forum non conveniens*.

SFJ, an Ontario-incorporated not-for-profit, alleged a defamation campaign orchestrated by the Republic of India and carried out by Indian media outlets, including ANI Media.

The court found that while a presumptive connecting factor (tort committed in Ontario due to online access) was arguable, it was rebutted because the claims were not sufficiently connected to Ontario to reasonably expect ANI Media to respond there, especially given the Republic of India's immunity and the broad nature of the alleged campaign.

Consequently, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice declined jurisdiction and dismissed the action.

The court also briefly addressed *forum non conveniens* for completeness, noting that India was not clearly a more appropriate forum due to significant impediments for SFJ to litigate there.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a respondent charged with committing indictable offences for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a terrorist group under section 83.2 of the Criminal Code.

The respondent was the sole member of his own terrorist group.

The trial judge found the respondent not guilty of the section 83.2 offences but found him not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (schizophrenia) for the underlying predicate offences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation that section 83.2 does not apply to a lone wolf terrorist acting as the sole member of a terrorist group, as the provision contemplates a bilateral relationship between the principal committing the offence and a separate terrorist group.

The court dismissed the appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the York Regional Police to include a withdrawn criminal charge in his Police Vulnerable Sector Check.

The Divisional Court set aside the decision, finding that the police breached procedural fairness by relying on undisclosed occurrence reports without giving the applicant an opportunity to respond.

The court also found the decision unreasonable for failing to justify how the applicant met the exceptional criteria for disclosing non-conviction information.

The matter was remitted for reconsideration under the newly enacted Police Record Checks Reform Act, 2015.

The Crown appealed a disposition order from the Ontario Review Board regarding a respondent found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for violent offences committed at a Canadian Forces recruiting centre.

The respondent was diagnosed with schizophrenia and found incapable of knowing his conduct was morally wrong.

The Board ordered detention on a secure forensic unit but granted limited indirectly supervised privileges to attend a local college for educational purposes within a two-kilometre radius of the hospital.

The Crown challenged both the indirect supervision privilege and the Board's failure to prohibit all contact with uniformed military personnel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding the Board did not err in law and its disposition was reasonable.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' request to remove a boundary tree, the successful respondents sought costs.

The respondents had made an offer to settle prior to the hearing, which the applicants did not accept.

The court awarded the respondents costs on a partial indemnity scale up to the date of the offer and on a substantial indemnity scale thereafter.

The court found the respondents' counsel's hourly rates and staffing choices reasonable, fixing total costs at $77,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicants sought an order authorizing the removal of a mature boundary tree shared with the respondents to facilitate a home extension.

The applicants argued the tree constituted a nuisance because its protection zone prevented their proposed construction.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the tree did not interfere with the applicants' current use and enjoyment of their property, but only with their desired enhancement.

The applicants failed to demonstrate that the tree was a substantial and unreasonable interference or that there were no reasonable alternative designs for their renovation.

The appellant was convicted of using an imitation firearm while committing assault with a weapon and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The trial judge grounded the conviction on accessorial liability under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge misconstrued the basis of liability, the conviction was firmly grounded in law and fact on aiding or abetting under ss. 21(1)(b) and 21(1)(c).

The conviction was upheld.

The sentence appeal was partially successful, with the victim surcharge being set aside, but the custodial and probation portions were upheld.

The appellant appealed his convictions on three counts each of trafficking in crack cocaine and possession of the proceeds of crime, as well as his sentence of 12 months in custody.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the seller.

The appellant challenged the photo lineup procedure on the grounds that it failed to include photos replicating distinguishing features and was not video or audiotaped.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was cognizant of these deficiencies and properly considered them in reaching a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, noting the undercover officer's consistent identification across three transactions over a three-week period and evidence that the appellant frequented the relevant location.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, though the Court set aside the victim surcharge and directed remittance of any payments made.

The appellant appealed his conviction for unauthorized possession of a firearm that was found heavily wrapped under a bed in the bedroom he occupied.

The appellant argued the conviction was unreasonable because the circumstantial evidence did not meet the standard established in R. v. Villaroman.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly applied the relevant legal principles, did not misapprehend the evidence, and provided cogent reasons for rejecting the appellant's claim that a third party was in possession of the firearm.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the victim surcharge was set aside, but the sentence appeal was otherwise dismissed.