Lene Madsen

The appellant, Clifton Vassel, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable regarding planning and deliberation, and that the jury instructions on this element were flawed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude planning and deliberation, and that the trial judge's instructions adequately outlined the relevant evidence, even if not exhaustive.

The appellant, Kevin Hyde, appealed convictions for dangerous driving causing death and impaired driving causing death, and sought leave to appeal his sentence of 6.5 years.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no legal error or material misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge, who had reasonably rejected the appellant's medical condition defence.

The court also dismissed a motion to file fresh accident reconstruction evidence due to a lack of due diligence.

While leave to appeal the sentence was granted, the sentence appeal was dismissed as the appellant failed to demonstrate that the sentence was manifestly unfit or based on errors in principle.

The appellant, Valerie Jacob, a recipient of Canada Pension Plan Disability Benefit (CPP-D), challenged the eligibility criteria for the Canadian Emergency Response Benefit (CERB) and Canadian Recovery Benefit (CRB) during the COVID-19 pandemic.

She argued that the $5,000 income threshold and the exclusion of CPP-D from eligible income sources violated her equality rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The application judge dismissed her claim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the income threshold and the exclusion of CPP-D did constitute a breach of s. 15(1) due to their disproportionate impact on disabled workers.

However, the Court further concluded that this breach was justified as a reasonable limit under s. 1 of the Charter, given the emergency context of the pandemic and the government's need for a simple, fast mechanism for benefit delivery, along with subsequent ameliorative measures like relaxed Employment Insurance rules.

The appeal was dismissed, and no costs were ordered.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to declare a mistrial in a sexual assault case after conviction but before sentencing.

The trial judge had admitted fresh evidence of the accused's subsequent acquittal on similar fact charges, believing it rendered the similar fact evidence inadmissible retrospectively.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in misinterpreting the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Mahalingan, which clarified that issue estoppel does not operate retrospectively to render evidence inadmissible in an earlier completed trial, even if sentencing has not occurred.

The Court also found that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 676(1)(b) of the Criminal Code because the trial judge failed to exercise jurisdiction on legally valid grounds by not proceeding to sentencing.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter remitted for sentencing.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a sexual assault charge.

The appeal argued that the trial judge erred in analyzing the complainant's capacity to consent and subjective consent, specifically by misapplying the test for capacity and failing to consider all evidence, and by taking an "all or nothing" approach to subjective consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the G.F. framework for capacity to consent or in his assessment of subjective consent, noting that a trial judge is not required to explicitly address every item of evidence.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault based on a 1983 incident, with identity being the central issue.

The complainant identified the appellant by voice, not sight.

The appeal argued that the trial judge erred by failing to provide an adequate eye-witness identification caution and an insufficient voice identification caution.

The Court of Appeal found that both cautions were essential given the frailties in the identification evidence, including the historical nature of the allegations and the complainant's limited observation.

The court concluded that the errors were not harmless and could have affected the verdict.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, convicted of multiple firearms offences, appealed his convictions on two grounds: misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge regarding forensic testing, and unreasonable verdicts due to the circumstantial evidence not eliminating the possibility of another person hiding the guns.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence was not material to the conviction.

It also found the verdicts were reasonable, as the inference of the appellant's knowledge and control over the hidden firearms was available given his operation of the studio and the nature of the hidden items.

The appeal was allowed in part, quashing the conviction on one count of careless storage of a firearm (Count 16) and entering an acquittal, but otherwise dismissed.

This is an appeal from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board (ORB) concerning an individual found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for uttering threats and possessing a weapon.

The ORB upheld a detention order, finding the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety.

The appellant challenged the ORB's finding of significant threat, arguing the evidence did not support it under the Winko test, and that the Board erred by not granting a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no fault with the ORB's comprehensive analysis of the Winko test and its decision not to grant a conditional discharge given the appellant's history of substance abuse, medication non-compliance, and aggression following a previous conditional discharge.

The appellant, a Muslim charity, appealed the dismissal of its application challenging a Canadian Revenue Agency (CRA) audit process, alleging violations of its Charter rights due to discriminatory targeting and Islamophobic attitudes.

The application judge dismissed the challenge as premature, citing an insufficient factual record and the availability of administrative appeal processes under the Income Tax Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, affirming the court's discretion to refuse to decide a case based on a preliminary and incomplete factual record, even for Charter relief.

While disagreeing with the lower court's suggestion that the Tax Court's jurisdiction would necessarily bar a subsequent Superior Court Charter challenge, the appellate court found the prematurity finding to be correct given the ongoing administrative process.

The appellant, Rajindra Becessar, appealed his conviction for firearm possession, challenging a pre-trial ruling that admitted his statement to police.

The application judge had found breaches of the appellant's s. 8 (search) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) Charter rights, excluding evidence from the search but admitting the statement.

On appeal, Becessar argued the statement should have been excluded due to the cumulative effect of the breaches, specifically that it was obtained in a manner infringing his s. 8 rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that this argument was not properly raised or supported with evidence before the application judge, thus she made no error in her analysis.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, which sought to dismiss a counterclaim brought against them by the respondents.

The motion judge found that the appellants' expression did not relate to a matter of public interest, failing the initial threshold for an anti-SLAPP motion.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, concluding that the appellants' expressions were primarily concerned with private property interests (e.g., tree protection, fencing, sightlines) related to an adjacent retirement facility development, rather than broader public concerns, despite the development itself having public interest aspects.

The court affirmed the deferential standard of review for a motion judge's finding on whether an expression relates to public interest and confirmed that the motion judge did not err by considering the context of the expressions without impermissibly assessing motivations.

The appellant appealed convictions for drug and proceeds of crime charges, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel regarding a s. 8 Charter application challenging the validity of a search warrant.

The appeal focused on counsel's failure to challenge the accuracy of GPS tracking data relied upon by police and counsel's agreement to allow the Crown to introduce amplification evidence from the affiant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice from counsel's tactical decisions and upholding the trial judge's conclusion that there were sufficient grounds for the search warrant.

Gurdev Singh Multani appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board (ORB) that continued his conditional discharge after he was found not criminally responsible due to a mental disorder (NCRMD) for uttering threats.

He sought an absolute discharge and also filed motions to dismiss the original offence and claim damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the argument regarding the justification of conditions was raised too late, as the appellant had previously agreed to the terms if a significant threat was found.

The court also dismissed the motions, stating it lacked jurisdiction to reverse the NCRMD finding on an appeal from an ORB disposition.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges including sexual exploitation and sexual assault.

The appeal argued that the trial judge erred by relying on stereotypical reasoning in assessing the complainant's credibility and by overemphasizing peripheral inconsistencies in the context of childhood abuse.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's repeated focus on why the complainant continued to engage with the respondent, despite knowing the risk of assault, constituted stereotypical reasoning, which is an error of law.

This error was deemed to have materially affected the verdict, as the trial judge's assessment of the respondent's credibility was inextricably linked to her flawed assessment of the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

This appeal arose from a failed commercial real estate transaction where the appellants (buyers) failed to close and alleged fundamental breaches by the respondent (seller).

The motion judge granted partial summary judgment on liability in favour of the seller.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants' motion for fresh evidence and their appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that the alleged breaches by the seller were not fundamental and that the buyers had breached the agreement by failing to close.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on multiple charges including assault and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by adopting a "piecemeal" approach to assessing the evidence, specifically by discrediting the complainant's testimony before considering the probative force of a corroborating video.

This error might reasonably have had a material bearing on the acquittal.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered on all counts.

Wasim Investments Ltd. appealed the dismissal of its statement of claim, which sought to enforce a mortgage.

The motion judge had dismissed the action as duplicative of a separate action commenced by the individual respondents, who sought to void the same mortgage, citing a clear risk of abuse of process due to potential inconsistent interpretations.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's factual findings or her conclusion that the action was duplicative and an abuse of process, affirming that all issues regarding the mortgage's enforceability should be addressed within the original action.

This is an appeal from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board (ORB) concerning an individual found not criminally responsible for arson.

The appellant challenged the ORB's refusal to grant a cannabis exemption as part of his continued detention and privileges, arguing that cannabis use would be a harm reduction strategy for his cocaine use and was not linked to public safety risk.

The Court of Appeal upheld the ORB's decision, finding it reasonable and supported by evidence, including a link between cannabis use and the index offence, and that prior cannabis use did not curb cocaine use.

The applicant sought to reopen her application for leave to appeal a 2015 conviction for impaired driving, which had been dismissed by the Court of Appeal in 2017.

She raised a new argument of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, which was not raised in previous appeals.

She also sought leave to appeal her sentence, which had never been appealed.

The Court of Appeal denied the motion, finding it lacked clear jurisdiction to reopen a dismissed leave application and, even if it did, would not exercise it.

The court noted that appeals from Summary Conviction Appeal Courts are limited to questions of law alone, and the new ground was not raised below.

Furthermore, the court reiterated its reluctance to allow new grounds of appeal and confirmed it had no jurisdiction to hear a sentence appeal directly from the trial court.

The appellant was convicted of seven counts of sexual assault, one count of assault with a weapon, and one count of assault.

He appealed on three grounds: the trial judge's treatment of the complainant's motive to fabricate, alleged "oath helping" to bolster the complainant's credibility, and the admission of electronic evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment that the mere existence of family law litigation did not establish a motive to lie, no impermissible oath helping in the complainant's explanation for delayed reporting, and that the electronic evidence met the low bar for admission under the Canada Evidence Act and was not central to the credibility analysis.