Michal Fairburn

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The appeal was granted on consent.

The court imposed a fine in lieu of forfeiture in the amount of $321,945.79 and increased the restitution order to the same amount.

The court further ordered that if the fine is not paid within ten years of the respondent's release from serving all current sentences, the respondent will be subject to a term of imprisonment of three years.

The appellant appealed a conviction.

On consent of both parties, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was directed to appear on December 10, 2018 to set a trial date.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering his detention at the General Forensic Unit of the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible on impaired driving and assault charges and was diagnosed with Bipolar Affective Disorder and Substance Use Disorders.

The Board issued conflicting reasons: initially a detention order, then reasons supporting a conditional discharge, and finally amended reasons supporting detention.

The Court of Appeal found the conflicting and unexplained reasons rendered the disposition untenable and allowed the appeal, ordering a new hearing before a differently constituted panel within three weeks.

The appellant brought an appeal in the Court of Appeal for Ontario against a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice.

On consent of the Crown, the appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was directed to appear on December 10, 2018 to set a trial date.

The appellant failed to attend the appeal hearing or contact counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellants, three physicians who practiced in the respondent hospital's urgent care centre, appealed the dismissal of their wrongful dismissal action.

The trial judge dismissed the claim on the ground that it was barred by section 44(5) of the Public Hospitals Act, which immunizes hospitals from liability for acts done in good faith when a hospital board decides to cease providing a service.

The appellants argued that section 44(5) should not apply based on legislative history and the characterization of their status as dependent contractors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that section 44(5) is clear and all-encompassing, barring all proceedings for damages arising from a hospital's decision to cease providing a service, regardless of the legal characterization of the terminated physicians' status.

The respondents sought to purchase a property owned by the appellant organization and advanced $1,735,000 under a Control Agreement dated April 8, 2015.

The trial judge found the funds constituted a loan repayable regardless of whether the property purchase was completed, that interest at 12% per annum was payable, and that two individual appellants were jointly and severally liable for repayment.

The appellants appealed, arguing the loan was conditional on property acquisition, that no interest was payable, and that the individuals were not personally liable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's interpretation of the Control Agreement and finding the appellants' interpretation commercially unreasonable.

This appeal concerns a boundary dispute between neighbouring property owners near Markdale, Ontario.

The respondent claimed possessory title to a portion of the appellants' land where his house and outbuildings were situated, and prescriptive easements over a cedar trail and laneway.

The trial judge found in favour of the respondent on all claims.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the findings regarding possessory title and prescriptive easements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the possessory title finding and the laneway easement but set aside the cedar trail easement, finding insufficient evidence of continuous use for a utility purpose as required by law.

The appellants sought to review an order dismissing their motion to set aside a default judgment.

The original action arose from a purchase of equipment in November 2007, with default judgment obtained in March 2011.

The appellants delayed over three years before bringing a motion to set aside the default judgment, which was dismissed by the motion judge.

The appellants then appealed but failed to perfect their appeal, resulting in dismissal for delay in April 2015.

After over three years of inaction, they brought a motion to review the dismissal order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the delay extraordinary and the equities of the situation favored dismissal despite the appellants' arguable defences on the merits.

The applicant sought an order setting aside a decision by Doherty J.A. dismissing his motion for leave to intervene as an added party in an appeal.

The applicant claimed to be the effective alter ego of the appellants and sought to adduce evidence he characterized as important and not previously presented.

The court found that the applicant had not satisfied the threshold criteria under Rule 13.03(1) for intervention as an added party, noting that the arguments he sought to make were more properly made by the appellants through their counsel.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant construction company appealed a decision by the application judge who found that the respondents had made lasting improvements to property sufficient to trigger claims under the Conveyancing and Law Property Act, s. 37, and in one case, proprietary estoppel.

The appellant argued the application judge erred by failing to direct a trial of the contested factual issues or convert the application into an action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in proceeding by application where the respondents had not objected and the factual issues were apparent from the outset.

The Court also found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's factual findings regarding the lasting improvements made by the respondents.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claim against his former lawyer and law firm on the basis that the claim was statute barred under section 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge found that the appellant discovered the material facts giving rise to his claim no later than February 3, 2014, and that the statement of claim issued on March 2, 2016 was therefore outside the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellants brought a class action against defendant manufacturers and suppliers alleging they conspired to fix the price of lithium-ion batteries sold in Canada between January 2000 and December 2011.

The conspiracy allegedly impacted all purchasers, including "umbrella purchasers" whose batteries originated from non-defendants, as the cartel's price increases caused non-conspirators to also raise prices.

The certification judge certified only a statutory claim under the Competition Act for non-umbrella purchasers.

The Divisional Court certified an unlawful means conspiracy claim but excluded umbrella purchasers, citing indeterminate liability concerns.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the principle of indeterminate liability does not apply to either the statutory claim or the unlawful means conspiracy claim, and that umbrella purchasers should be included in the class with a subclass created for non-umbrella purchasers regarding aggregate damages quantification.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 14 years imprisonment imposed after conviction on 23 drug and weapons-related offences, including conspiracy to traffic heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine, dangerous possession of weapons, conspiracy to assault, and money laundering.

The appellant raised three issues: (1) that the sentencing judge erred in applying the parity principle by giving him the same sentence as his co-conspirator despite allegedly playing a lesser role; (2) that he should have received enhanced credit for harsh pre-trial custody conditions; and (3) that he should have received credit for time spent on restrictive bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the first two grounds but granted it in part on the third ground, allowing an additional 177 days credit for restrictive bail conditions.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision granting a stay of proceedings on forum non conveniens grounds.

The motion judge had characterized the claim as one for oppression under the Canada Business Corporations Act and found that Ontario was forum non conveniens because the core dispute involved shareholders' dissatisfaction with internal management decisions of a Quebec-based company.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred by misconstruing their claim as purely oppression and failing to recognize a common law claim for fraudulent misrepresentation with connections to Ontario.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's characterization of the claim or his forum non conveniens analysis.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order dismissing their action against their former lawyer for professional negligence.

The appellants alleged the respondent failed to protect their interests in settlement negotiations, failed to account for funds paid towards legal bills, and misappropriated funds secured by a mortgage.

The motion judge found the appellants had put forward no evidence to support their claims, that they were fully informed of and agreed to the settlement terms which benefited them, and that there was no evidence of inappropriate or excessive billings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no genuine issue for trial and rejecting all three grounds of appeal raised by the appellants.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment concerning a business purchase agreement that was terminated before completion.

The trial judge found that a $100,000 deposit paid by the appellant toward a $500,000 purchase price was to be retained by the respondent pursuant to a termination agreement entered into by the parties.

The trial judge found no legal fault on either side and concluded that the parties' intention in the termination agreement was that the deposit remain with the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's interpretation and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order granting the respondents leave to amend their statement of claim to substitute the names of three doctors for "Dr. John Doe Anesthesiologist." The motion judge relied on the doctrine of misnomer and applied the "litigating finger" test, finding that the doctors would have known the claim was directed at them based on the notice of action, medical records, and their status as anesthesiologists.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in principle or palpable and overriding error in the alternative finding based on the notice of action served within the limitation period.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed following conviction on multiple charges including sexual assault, assault with a weapon, simple assault, threatening to cause death, mischief, and criminal harassment, as well as guilty pleas to breach of recognizance and breach of probation.

The trial judge imposed a global sentence of nine years less four years credit for time served.

The appellant argued the sentence was demonstrably unfit and sought a reduction of two years.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's approach and noting that sentencing ranges are guidelines, not straitjackets, and that the trial judge had adequately explained her reasons rooted in the facts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of oxycodone for the purposes of trafficking and possession of cocaine, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted the appeal from the trafficking conviction and substituted a conviction for simple possession of oxycodone.

The appeal from the cocaine possession conviction was dismissed.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and a sentence of time served was substituted in place of the original sentence.