Michael S. Dunn

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board denying OHIP funding for out-of-country residential psychiatric treatment at the Austen Riggs Centre.

The Board found that the appellant failed to establish that the required services were not available at an OHIP preferred provider facility.

The Divisional Court upheld the Board's decision as reasonable, noting that while the chosen facility may have been preferred by the appellant's expert, the evidence did not show that the preferred providers could not provide the necessary care.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a tobacco manufacturer on the Six Nations reserve, appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing its application for judicial review of the Minister of Finance's demand for security under section 12(2)(f.1) of the Tobacco Tax Act.

The appellant manufactured tobacco for export and for sale on First Nations reserves, neither of which were subject to Ontario's tobacco tax.

The appellant argued the Minister's interpretation of the security requirement was unreasonable and that the provision was unconstitutional as an indirect tax on exported goods.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's decision, finding the Minister's interpretation reasonable and the provision constitutionally valid as incidental to a valid direct taxation scheme.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision finding that frequent lockdowns at Maplehurst Correctional Complex violated the Charter rights of two remanded inmates under section 12 (cruel and unusual treatment).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge had significantly overstated the frequency, duration, and impact of lockdowns affecting the respondents.

The court concluded that while lockdowns occurred more frequently than ideal, they did not rise to the level of cruel and unusual treatment.

The court also found procedural unfairness in the award of damages without notice to the parties and rejected alternative arguments based on sections 7 and 10(c) of the Charter.

The appellant, a small distillery, challenged the LCBO's 139.7% mark-up on spirits sold at its on-site retail store, arguing it was an unconstitutional tax under sections 53 and 90 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The application judge dismissed the challenge, finding the mark-up was a proprietary charge and not a tax, and that the appellant had voluntarily agreed to it by contract.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that the LCBO, as the owner of the spirits under the contract, was exercising its private law rights to determine prices in a commercial context.

The applicant, a small craft distillery, applied for a declaration that the markup imposed by the LCBO on spirits sold at its on-site retail store was an unconstitutional tax under the Constitution Act, 1867.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the markup was a proprietary charge levied by the LCBO as the owner and commercial supplier of the spirits.

Alternatively, the court held that the markup was a contractual term freely agreed to by the applicant in exchange for the authorization to sell its products.

The applicant, a tobacco manufacturer, challenged the Minister of Finance's demand for security under the Tobacco Tax Act.

The applicant argued that because its products were sold exclusively to on-reserve First Nations retailers and for export, they were not subject to Ontario tax, and thus no security could be demanded.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the plain language of s. 12(2)(f.1) of the Act requires the Minister to demand security for unmarked fine cut tobacco as if it were destined for taxable sale, to protect against the risk of product diversion.

The court also found the Minister's decision to reduce the required security amount was reasonable.

The applicant, an OPP officer facing workplace misconduct proceedings, brought an application for judicial review seeking to quash or stay the proceedings.

He argued that the disciplinary process under the Police Services Act violated his rights under sections 7 and 11 of the Charter by failing to provide an independent and unbiased tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that section 11 applies only to criminal matters, not employment discipline, and that section 7 is not engaged because there is no constitutional right to practice a profession unfettered by regulatory rules.

The court also declined to order the police association to fund the applicant's legal counsel.

The Attorney General applied for the civil forfeiture of a leisure-use sailboat under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, after the owner was charged with operating the vessel while impaired.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the general forfeiture provisions of the Act were intended to target organized crime and serious criminal offences, not leisure boating.

The Crown failed to establish that it was likely the sailboat would be used for unlawful activity in the future or that such activity would likely result in serious bodily harm.

A physician applied under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for remedies following an unlawful police search of his home computer that uncovered child pornography.

The criminal charges were withdrawn due to an invalid search warrant, but the physician’s professional regulator obtained a copy of the hard drive and commenced disciplinary proceedings.

The applicant sought orders requiring destruction of the copied hard drive and prohibiting the regulator from relying on the evidence in the discipline hearing.

The court assumed serious Charter breaches, including possible bad faith by police, but held that neither destruction nor prohibition was appropriate or just in the circumstances.

The Discipline Committee was best positioned to determine the admissibility of the evidence under s. 24(2) in the administrative proceeding.

The applicants sought judicial review of regulations authorizing a two-year spring bear hunt pilot program in northern Ontario, arguing the regulations were ultra vires and the Minister's decision was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Minister complied with the Environmental Bill of Rights process, an environmental assessment was not required due to an existing exemption, and the regulations did not conflict with the Criminal Code's animal cruelty provisions.

The court also held that the Minister's decision to implement the pilot project was protected by privative clauses and not subject to judicial review.

The appellant, a milk farmer, provided unpasteurized milk to individuals through a 'cow share agreement' and was convicted of selling and distributing unpasteurized milk contrary to the Health Protection and Promotion Act and operating an unlicensed milk plant contrary to the Milk Act.

On appeal, he argued the legislation did not apply to his private arrangement and violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the cow-share program was a public marketing scheme caught by the legislation.

The court also held that the prohibition on unpasteurized milk did not violate the right to life, liberty, or security of the person, and was not arbitrary or overbroad given the scientific evidence of public health risks.

The debtor company in CCAA proceedings brought a motion seeking a declaration that two Occupational Health and Safety Act prosecutions commenced by the provincial labour ministry were stayed by the CCAA initial order, or alternatively that the proceedings should be stayed under s. 11.1(4) of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act.

The debtor argued that any conviction would result only in monetary fines, rendering the ministry a creditor whose claim should be addressed within the insolvency process.

The court held that regulatory prosecutions are not equivalent to creditor enforcement where no monetary obligation has yet crystallized and the regulator is acting in a prosecutorial capacity.

Applying the Supreme Court’s test for regulatory claims under insolvency legislation, the court concluded that the ministry was not acting as a creditor and that the proceedings remained regulatory in nature.

The motion to declare the prosecutions stayed was therefore dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of two 2004 decisions denying him disability benefits under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act.

He had failed to appeal the decisions to the Social Benefits Tribunal within the statutory time limit.

In 2008, he reapplied with new medical evidence and was granted benefits, but sought to have the grant made retroactive to 2004.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the judicial review due to the applicant's five-year delay and his failure to pursue his statutory right of appeal.

The respondent purchased timber from the Crown and harvested it pursuant to a licence under the Crown Forest Sustainability Act, 1994.

The price included a Residual Value Charge (RVC).

The respondent successfully applied for a declaration that the RVC was an unlawful tax.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge erred in applying the test for distinguishing regulatory charges from taxes.

The RVC is a proprietary charge and a legitimate component of the price of timber set by the Crown as owner of the resource, not a tax.

The appellants, owners and patrons of adult entertainment parlours, challenged the constitutional validity of the Smoke-Free Ontario Act and sought damages under private law causes of action.

The motion judge struck most of the claims but allowed the division of powers claim to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the private law and Charter claims.

On cross-appeal, the Court held that the division of powers claim should also have been struck, as it is plain and obvious that the pith and substance of the Act is to promote health, which falls within provincial jurisdiction.