Marc Rosenberg

A two-year-old child suffered a catastrophic brain injury after falling from a fifth-floor apartment window with a broken screen.

The jury awarded over $12.9 million in damages, including maximum non-pecuniary damages and future care costs exceeding the plaintiffs' highest suggested scenario.

The landlord appealed the damage awards and several evidentiary rulings, including the admission of subsequent remedial measures and expert witness qualifications.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on liability and damages, finding the jury's awards supported by evidence and the trial judge's evidentiary rulings largely correct or harmless.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding a $350,000 costs premium payable by the landlord, reducing it to $50,000 based on recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, while allowing a cross-appeal to charge the balance of the premium to the child's award.

Mylex Ltd. appealed a trial judgment finding it liable in contract and tort for failing to meet delivery dates and providing poor quality ready-to-assemble furniture to Magnussen Furniture Inc. Magnussen cross-appealed the damages and costs awards.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in finding an 'overall contract' existed, this did not affect the ultimate liability finding based on breached purchase orders and negligence.

The Court upheld the trial judge's assessment of damages, which limited lost profits to a two-year period due to contingencies, and affirmed the discretionary costs award.

Both the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.

The parties reached a settlement agreement prior to the disposition of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the lower court's judgment in accordance with the terms of the settlement.

The appellant was convicted of returning to Canada without the written consent of the Minister after being deported, contrary to s. 55(1) of the Immigration Act.

The trial judge placed an evidentiary burden on the appellant to adduce some evidence of permission to return.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the lack of written consent is an element of the offence, and the burden of proof lies entirely on the Crown.

The common law rule placing the burden on the accused for certain exceptions did not apply.

As the Crown failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt, the appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The self-represented appellant appealed the dismissal of his action.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant had repeatedly failed to comply with the Rules, ignored court orders, and misused court processes.

Finding no reason to interfere with the lower court's decision, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and awarded costs to the respondent.

The parties reached a settlement regarding the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement dismissing the appeal without costs.

The appellant, who was largely unsuccessful at trial, appealed to the Court of Appeal where his appeal on liability was dismissed but the costs order was varied.

After being denied leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the appellant brought a motion before the trial judge under Rule 59.06 to amend or vary the trial order.

The trial judge dismissed the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the subsequent appeal, holding that the trial judge had no jurisdiction to vary an order of the Court of Appeal and that Rule 59.06 applies to orders and judgments, not reasons for judgment.

The appellant challenged a conviction and penitentiary sentence arising from a historical sexual assault in which consent was the central issue.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge improperly used prior consistent statements and post-offence conduct to bolster the complainant’s credibility, misapprehended evidence, applied an uneven standard of scrutiny, and gave insufficient reasons.

The court held that the impugned statements were admissible and were used only to assess consistency of conduct placed in issue by the defence, not for their truth.

The proposed fresh evidence relating to a post-trial statement by the complainant did not meet the admissibility test because it could not reasonably be expected to have affected the verdict.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his sentence of three years' imprisonment.

He argued that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated due to institutional delay following a mistrial.

He also challenged the admission of his prior guilty plea for assaulting the complainant's mother and the admission of the complainant's videotaped statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no unreasonable delay and no error in the evidentiary rulings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the three-year penitentiary sentence was fit given the repeated sexual assaults on a child in a position of trust.

The appellant appealed his conviction.

Fresh evidence was introduced demonstrating that the appellant was not criminally responsible by reason of a mental disorder at the time of the offence.

The Crown and amicus curiae agreed with substituting a finding of not criminally responsible.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, substituted a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, and referred the matter to the Review Board.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by rejecting a joint submission without adjourning the matter to allow the Crown who negotiated the resolution to attend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no obligation on the trial judge to adjourn the case on his own motion, and agreeing that the joint submission was inappropriate and would have brought the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant was convicted of offences relating to a home invasion.

While in custody, he had an incriminating conversation with a co-accused in a police cell, which was overheard by police.

The appellant appealed, arguing his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was infringed because police delayed his access to a lawyer.

The Court of Appeal found a s. 10(b) breach due to the unjustified delay, though it held the police did not actively elicit the conversation.

Applying s. 24(2), the Court excluded the conversation, finding the breach was serious and its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The convictions related to the home invasion were set aside and a new trial ordered.

The young person appealed a conviction entered by a summary conviction appeal judge, arguing a violation of her s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the burden was on the accused to demonstrate a violation and there was no evidence to support the claim.

The failure of police to record that the accused did not wish to speak to a lawyer did not establish a failure to comply with s. 10(b).

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by relying on the complainant's demeanour after the event and at trial as confirmatory of a lack of consent, and by failing to resolve critical credibility issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while demeanour was not confirmatory of lack of consent, its use did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The trial judge's comments were largely a response to defence counsel's suggestions.

The court also found the credibility issues raised by the appellant to be peripheral or adequately explained.

The Crown appealed the respondents' acquittals on drug charges, which were entered following a directed verdict.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in finding there was no evidence upon which a properly instructed trier of fact could convict.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that while the demeanour evidence was weak, the inference of knowledge from the presence of drugs in the unlocked trailer was not unreasonable.

The court held that weighing such inferences is for the trier of fact at the conclusion of all evidence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision of the summary conviction appeal court that had dismissed an appeal from a conviction.

The Crown conceded that the appeal should be allowed.

The Court of Appeal agreed, allowed the appeal, and ordered the matter returned for trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in finding he was not detained during police questioning, which he claimed resulted in a Charter violation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest at the time of questioning, and that the questioning was general and non-coercive.

The court also dismissed an application to admit fresh evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the court found the trial judge's credit for stringent bail conditions was reasonable given the serious nature of the crimes and the appellant's prior record.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for breaching three Canadian court orders (firearms prohibition, probation, and recognizance) after purchasing an assault rifle in Michigan.

He argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the possession occurred outside Canada, and that a procedural error during arraignment vitiated the conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the failure to read the full charge at arraignment caused no prejudice and that Canadian courts have jurisdiction to enforce their own orders even when the breaching conduct occurs abroad.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister's decision ordering his extradition to the United States.

The applicant argued that his extradition would be unjust or oppressive under s. 44(1)(a) of the Extradition Act and would shock the conscience under s. 7 of the Charter, primarily because his elderly parents relied on him for care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister fully considered the relevant circumstances, applied the correct test, and made no reversible error.

The court noted that the need for the applicant's parents to make other care arrangements did not render the extradition unjust or oppressive.

The appellant insurance company appealed an order regarding the interpretation of an insurance policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that clause 14 of the policy was at best ambiguous.

Applying the contra proferentem rule, the court interpreted the clause in favour of the respondent insured and awarded costs of the appeal.