Nader Raymond Hasan

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing her application for a declaration that she was the sole owner of a boundary tree.

She sought to cut down the tree without her neighbours' consent, arguing that under previous jurisprudence, the trunk at ground level was entirely on her property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's interpretation of section 10(2) of the Forestry Act, finding that 'trunk' should be given its ordinary dictionary meaning, encompassing the part of the tree from its roots to where it branches out, not just at ground level.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his designation as a long-term offender.

At trial, the complainant's mother testified about a phone call during which the complainant stated the appellant was touching her.

The trial judge found it would be dangerous to convict on the complainant's evidence alone but used the mother's hearsay evidence as confirmatory.

The Court of Appeal held that while the prior consistent statement was admissible to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication, the trial judge erred by using it for the truth of its contents to confirm the complainant's allegations.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

Following dismissal of an application concerning ownership and removal of a boundary tree under s. 10 of the Forestry Act, the successful respondents sought costs on a full indemnity or substantial indemnity basis, alleging abusive litigation conduct.

The court reviewed the jurisprudence governing elevated costs awards and confirmed that such awards are reserved for rare circumstances involving reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous conduct.

The court found that the application raised a legitimate issue of statutory interpretation and that the parties conducted the litigation professionally and without abuse of process.

As none of the exceptional circumstances required for elevated costs were present, costs were fixed on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondents were awarded $10,000 in fees plus HST and disbursements of $2,951.48 plus HST.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) to not deal with his complaint regarding the conduct of the Chief of Police and other senior officers during the G20 summit.

The OIPRD dismissed the complaint under s. 60(2) of the Police Services Act because it was filed more than six months after the incident.

The Divisional Court quashed the decision, finding that the Director breached procedural fairness and statutory requirements by failing to provide adequate reasons.

The court held that s. 60(2) is not a strict limitation period and requires consideration of discoverability and public interest.

The matter was remitted to the Director for reconsideration; mandamus was denied.

The appellant sought costs of $107,070 plus disbursements after successfully appealing a decision under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The respondent argued for no costs on the basis that he was a public interest litigant.

The Divisional Court declined to award costs to either party, noting that success on the appeal was divided, the proceeding raised novel legal issues of public importance regarding municipal codes of conduct, and it was reasonable for the respondent to have pursued the application initially.

The appellant, Mayor Robert Ford, appealed a decision declaring his seat vacant for violating the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act (MCIA).

The application judge found the appellant breached the MCIA by speaking and voting on a council motion to rescind a previous council decision that required him to reimburse $3,150 in donations to his private football foundation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the original reimbursement order was ultra vires the City of Toronto Act, 2006, which only permits reprimands or suspensions of remuneration for Code of Conduct violations.

Because the financial sanction was a nullity, the appellant did not have a pecuniary interest when he voted to rescind it, and therefore did not contravene the MCIA.

The applicant brought an application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act (MCIA) seeking to declare the respondent's seat on Toronto City Council vacant.

The respondent, the Mayor of Toronto, had previously been found to have violated the Code of Conduct and was ordered to reimburse $3,150 to donors.

At a subsequent Council meeting, the respondent spoke and voted on a motion to rescind that repayment obligation.

The court found that the respondent had a pecuniary interest in the matter and breached s. 5(1) of the MCIA.

The court rejected arguments that the MCIA did not apply to Code of Conduct violations, that the repayment order was ultra vires, or that the interest was too insignificant to influence him.

The court also found the breach was not committed through inadvertence or an error in judgment.

The application was granted and the respondent's seat was declared vacant.

In a criminal appeal concerning workplace computer privacy, the Court held that an employee may retain a reasonable, though diminished, expectation of privacy in personal information stored on an employer-issued laptop where personal use is permitted or reasonably expected.

The police breached section 8 by conducting warrantless searches of computer data received from a school board, because the employer's authority to search for workplace purposes did not transfer to police for criminal investigation.

The majority concluded exclusion under section 24(2) was not warranted after balancing police conduct, privacy impact, and trial truth-seeking interests.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial order remained in place.

A dissent would have excluded the evidence due to serious disregard of warrant requirements.

The appellant, a 19-year-old first offender on bail, killed a police officer while fleeing arrest in a stolen vehicle.

He was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment and a 10-year driving prohibition.

On appeal, he argued the sentence was unfit and the sentencing judge erred in her findings of fact, admission of a video tribute, and application of sentencing principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding that the sentence, while at the high end of the range, was not demonstrably unfit given the paramountcy of denunciation and deterrence in these circumstances.

The applicant, a graduate student, sought judicial review of a university disciplinary decision that resulted in a formal reprimand for harassment under the Code of Student Conduct.

He argued that he was denied procedural fairness because he was not permitted legal representation at the initial hearing before the Vice-Provost, that the decision was unreasonable, and that it violated his Charter right to freedom of expression.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the process was fair given the context and minor sanctions, the Statutory Powers Procedure Act did not apply, the decision was reasonable, and the Charter did not apply to the university's internal disciplinary process.

The accused was charged with sexual offences against a four-year-old child.

During a voir dire into the admissibility of a video-recorded police interview with the child complainant, the defence brought a motion for further Crown disclosure seeking police training materials, policy manuals, and information regarding the interviewing officer's training in child interrogation techniques.

The Crown argued these materials were not in its possession and control, and that the defence should pursue a third-party records application.

The court granted the motion in part, ordering disclosure of police-wide standards, policies, and protocols governing child interviews, but refusing disclosure of general training and reference materials.