Nader Raymond Hasan

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual assault with a weapon following a jury trial, but acquitted of three counts of uttering threats and one count of assault.

All charges involved the same complainant, the appellant's former common law spouse.

The appellant was sentenced to 22 months less one day of imprisonment plus two years' probation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the conviction appeal on the basis that the trial judge erred by failing to provide the jury with meaningful guidance about assessing credibility, particularly regarding prior inconsistent statements made by the complainant.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the significance of the complainant's initial denial of sexual abuse during her first police interview, which was inconsistent with her later allegations.

The Court found this error was reversible and went to the heart of the complainant's allegations.

A new trial was ordered on the sexual assault charges.

The applicants brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing their s. 11(b) Charter rights were violated due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was 43.5 months.

After deducting 5.5 months of defence waiver and 6 months for exceptional circumstances (Crown illness and underestimation of trial time), the net delay was 32 months.

The court found the case was not particularly complex and the remaining delay exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was entered.

This criminal trial involved three accused (Adeel Safdar, Shaheen Safdar, and Aatif Safdar) charged with various assaults and uttering threats against Sara Salim, Adeel's wife.

The central issue was whether Sara's extensive injuries were inflicted by the accused or were self-inflicted due to mental illness, as she initially claimed.

The court found Adeel Safdar guilty of two counts of aggravated assault related to breaking Sara's jaw and permanently disfiguring her ear, based on Sara's testimony corroborated by expert medical evidence.

Shaheen Safdar and Aatif Safdar were found not guilty of all charges due to reasonable doubt, as Sara's testimony against them lacked sufficient corroboration and suffered from inconsistencies.

This mid-trial ruling addresses the Crown's application regarding alleged violations of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Crown contended that the defence adduced evidence without first confronting Crown witnesses, particularly the complainant, Sara Salim, during cross-examination.

The court found four specific instances where the defence's failure to cross-examine on substantial matters constituted a breach of the rule, while dismissing the majority of the Crown's 16 alleged violations as either insubstantial or generally covered by the extensive cross-examination.

As a remedy, the court permitted the Crown to recall the complainant or other witnesses for reply testimony, declining the Crown's request for an adverse inference against the accused's credibility.

The applicant, Ryan Alford, challenged the Law Society of Upper Canada's requirement for licensees to adopt a Statement of Principles promoting equality, diversity, and inclusion.

The Law Society brought a motion challenging the Superior Court's jurisdiction, arguing the matter should be heard as an application for judicial review in the Divisional Court.

The court found that the Law Society's decision was an exercise of statutory power, falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Divisional Court for judicial review.

The motion to transfer the application to the Divisional Court was granted.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 18 months incarceration (less pre-sentence credit) imposed for multiple offences including making false documents, possessing identity documents, using forged documents, possession of property obtained by crime, and trafficking in identity information.

Duty counsel argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider serious immigration consequences, specifically that the appellant faced deportation to the United Kingdom as a permanent resident.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was fit given the appellant's extensive criminal record of 24 convictions for dishonesty and multiple failures to comply with community supervision orders.

The court rejected the argument that a conditional sentence should be imposed to preserve immigration appeal rights, holding that sentencing flexibility should not be misused to avoid collateral statutory consequences.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault of his neighbor and sentenced to two years less a day imprisonment followed by three years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on multiple grounds, including that the trial judge erred in finding no air of reality to a mistaken belief in consent defense, that the trial judge placed undue emphasis on the complainant's demeanor and mental health history, that the verdict was unreasonable, and that the trial judge improperly used prior consistent statements.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility findings were reasonable, the defense arguments were properly addressed, and the sentence was fit.

The appellant appealed convictions for possession of marijuana, cocaine and MDMA for purposes of trafficking, and possession of a prohibited weapon, challenging the lawfulness of his arrest on the basis that police lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that police had received a detailed tip from a confidential informant that was corroborated through vehicle registration searches, and that subsequent surveillance observations of suspicious interactions consistent with drug trafficking provided reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The search incident to arrest was therefore lawful.

The accused attacked military personnel at a Canadian Forces Recruiting Centre with a knife.

He was charged with nine counts of committing indictable offences for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a terrorist group under s. 83.2 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued that the accused, acting as a 'lone wolf', constituted a terrorist group himself.

The court rejected this interpretation, holding that s. 83.2 requires the terrorist group to have an identity separate from the person committing the offence.

The accused was therefore acquitted of the terrorism charges.

On the included offences of attempted murder, assault causing bodily harm, and weapons offences, the court accepted joint psychiatric evidence that the accused was suffering from schizophrenia and was incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The accused was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

Crown appeal from the acquittal of Aasif Patel on charges of first degree murder and second degree murder in connection with the fatal shooting of Lorenzo Martinez.

The Crown argued that the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on party liability under section 21(2) of the Criminal Code (common unlawful purpose) and in his instructions regarding section 21(1) liability (aiding and abetting).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown had materially changed its legal theory between trial and appeal, which would be unfair to the respondent and offend double jeopardy principles.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's instructions on causation or on the relationship between the liability of the principal and the party.

The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the National Energy Board authorization for offshore seismic testing in Baffin Bay and Davis Strait.

It held that the Board’s approval process triggered the Crown’s duty to consult, and that the Crown may rely on a regulatory process to fulfill consultation obligations where that process is adequate.

On these facts, consultation was inadequate given the significance of Inuit treaty harvesting rights, the potential impacts of testing, limited participation opportunities, and insufficient accommodation.

The defendant, Stacey Newman, brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP legislation) to dismiss a defamation and malicious prosecution action brought by the plaintiffs, Azim Rizvee and Rabiya Azim.

The court found that Newman's public statements regarding Rizvee's political candidacy and campaign conduct related to a matter of public interest, satisfying the initial burden for the anti-SLAPP motion on the defamation claim.

However, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Newman had no valid defence (specifically, fair comment and limitations period) and provided insufficient evidence of serious harm to their reputation.

Consequently, the defamation claim was dismissed.

Conversely, the malicious prosecution claim, arising from Newman's private peace bond application against Rizvee, was deemed not to relate to a matter of public interest, and thus the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss it was denied.

The applicant sought judicial review of the New Democratic Party's internal decision to reject his candidacy for the party's leadership.

The court first determined that it had jurisdiction to review the decision, finding that the selection of a major political party's leader has a sufficiently broad public impact to bring it within the realm of public law.

However, applying a reasonableness standard, the court upheld the National Director's decision to reject the applicant, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias and concluding that the party was entitled to broad discretion in vetting its leadership candidates.

The appellant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic cocaine and was sentenced to two years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

He appealed the sentence, arguing it was demonstrably unfit and that the sentencing judge failed to give full credit for time spent in immigration detention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was within the established range and the sentencing judge properly exercised his discretion in allocating credit for the immigration detention, which was largely triggered by unrelated factors.

The accused sought a review of two detention orders related to charges including attempt murder, aggravated assault, and later, obstructing a peace officer.

The initial detention was based on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court reviewed alleged errors of law regarding the admissibility of bad character evidence and the assessment of the connection between the accused and his sureties.

It also considered changes in circumstances, including additional sureties and arguments about the strength of the Crown's case.

The application for review was dismissed, affirming the detention orders.

The appellant sought costs for a successful motion to extend the time to file a notice of appeal from a Small Claims Court decision.

The appellant claimed over $2,700 in costs, arguing the motion was necessitated by the self-represented respondent's lack of cooperation.

The court found the claimed amount excessive and disproportionate for a Small Claims matter, noting the respondent did not evade service.

The court awarded the appellant costs of $500 all inclusive.

The appellant lawyer appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent $10,000.

The respondent, a third party, had paid the appellant $20,000 to personally represent a co-accused at a two-day bail hearing.

The appellant attended the first day but, on the client's instructions, sent his partner to the second day.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's finding that there was a separate oral contract between the respondent and the appellant, which the appellant breached by failing to personally attend the second day.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent was arrested during the G20 summit and filed a timely complaint against the arresting officers.

After receiving the investigative report, he discovered that higher-ranking officers may have ordered the arrests, prompting him to file a second complaint outside the six-month statutory period.

The Director of the OIPRD refused to deal with the second complaint, citing the time limit without further explanation.

The Divisional Court quashed the decision, finding the Director failed to apply discoverability principles and failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Director's appeal, affirming that discoverability applies to the screening of complaints and that the Director's cursory reasons were inadequate and unreasonable.

The appellant brought a motion for an extension of time to serve and file a notice of appeal from a Small Claims Court decision regarding a disputed legal retainer.

The court applied the four-factor test for extending time to appeal, finding that the appellant formed an intention to appeal in time, the delay was minimal with a reasonable explanation, there was no prejudice to the respondent, and the appeal had sufficient merit.

The motion for an extension of time was granted.

The offender, a 56-year-old first-time offender, was found guilty of sexually assaulting his then-girlfriend's 13-year-old daughter in 2005.

The Crown sought a penitentiary term of 3 to 4 years, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered the principles of denunciation and deterrence, but noted the offence was a single, transitory incident of touching by a person in a quasi-position of trust.

Applying the law as it existed at the time of the offence, the court found a conditional sentence was available and appropriate.

The offender was sentenced to a 9-month conditional sentence to be served under house arrest, along with a 20-year SOIRA order and a DNA order.