Lene Madsen

The appellant appealed his conviction on three counts of historical sexual assault against his niece.

He argued that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence by misinterpreting his testimony and overlooking internal inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability.

The appellant and respondent, adult siblings, were named co-estate trustees of their father's estate.

Disagreements arose over the payment of estate debts, leading to a breakdown in the administration of the estate.

The application judge removed the appellant as estate trustee, finding she had obstructed the estate's administration and preferred her own interests, while dismissing the application to remove the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's discretionary decision and concluding that the appellant's arguments regarding the law of abatement were an ex post facto rationalization for her conduct.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for various offences, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that maintained his conditional discharge with reduced reporting requirements.

He argued that he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety and should be granted an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board reasonably relied on expert psychiatric evidence indicating that the appellant required a longer transition period in independent living to ensure medication compliance and mental stability.

The appellant, Toronto Wholesale Produce Association (TWPA), appealed a trial judgment finding it breached a Sale and Maintenance Agreement (SMA) with the respondent, ID Inc., regarding the conversion of a billboard to a digital sign.

The trial judge had awarded ID Inc. damages for lost profits, finding the SMA had not expired and that TWPA had waived or was estopped from relying on the expiry provision.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in her contractual interpretation by injecting a fault concept into the plain language of the SMA, which clearly stated the agreement would terminate if a permit was not obtained within 360 days.

The Court also found no evidence to support waiver or estoppel.

ID Inc.'s cross-appeal regarding an alleged separate oral agreement was dismissed, as the trial judge correctly applied the objective test for contract formation.

The action against TWPA was dismissed.

The appellant, an investment advisor, received a recruitment bonus structured as a loan to be forgiven annually if revenue targets were met.

After the employer failed to credit bonuses for two years, the parties signed an Amended Note extending the repayment period and acknowledging the unpaid bonuses.

Following his termination, the respondent sued to enforce the Amended Note.

The appellant argued the Amended Note lacked fresh consideration.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the Amended Note was supported by valid consideration, including clarification of the parties' relationship, tax deferral benefits, and an extended interest-free period.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondents purchased a motel and gas station from the appellants.

The trial judge found the appellants fraudulently misrepresented the condition of the underground fuel tank system and breached the Agreement of Purchase and Sale by failing to provide a required safety compliance report.

The trial judge awarded damages based on the cost to replace the tank system.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred by not granting an adjournment due to late disclosure of a Pierringer agreement, misapprehending evidence about compliance alternatives, and using the wrong measure of damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellants never requested an adjournment or stay at trial, and the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors in her assessment of damages or contractual interpretation.

ID Inc. appealed the dismissal of its claim against StrategyCorp, which arose from a dispute over the transformation of a billboard to a digital sign and a related consulting agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that StrategyCorp did not intentionally interfere with ID Inc.'s economic relations, the consulting agreement was conditional on a separate agreement that never materialized, StrategyCorp had repudiated the agreement which ID Inc. accepted by silence, and StrategyCorp did not breach its duty of good faith.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party, Aviva General Insurance Company, sought leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision that found Carrie-Anne Davis suffered an "accident" under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS) after slipping on ice near her car.

The Court of Appeal clarified that the `Sault Dock` framework for leave to appeal remains unchanged, despite recent comments in `West Whitby`.

The Court denied leave, finding the dispute largely fact-specific and that Aviva had not presented an arguable case to change the settled SABS "accident" test.

This was a motion to quash a notice of appeal filed by Edgar Bray.

The underlying litigation involved a commercial lease, where default judgment was granted against Mr. Bray and Triloq Corp. The moving parties argued that no appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from a default judgment because it is not a final order under s. 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court confirmed the interlocutory nature of default judgments, noting that the proper mechanism to challenge such a judgment is a motion to set aside under Rule 19.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion to quash was granted, and the appellant was ordered to pay substantial indemnity costs.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court judgment that found the appellants liable for fraudulent misrepresentation and pierced the corporate veil.

The underlying dispute involved a three-way agreement for medical gloves, where the appellants, acting as distributors, failed to deliver a significant portion of goods and misrepresented their "factory direct" relationship with the manufacturer.

The trial judge found the appellants engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation in Canada, leading to the plaintiff's losses, and held the individual principals personally liable.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the application of the corporate veil piercing test, the trial judge's distinction between Canada-based and China-based fraud, and the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that fraudulent misrepresentation constitutes "conduct akin to fraud" for piercing the corporate veil, that the trial judge's analysis of distinct frauds was within the pleadings, and that the costs award was a discretionary matter warranting no interference.

The appellant, The Corporation of the Township of Ignace, appealed a summary judgment order that awarded the respondent, Karen Dufault, damages for wrongful dismissal.

The core issue was the enforceability of termination clauses in an employment contract under the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (ESA).

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that the "for cause" termination clause was unenforceable because its definition of "cause" was broader than the ESA's narrow exception for "wilful misconduct." Applying the principle from Waksdale v. Swegon North America Inc., the court held that the invalidity of the "for cause" clause rendered all termination provisions in the contract unenforceable, even though the respondent was terminated without cause.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the original award of damages.

This is a panel review of a single judge's order dismissing a motion to stay a return order for an infant child to Bangladesh, pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal majority granted the review, set aside the stay dismissal, and granted a stay of the return order.

The majority found that the single judge erred in principle by giving insufficient weight to the serious issue of the relationship between the Children's Law Reform Act and pending refugee claims, and by misapplying the irreparable harm and balance of convenience tests, particularly regarding the child's best interests and the potential loss of refugee status.

The dissenting judge argued that the majority conducted a de novo review rather than applying deference to the single judge's discretionary order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for four firearms-related charges, arguing that the trial judge improperly used judicial notice regarding drug subculture and the operational nature of firearms, and denied procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were well-anchored in the evidence and that any comments about the drug industry were peripheral to the core reasoning, not constituting improper judicial notice or procedural unfairness.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order upholding the validity of a marriage contract and denying relief for alleged physical injury and loss of income.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision to determine the contract's validity on motion, given the appellant's failure to read it and lack of material conflicts in evidence.

The court also upheld the denial of relief for injury, noting no spousal support claim was made and insufficient evidence.

The appellant's request for leave to appeal costs was also dismissed, with the court deferring to the motion judge's discretion on costs, including those for conferences where the appellant was unprepared.

The appellant appealed an order striking his Notice of Application and refusing leave to amend, which sought Charter relief against the respondents.

The motion judge found the Charter claim could not succeed, was a collateral attack on a Law Society decision, and that the Charter did not apply to the individual respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the Charter interpretation or application, and that summary determination was not an abuse of process.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's motion for review of a single judge's order regarding joint representation, deeming it frivolous and an abuse of process.

Ms. Sochnyeva sought a review of a previous order dismissing her motions for a stay of Divisional Court orders, pending her motions for leave to appeal.

She also brought a motion for reconsideration and reinstatement of a previously dismissed leave to appeal motion.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision regarding the stay, noting the matter was moot as her leave to appeal motions had already been dismissed.

The court also dismissed her motion for reconsideration, finding no circumstances to justify reversing the earlier denial of leave to appeal.

The appellants, Stewart Wilson and Elizabeth Wilson, appealed a motion judge's order dismissing two of their actions, one against Sara Fatahi-Ghandehari and another against Abrahams LLP.

The respondents sought dismissal of the appeal under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing it was an abuse of process given the appellants' history of vexatious litigation and non-compliance with court orders.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal to be an abuse of process, reflecting frivolous or vexatious allegations and a continuation of issues previously struck by the court.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, Carolyn Burden, appealed her conviction for fraud over $5,000 and her five-year sentence, which included restitution and forfeiture orders.

She argued her guilty plea was uninformed and the sentence unduly harsh, particularly regarding the imposition of both a forfeiture order and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding her plea informed and voluntary.

However, it granted leave to appeal sentence, setting aside the forfeiture order and reducing the fine in lieu of forfeiture to account for prior restitution payments, clarifying that only one such order (forfeiture or fine in lieu) can be imposed and that restitution should reduce the fine.

The appellant sought to set aside a motion judge's order dismissing her Notice of Objection to a Will and an order for interest on legacies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's factual findings and upholding the summary determination of the estate matter under Rule 75.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court also denied leave to appeal the costs order, affirming the discretionary nature of interest and costs awards.

This costs endorsement followed the Court of Appeal's reasons dated November 1, 2024, where parties were invited to make submissions regarding costs if they could not agree.

After reviewing the submissions, the Court ordered the respondent, Matthew Preston, to pay the appellant, Cervus Equipment Corporation, all-inclusive costs of $30,000 for the motion.