Marc Rosenberg

The appellant appealed a decision regarding a title insurance claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge and finding that the claim was barred by the exclusions and exceptions relating to leases in the insurance policy.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that there was consideration to support the agreement.

Costs were fixed at $5,000.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict in a motor vehicle accident case, arguing the trial judge erred by charging the jury on both the 'but for' and 'material contribution' tests for causation.

The Court of Appeal agreed that charging on both tests was an error of law, as only one test applies.

However, the court found no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, as the trial judge's explanation of 'material contribution' effectively amounted to a further instruction on the 'but for' test.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding the trial judge's guidance on the quantum of damages was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action for non-compliance with the governing limitation period.

She argued that the action should proceed because the motion judge did not find actual prejudice to the defendants, despite the statement of claim being served more than two years late.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly considered the relevant factors, including prejudice and the complete lack of explanation for the delay by the appellant's solicitor.

The appellants appealed a decision staying their action against the respondents on the basis that the dispute was subject to an arbitration clause in a franchise agreement.

The appellants argued the franchise agreement was void ab initio, meaning the arbitration clause was not triggered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the argument was not raised before the motion judge and was undercut by the factual record.

The Court agreed with the motion judge that the arbitration agreement was broad enough to encompass disputes regarding the validity of the franchise agreement itself.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to inquire into his Aboriginal background and consider s. 718(2)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence in the form of a Gladue report detailing the appellant's systemic and personal challenges.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to time served, with additional probation conditions requiring the appellant to reside with his father, attend counselling, and participate in a Healing Lodge program.

The appellant appealed an order but failed to comply with any of its provisions and stopped making child support payments.

Applying Dickie v. Dickie, the Court of Appeal stayed the appeal until the appellant complies with the previous court order.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the circumstantial evidence, which included the appellant driving the car to the drug deal, questioning the undercover officer's identity, and being found in possession of the buy money shortly after the transaction, was sufficient to ground the convictions.

The court concluded there was no misapprehension of evidence and dismissed the appeal.

Following a change in corporate control, the new management of Echo Energy Canada Inc. sought to assess the paid accounts of three law firms retained by the former management.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding no 'special circumstances' under s. 11 of the Solicitors Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part.

The Court found that the application judge erred in principle by adopting a lawyer-focused perspective and failing to consider evidence that the former directors may not have acted in the company's best interests when approving the accounts of litigation counsel (Lenczner and Voorheis).

Special circumstances were established for those accounts.

However, the appeal regarding the corporate counsel (McCarthy) was dismissed as no special circumstances were shown.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the conviction did not depend on accepting the police evidence, as the appellant's own evidence established both the actus reus and mens rea of the offence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision that upheld her conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that the trial judge had compelling reasons to reject the appellant's evidence, the appeal judge's reasons were sufficient under the Sheppard test, and the proposed fresh evidence could not have affected the verdict.

The appellant appealed his sentence, having already served his term of imprisonment but expressing concerns about his ability to comply with the probation terms.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence fit given the seriousness of the offence and the appellant's record.

The court held that any future problems with probation terms should be addressed through an application under s. 732.2 of the Criminal Code.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of two unrelated counts of first degree murder following a joint trial.

The Crown's case relied heavily on statements obtained during a 'Mr. Big' operation and testimony from unsavoury witnesses.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to sever the counts and in denying a mistrial application after a witness blurted out highly prejudicial, inadmissible evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by concluding the absence of similar fact evidence militated against severance.

The Court held that the risk of impermissible propensity reasoning was overwhelming and ordered a new trial with the counts severed.

The appellant corporations were placed into receivership.

The boards of directors retained counsel to oppose the receivership and represent the corporations' interests.

The motion judge held that the boards did not have the right to retain counsel without court approval but awarded partial costs on an equitable basis.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the boards retained residual authority to retain counsel without prior approval of the receiver or the court to challenge the receivership or the receiver's actions.

The Court ordered that the reasonable legal fees for the receivership litigation be paid out of the corporations' assets.

The young person appealed his conviction for robbery of a fast food delivery driver.

The sole issue at trial was identification, which the trial judge determined based on video surveillance, clothing seized upon arrest, and cell phone records.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reliance on the video surveillance or her application of the Nikolovski principle to compare the accused with the person in the video.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the summary conviction appeal judge that the breath test evidence should not have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge had not had the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Grant and failed to consider the officers' good faith and the minimal intrusiveness of the breath test.

The appellant pleaded guilty to infanticide in 1998 based on the pathology opinion of a paediatric forensic pathologist.

Following a Coroner's Review and a public inquiry, new expert evidence revealed there was no reliable pathological evidence to support the conclusion that the cause of death was asphyxia.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, finding a miscarriage of justice had occurred.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in 1994 for the death of her newborn child, based heavily on the flawed forensic pathology evidence of Dr. Charles Smith.

Following the Goudge Inquiry, which revealed serious errors in Dr. Smith's conclusions, the appellant sought to introduce fresh expert evidence demonstrating that the cause of death could not be ascertained and that there was no evidence of asphyxia.

The Crown consented to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea, and ordered a new trial, finding that the appellant would not have pleaded guilty but for the flawed expert opinion.

The appellants challenged the municipal tax assessments of several bank tower properties in downtown Toronto.

The Assessment Review Board initially ruled that the phrase 'fee simple, if unencumbered' in the Assessment Act required the properties to be valued as if they were vacant.

The Divisional Court overturned this, holding that the standard of review was correctness and that the Board erred in law.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's interpretation, confirming that income-producing properties should be assessed using market rents and a normal vacancy rate, rather than assuming they are entirely vacant.

The appeal was allowed only to the limited extent of returning the matter to the same panel of the Board rather than a new one.

The appellant franchisor appealed a trial judgment finding it breached a franchise agreement and the statutory duty of good faith under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The trial judge found the franchisor deliberately withheld information from the franchisee regarding a new head lease and denied the franchisee's conditional right of renewal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's interpretation of the contract, her decision to treat the individual franchisee and his corporation as a single entity, and the damages awarded for breach of contract, breach of good faith, and mental distress.