Michael H. Tulloch

The appellant, a former senior compliance manager at Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD Bank), appealed the dismissal of her application for lack of standing.

She sought to uncover and remedy alleged regulatory infractions and trust breaches by TD Bank in its mutual fund administration, claiming unjust enrichment and wrongful dismissal.

The motion judge dismissed her application, finding she lacked standing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the court's inherent jurisdiction to supervise trusts does not negate standing requirements, that the private interest standing test (requiring a personal and direct interest) was correctly applied, and that the appellant failed to plead facts establishing such standing, including as a constructive trustee.

The court also rejected the argument that public interest standing principles should inform private interest standing or that her whistleblower status conferred standing for private litigation.

The appellant, S.H., appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The core issue on appeal was whether the trial judge misapplied the second stage of the R. v. W.(D.) analysis regarding reasonable doubt in credibility cases, despite correctly citing the principles.

The Court of Appeal found that, reading the trial judge's reasons as a whole, it could be inferred that the judge rejected the appellant's exculpatory testimony entirely, rendering it incapable of raising a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, David Brown and Daimian Johnson, appealed their sentences for drug trafficking offences, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient credit for various mitigating factors, including multiple arrests, restrictive bail conditions, and cooperation with authorities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the sentencing judge had properly identified and considered the mitigating factors and that the sentences imposed were reasonable and reflected the circumstances.

The appellant, David Earle, appealed his conviction for fraud over $5,000 and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The trial judge had found that Earle defrauded clients of Global Precious Metals (GPM) of nearly one million dollars by leading them to believe they were purchasing physical precious metals when they were only acquiring notional "metal positions." The appeal raised issues concerning undue delay under the Charter (s. 11(b)), the trial judge's assessment of the mental element of fraud, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the quantum of restitution and fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, except for quashing the victim fine surcharge.

The appellant, Charles Mark Hilton, appealed the dismissal of his 14B motion by Nicholson J., which sought to set aside previous orders made in divorce proceedings, including those issued after he was noted in default.

The appellant alleged that the respondent, Marlene Dale Hilton, committed fraud through misrepresentations and material omissions during the uncontested trial.

Nicholson J. had dismissed the motion on the basis that the appellant had not appealed the earlier orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, clarifying that while some orders resulting from the appellant's default required an appeal, the allegations of the respondent's misrepresentations and material omissions should have been determined on their merits under r. 25(19)(a) of the Family Law Rules.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a new hearing on these specific allegations.

The appellant, Alexander Sangster, appealed convictions for multiple firearm and assault offences, and a global sentence of seven years and seven months.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings regarding the reasonable expectation of privacy for a guest and the validity of consent to search, and finding no material misapprehension of evidence.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal based on fresh evidence demonstrating the appellant's significant rehabilitative progress while in custody and on bail, substituting the sentence to time served.

The appellant, Boris Rajkovic, appealed a global sentence of 13 years for six offences, including kidnapping, bank robbery, and discharging a firearm at police.

He challenged the fitness of the sentence, the imposition of a consecutive sentence for discharging a firearm, and the sufficiency of credit for pre-trial custody conditions, including alleged poor medical care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the global sentence fit given the gravity and number of offences, upholding the consecutive sentence due to the distinct nature of the firearm discharge, and affirming the sentencing judge's decision on pre-trial credit as the medical records did not support the appellant's claims.

The appellant, N.K., appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, criminal harassment, and uttering threats, and his global sentence of five years and 11 months incarceration.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's application of the W.(D.) principle, assessment of credibility, and calculation of pre-sentence custody credit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or application of the W.(D.) principle.

However, the appeal from sentence was allowed in part; the pre-sentence custody credit was varied from five months to six months and one day, and the victim fine surcharge of $800 was set aside.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a home invasion and robbery where a co-perpetrator shot and killed the victim.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on post-offence conduct, circumstantial evidence, and by failing to answer a withdrawn jury question regarding the mens rea for murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions and concluding the trial judge appropriately accepted the jury's decision to withdraw their question after they resolved it themselves.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed the trial judge's factual findings on an off-set issue and the costs disposition.

The respondent cross-appealed on costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the off-set issue, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings.

However, the Court allowed the appellant's costs appeal and dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal, as the parties agreed the trial judge erred in principle by determining success on a distributive-costs basis.

The matter was remitted to the trial judge to determine the quantum of costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and criminal harassment against his estranged spouse, as well as his 42-month global sentence.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the timing of divorce proceedings and failed to properly apply the W.(D.) principles to his testimony.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence from family court proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and rejecting the fresh evidence as it failed the Palmer test.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court affirming that the sentence was fit and that the trial judge properly considered the abusive domestic context and parental alienation as aggravating factors.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking offences after police found cocaine during a search incident to arrest.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding no section 10(b) Charter breach when police delayed his access to counsel for 3.5 hours while preparing a search warrant for his residence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the delay was justified by officer and public safety concerns due to credible information that the appellant possessed a long firearm.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences relating to a residential break-in and theft of firearms.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in denying him standing to challenge a warrantless search of his girlfriend's vehicle, unfairly dismissed his s. 8 Charter challenges and Garofoli application, and erred in finding reasonable grounds for search warrants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge acted unfairly in summarily dismissing the Garofoli application and standing arguments without hearing submissions, no miscarriage of justice occurred because the applications had no reasonable prospect of success.

The appellant appealed an order awarding retroactive and prospective spousal support to the respondent.

The appellant argued the order was a nullity because it was made under the Divorce Act after being severed from a divorce order, and alternatively, that the court lacked jurisdiction because the respondent had attorned to divorce proceedings in Alabama.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the support order was properly made under the Family Law Act and that the application judge correctly determined he had jurisdiction.

Costs of $12,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for attempted murder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention.

He argued the Board unreasonably found he posed a significant threat to public safety, applied the wrong legal test, and acted unfairly by copying portions of its reasons from a previous year's hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence of the appellant's treatment-resistant schizophrenia, lack of insight, and recent aggressive behaviour supported the significant threat finding.

While the Board's copying of previous reasons was ill-advised, the reasons as a whole demonstrated a firm grasp of the current evidence and did not warrant a new hearing.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for three counts of assault, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board detaining him at a forensic hospital.

He sought an absolute discharge, arguing he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's longstanding, treatment-resistant schizophrenia, lack of insight, and severe substance abuse issues—which predictably lead to decompensation and aggressive behaviour—supported the Board's conclusion that he remained a significant threat to the public.

Jereemy Tan, the moving party, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against a Superior Court decision that authorized a Receiver to disclaim an agreement of purchase and sale for a property.

The moving party's counsel inadvertently missed the 10-day appeal deadline, believing it was 30 days.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding the delay was short and excusable, prejudice to respondents negligible, and the proposed appeal met the low threshold for merit.

The court also determined the appeal was "as of right" under sections 193(b) and (c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, as the decision could affect other similar cases and involved property exceeding $10,000 in value.

The appellant appealed her convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, as well as her sentence of 12 months in custody.

The appellant had stabbed one individual and cut another during a physical altercation, claiming she acted in defence of her romantic partner.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the trial judge properly assessed the self-defence factors under s. 34 of the Criminal Code and reasonably concluded her use of a knife was disproportionate.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred by failing to apply the sentencing principles applicable to youthful first-time offenders.

The sentence was varied to a suspended sentence with probation.

The appellant was convicted of child luring and making sexually explicit images available to a child following an undercover police sting.

The trial judge relied on the evidentiary presumption of belief in age under s. 172.1(3) of the Criminal Code.

Following the convictions, the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Morrison struck down this presumption as unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by applying the pre-Morrison framework and relying on the presumption to establish the appellant's belief in the interlocutor's age.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for breach of probation, appealed a Review Board decision continuing his conditional discharge and denying an absolute discharge.

The appellant argued there was no evidence he continued to pose a significant risk to public safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and supported by psychiatric evidence that the appellant lacked insight, was likely to discontinue medication, and would experience worsening persecutory delusions leading to a risk of criminal behaviour.