Marc Rosenberg

The appellant father appealed a trial judgment awarding increased child support for his two daughters, arguing procedural unfairness and errors in quantum.

He contended that the trial judge should not have awarded Guidelines support without a formal application and that the children should support their own university education through employment and loans.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural prejudice as the appellant was aware of the issues and had examined the children at trial.

The Court also upheld the quantum of support, noting the trial judge properly accounted for the children's earnings and the terms of the parties' separation agreement.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict regarding an insurance claim for fire damage.

The jury had heard expert evidence from the respondent's electrical engineer that the building's permanent wiring was not the cause of the fire, and that the fire was likely caused by shoddy electrical wiring used for a marijuana grow operation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was evidence upon which the jury could reasonably reach its verdict.

The defendant municipality appealed a trial judgment finding it grossly negligent for failing to sand an icy sidewalk, resulting in the plaintiff's injuries.

The municipality also appealed the admission of expert evidence and the award of pre-judgment interest on future loss of competitive advantage.

The plaintiffs cross-appealed on damages and costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of gross negligence, noting the municipality failed to follow its own winter maintenance policy.

The court allowed the appeal in part to set aside pre-judgment interest on future pecuniary loss, and allowed the cross-appeal in part to award interest on out-of-pocket expenses.

The appellant father appealed a finding that his child was in need of protection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the finding was supported by the record and not tainted by materials solely admissible at the disposition stage.

The Court clarified that the judge hearing the disposition stage would not be bound by certain statements in the lower court's reasons concerning the necessity for court intervention.

The appellant golf club appealed a trial judgment, relying on an exclusion of liability printed on a greens fee ticket.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to bring the exclusion to the respondent's attention as required by section 5(3) of the Occupiers Liability Act.

The court also found no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's treatment of expert evidence, as the expert had not considered certain facts accepted by the trial judge.

The respondent was charged under s. 106(6) of the Highway Traffic Act for driving with a child passenger who was not wearing a seat belt.

The trial judge convicted the respondent, finding the offence to be one of absolute liability.

The summary conviction appeal judge allowed the appeal, holding that it was a strict liability offence and remitted the matter for consideration of a due diligence defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, applying the Sault Ste.

Marie framework to conclude that the offence is one of strict liability, allowing for a defence of due diligence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and forcible confinement involving a 13-year-old complainant.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the theory of the defence, consent, mistake of age, and reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge adequately set out the defence's theory, properly instructed the jury on the withdrawal of consent and the objective element of the mistake of age defence, and correctly applied the burden of proof.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff was injured when a rental truck in which he was a passenger crashed.

The truck had been rented for the plaintiff's use, but was driven by an intoxicated, unlicensed acquaintance who had taken the keys.

The plaintiff had jumped into the passenger seat to try to stop him.

The plaintiff sued the driver, the rental company, and his own insurer.

The rental company moved for summary judgment, arguing it was not vicariously liable under s. 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act because the vehicle was operated without its consent.

The motion judge dismissed the rental company's motion and granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, finding the rental company liable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the rental company's appeal, holding that while the rental company was not entitled to summary judgment because an owner can be liable if the person with consent remains in possession as a passenger, the plaintiff was also not entitled to summary judgment because whether he was actually in possession of the vehicle at the time of the crash was a genuine issue for trial.

The appellant life insurance company appealed a trial judgment awarding its former agent damages for breach of fiduciary duty, punitive damages, and vested renewal commissions following his termination.

The trial judge found the appellant breached its fiduciary duty by freezing the agent's vested commission account and acted in bad faith in its post-termination conduct.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on the vested commissions, the breach of fiduciary duty, the punitive damages award, and the dismissal of the appellant's counterclaim.

However, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal regarding the trial judge's award of a risk premium on costs, holding that the amended Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure does not permit a risk premium to be awarded against an unsuccessful party.

The Crown appealed a decision granting certiorari and prohibition to quash summonses issued under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The application judge held that jurisdiction was lost when nothing was done on the original return date and that the one-year limitation period had expired before new summonses were issued.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that s. 31 of the Provincial Offences Act preserves jurisdiction over the offence and permits the issuance of new summonses.

The Court also held that a prosecution is instituted when an information is laid, not when process is issued, meaning the charges were laid within the limitation period.

The appellant, a lawyer who had power of attorney over a deceased client's affairs, was convicted of theft over $1,000 for failing to notify an insurance company of the client's death and continuing to collect annuity payments.

He appealed the conviction and the dismissal of his pre-trial motion for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal found that while the application judge erred in attributing certain periods of delay, the total institutional and Crown delay of ten months fell within acceptable limits.

The court also found sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant had the requisite mens rea.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's two-year delay in rendering a decision, followed by an additional five-month delay to release brief reasons, constituted an unreasonable delay.

The appeal was allowed, the finding of guilt was set aside, and the proceedings were stayed.

The appellant appealed his sentence for offences including being a party to pointing a loaded shotgun in a public place and possessing the weapon while subject to three firearms prohibitions and probation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge correctly distinguished between the appellant and his brother when imposing sentence.

Given the gravity of the offences, the appellant's record, and other aggravating circumstances, the sentence was deemed fit and the appeal was dismissed.

Four physicians appealed the dismissal of their action against a hospital regarding a reduction in their operating room allocation.

The motion judge had dismissed the action against the hospital, finding the court lacked jurisdiction as the matter fell under the statutory review regime of the Public Hospitals Act, but allowed the action to continue against the hospital's CEO.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the physicians' appeal and allowed the CEO's cross-appeal, concluding that the dispute over operating room access was a matter of hospital privileges governed by the Act, and that the pleadings failed to allege any personal wrongdoing by the CEO.

The appellant appealed the global sentence of twelve years imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge's decision to be thorough and well-reasoned, and the sentence entirely fit.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that the judge failed to apply the test in s. 490.012(4) of the Criminal Code regarding a Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding no basis to refuse the order.

The appeal was allowed, and an order was issued requiring the respondent to register under SOIRA.

The appellant appealed a 22-month custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's breach of a bail condition as an aggravating factor to increase the length of the sentence.

Leave to appeal was granted and the sentence was reduced to 15 months.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order regarding child support, specifically challenging the amount of income imputed to the respondent, the credit given for retroactive support, and the allocation of the child's university expenses.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's findings of fact were supported by the record and dismissed the appeal.

The insured claimed the full value of an OPCF-19A endorsement after his vehicle was damaged.

The insurer suspected the initial appraisal was fraudulent and required the insured to attend an examination under oath pursuant to Statutory Condition 6(4).

The insured refused to answer questions about the appraisal and commenced an action.

The insurer counterclaimed for misrepresentation.

The motion judge held the insurer lost the right to the statutory examination once litigation commenced and granted summary judgment dismissing the counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the statutory examination can co-exist with discovery, its scope includes matters material to liability such as suspected fraud, and the summary judgment was improperly granted as the moving parties failed to adduce evidence.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition to the United States, arguing that the demanding state did not produce reliable evidence because the means of knowledge of a special agent were not disclosed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the record provided detailed information about the special agent's means of knowledge through electronic and physical surveillance, which demonstrated the reliability of the evidence and confirmed the appellant's identity.