Marc Rosenberg

The appellant, a user of the drug Paxil, brought a proposed class action against the respondent pharmaceutical companies alleging abuse of process, conspiracy, and waiver of tort.

The appellant claimed the respondents misused the Notice of Compliance proceedings under the Patent Act to delay the entry of a cheaper generic equivalent into the market, forcing consumers to pay supra-competitive prices.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim, finding it disclosed no viable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, concluding that the appellant was not a party to the legal process initiated by the respondents, the respondents' predominant purpose was to advance their own economic interests rather than injure the appellant, and there was no predicate wrongdoing to support a waiver of tort claim.

The Superintendent appealed a Divisional Court decision that set aside a Licence Appeal Tribunal order revoking the registration of a private career college.

The Divisional Court had found a reasonable apprehension of bias based on the adjudicator's statement that the self-represented principal was 'misleading the Tribunal' and her irrelevant questioning about his possible ties to a terrorist organization.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the finding of bias, rejecting the argument that the bias claim was waived, and affirming that a new hearing was the appropriate remedy despite the strength of the Superintendent's case.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the grounds of appeal were weak and had no significance beyond the immediate case.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder for the killing of a police officer.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge misdirected the jury regarding expert psychiatric evidence and that the Crown engaged in illegal jury vetting by seeking police officers' opinions on potential jurors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions correctly explained how to weigh expert opinions based on hearsay without shifting the burden of proof.

The Court also held that the jury vetting process did not give the Crown an unfair advantage or create an appearance of bias, as the police opinions were not drawn from databases and the Crown had no obligation to disclose them.

The appellant was convicted of fraud and appealed on two grounds: the trial judge's refusal to allow him to testify about conversations with a business associate regarding NSF cheques, and the Crown's undisclosed jury vetting process using police databases.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in excluding the evidence as hearsay, the error caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice because the jury had sufficient other evidence to assess the appellant's state of mind.

Regarding the jury vetting, the Court held that while the Crown breached its disclosure obligations and the police misused databases, the non-disclosure did not impact the reliability of the verdict or the overall fairness of the trial process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The self-represented appellant appealed a summary judgment ordering him to pay a mortgage debt and give up possession of his property.

He argued that he had paid condominium fees, that the respondents wrongly discharged a lien against the property, and that he received no notice of non-renewal of the mortgage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the motion judge, noting the mortgage had matured and the respondents properly paid the condominium corporation to satisfy the lien.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to stay the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice, which struck down several prostitution-related provisions of the Criminal Code as unconstitutional, pending appeal.

The moving party argued that the judgment created a legislative void with profound implications for the public interest.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that there was a serious issue to be tried, the government would suffer irreparable harm to the public interest without a stay, and the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo.

The motion was granted and the judgment was stayed for a limited period to permit appellate review.

The appellant appealed his manslaughter conviction arising from the shooting death of his friend.

The Crown's case at trial relied heavily on expert evidence regarding gunshot residue and bullet trajectory to prove the appellant, rather than the deceased, fired the handgun.

On appeal, the Court found that the expert opinions were significantly undermined during cross-examination, leaving no reliable evidence to exclude the reasonable possibility of a self-inflicted injury.

The Court of Appeal concluded the jury's verdict was unreasonable, allowed the appeal, and entered an acquittal.

The appellants, residents of a social housing complex, were arrested by security guards for trespass after refusing to answer questions and acting belligerently.

At trial, the jury returned inconsistent answers, and the trial judge dismissed the action, finding the guards had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by engaging in fact-finding to fill gaps in the jury's answers.

The Court found that the guards lacked reasonable and probable grounds to believe the appellants were trespassing, as residents have no legal obligation to answer security guards' questions.

Judgment was entered for the appellants for false arrest and assault.

The appellants appealed an order finding that a letter sent by the respondent prior to litigation was protected by absolute privilege.

The appellants argued that the prospect of litigation was too remote at the time the letter was sent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the letter was a preparatory step taken with a view to judicial proceedings and therefore fell within the confines of absolute privilege.

The appellant appealed a decision refusing to extend the time to appeal an order that set aside a previous order and transferred the family law proceeding to London, Ontario.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit to the proposed appeal.

The court held that the original judge had jurisdiction to set aside her own order under the Rules of Civil Procedure, rendering the doctrine of functus officio inapplicable, and properly transferred the venue under the Family Law Rules.

The appellant appealed a decision finding it liable for tax under s. 189(1)(e) of the Mining Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the appellant's acquisition of mineral rights fell within the statutory definition of 'mining rights'.

The court held that the industry distinction between surface rights and surface access rights does not apply for the purpose of tax liability under the Act.

The appellant, a fugitive from justice convicted of securities offences in absentia, appealed orders refusing to set aside a noting in default and granting default judgment against her for over $770,000.

The respondents had sued for breach of contract and fraud related to unfulfilled share agreements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's refusal to set aside the noting in default, finding the appellant's delay was tactical and her explanation for failing to defend lacked credibility.

The court also upheld the default judgment, finding no material inconsistencies in the evidence, but reduced the prejudgment interest rate on concession.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that found them liable for trespass, issued a mandatory order, awarded damages including punitive damages, refused to order partition, and awarded substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's strong findings of fact or assessment of damages.

The court upheld the punitive damages due to the egregious nature of the trespass and affirmed the costs award.

Following the dismissal of a motion for leave to appeal with costs, the moving party complained that it was not given the opportunity to make submissions as to costs.

The court invited submissions.

The responding party provided submissions and a bill of costs supporting the amount awarded, while the moving party provided no further submissions.

The Court of Appeal was satisfied that the original costs order was fair and ordered that it stand.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice, Family Court, arguing that the motion judge misapprehended the Minutes of Settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no such misapprehension, and awarded costs of $5,000 to the respondent.

The appellant wife appealed a trial judgment finding that the respondent husband had a fifty percent beneficial interest by way of resulting trust in a property, and failing to order retroactive child support for a specific period.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's decision to award no costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice in the failure to plead resulting trust and no error in the trial judge's appreciation of the evidence regarding the property or child support.

The cross-appeal was also dismissed, as the offers to settle would not have affected the costs outcome.

The appellant appealed his conviction for touching for a sexual purpose.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting prior consistent statements made by the complainant to her school friends and by failing to properly resolve inconsistencies in her testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the prior statements were properly admitted to rebut the defence's allegation of recent fabrication and that the trial judge's resolution of the evidentiary inconsistencies was reasonably supported by the record.

An Ontario resident insured by the respondent was injured in a car accident in North Carolina caused by a driver insured by the appellant.

The respondent paid statutory accident benefits and demanded arbitration for loss transfer under s. 275 of the Insurance Act.

The appellant refused, arguing the scheme did not apply because the accident occurred outside Canada and the policy was issued in North Carolina.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that because the appellant is an Ontario insurer, it is required to arbitrate the claim.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that pierced the corporate veil and set aside a transaction under s. 2 of the Fraudulent Conveyance Act.

The respondents cross-appealed regarding $8,000 taken by the appellant following the deceased's death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge applied the correct test from Wildman v. Wildman.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, noting the appellant admitted to taking the $8,000, which was an asset of the estate.

Costs of $15,000 were awarded to the respondents.