Susan Margot Blight

The plaintiff, dismissed without cause from her Group Station Manager position at the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC), moved for summary judgment in her wrongful dismissal claim.

She sought damages based on a 12-month notice period, loss of benefits, and pregnancy-related top-ups, as well as aggravated and moral damages for unpaid vacation and breach of confidence regarding her pregnancy.

The TTC argued for a 4-month notice period and disputed other claims.

The plaintiff abandoned her claims for moral and aggravated damages to proceed with the summary judgment motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial, primarily due to a significant factual dispute regarding the character of the plaintiff's employment (senior vs. mid-level manager) which directly impacted the appropriate notice period and the reasonableness of her mitigation efforts.

In a wrongful dismissal action, the plaintiff previously succeeded on a Rule 21 motion declaring a termination clause in the employment contract void for non‑compliance with the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The court addressed the quantum of costs arising from that motion.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the indemnity principle, the court held that partial indemnity costs were appropriate because any settlement offer relating to the broader litigation could not yet be considered.

While most hours and rates claimed were reasonable given the complexity and importance of the issue, some adjustments were warranted.

The court fixed the plaintiff’s costs of the motion and determined a conditional additional amount should substantial indemnity later be awarded by the trial judge.

The plaintiff employee brought a motion to determine two questions of law following his dismissal without cause.

First, he argued that the termination clause in his employment contract was void because it excluded the continuation of group insurance benefits during the statutory notice period, contrary to the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

Second, he argued he was entitled to statutory severance pay because the employer's global payroll exceeded $2.5 million, even though its Ontario payroll did not.

The court agreed on both issues, finding the termination clause null and void for violating the Act's minimum standards, and ruling that the calculation of an employer's payroll under section 64 is not restricted to wages paid in Ontario.

A motion raised a question of law concerning the enforceability of a termination clause in an employment contract under the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The clause limited termination compensation to base salary and excluded commissions and the continuation of benefits.

The court held the clause violated statutory minimum standards because it attempted to exclude the employer’s obligation to maintain benefit contributions during the statutory notice period under ss. 60 and 61 of the Act.

The court further interpreted s. 64 of the Act and held that an employer’s payroll for severance eligibility includes the wages of all employees, not only those in Ontario.

The termination clause was declared void and the employer remained liable to pay statutory severance.

Following the reorganization of Ontario school boards, the appellant and respondent school boards entered into an agreement to share the liability for retirement benefits of transferred teachers.

The appellant later argued the agreement was invalid because it did not fall under section 135(26.1) of the Education Act and was vitiated by common mistake.

The Court of Appeal held that the Act does not preclude boards from making binding agreements outside of section 135(26.1).

The Court also found no fundamental mistake that would void the agreement and refused to cap the appellant's liability at the initial estimated amount.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant school board appealed a trial decision finding it liable for a proportionate share of retirement gratuities owed to teachers transferred during a school board reorganization.

The trial judge found that while the agreement between the boards did not fall under s. 135(26.1) of the Education Act, it was still a valid and enforceable agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Education Act does not preclude agreements outside of s. 135(26.1), the agreement was not vitiated by mutual mistake, and the appellant's liability was not limited to the initial estimated amount.

The Crown appealed a decision granting certiorari and prohibition to quash summonses issued under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The application judge held that jurisdiction was lost when nothing was done on the original return date and that the one-year limitation period had expired before new summonses were issued.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that s. 31 of the Provincial Offences Act preserves jurisdiction over the offence and permits the issuance of new summonses.

The Court also held that a prosecution is instituted when an information is laid, not when process is issued, meaning the charges were laid within the limitation period.

The appellants appealed an order granting an injunction against them for obstructing access to the respondent's work site during a labour dispute.

The appellants argued that a protocol had been agreed upon and successfully applied by the police.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's finding that no such agreement existed and that the union's imposition of a one-hour delay for entering vehicles amounted to unlawful obstruction.

The court upheld the trial judge's application of the R.J.R-MacDonald factors and dismissed the appeal, subject to removing the union as a named party.

The applicant filed an application alleging that the union breached its duty of fair representation under section 74 of the Labour Relations Act.

The union had investigated complaints about a job selection process and filed a grievance, which it later settled with the employer by agreeing to re-run certain positions.

The applicant, who had been successful in the initial selection process, complained that the union acted arbitrarily by not seeking his input before settling the grievance.

The Board dismissed the application, finding that the union had conducted a sufficient investigation to establish that the initial complaints were well-founded, and its failure to seek the applicant's input did not constitute a violation of the Act.

The applicant, an employee in a temporary rotational position, alleged that his union breached its duty of fair representation under section 74 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

The union had negotiated an Incentive Pay Plan with the employer but was unable to secure the employer's agreement to include employees in rotational positions.

The Board dismissed the application, finding that a union does not violate the Act merely by failing to secure a benefit for all members, absent any allegation that the exclusion was motivated by arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith conduct.

The applicant union applied for certification.

Prior to the conclusion of the hearing regarding the appropriate geographic scope of the bargaining unit, the parties reached an agreement.

The Board found the agreed-upon unit of security guards at the Lakeview Generating Station to be appropriate for collective bargaining.

As more than fifty percent of the ballots cast in the representation vote were in favour of the applicant, the Board ordered that a certificate issue to the applicant.

The applicants sought a new representation vote, alleging the employer committed unfair labour practices by denying union leave to SEIU members to campaign for OSSTF while granting leave to CUPE members, and allowing CUPE to campaign on school time.

The Board dismissed the request for a new vote on a preliminary motion, finding that even if the allegations were true, the conduct amounted to a loss of opportunity to influence voters rather than conduct that would overwhelm employees' ability to express their true wishes in a secret ballot.

The union filed construction industry grievances against two employers for failing to pay interest charges on late remittances to trust funds, as required by the collective agreement.

The employers raised preliminary objections, primarily arguing that the grievances were untimely.

The Board found that the trust fund administrator's 'dunning letters' did not constitute formal grievances and that the actual grievances were filed well beyond the time limits specified in the collective agreement.

The Board declined to exercise its discretion under section 48(16) of the Labour Relations Act to extend the time limits, finding no reasonable grounds to do so, and dismissed the grievances in their entirety.

The respondents in a human rights complaint alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation brought a preliminary motion seeking access to the notes made by the Commission's investigating officer.

The respondents argued that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Stinchcombe required full disclosure.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, holding that Stinchcombe does not apply directly to human rights proceedings, which are civil rather than criminal in nature.

The Board emphasized the need to protect the confidentiality of witnesses who participate in human rights investigations to prevent potential reprisal and ensure the efficacy of the investigative process.

The individual respondent brought a preliminary motion to stay human rights proceedings against him, arguing that an extensive delay by the Commission infringed his rights under s. 7 of the Charter and breached the principles of natural justice.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, finding that s. 7 of the Charter does not apply to remedial human rights proceedings because neither the potential consequences nor the nature of the proceedings jeopardize the liberty or security interests of the respondent.

The Board also found no actual prejudice to the respondent's ability to mount a full answer and defence, and no procedural unfairness amounting to a breach of natural justice.

The individual respondent brought a preliminary motion requesting the Board of Inquiry step aside because the substance of settlement negotiations had been disclosed to the Board during related judicial review proceedings.

The Commission argued the disclosure was necessary to respond to the respondent's allegations of delay and failure to pursue settlement.

The Board granted the motion and stepped aside, finding that the disclosure of settlement details was unilateral and unnecessary, and that preserving the public policy of encouraging settlements required adjudicators to remain unaware of such negotiations.