Lene Madsen

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her claims related to a mistaken Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) transfer in 2018 and a medical driver's license suspension in 2016, along with a substantial indemnity costs order of $100,000.

The trial judge had dismissed the claims as statute-barred and found the appellant lacked credibility regarding her parking tickets.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding there was no palpable and overriding error in the determination that the claims were statute-barred, as the appellant was aware of the facts giving rise to the claims well outside the limitation periods.

The Court also affirmed the costs award, noting the appellant's unreasonable conduct, failure to accept a Rule 49 offer, and history as an experienced litigant.

The appellant, D.S., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his sentence of two years less a day.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's admission of evidence regarding a prior incident of unwanted sexual contact with the complainant, which occurred when the appellant was a youth.

The appellant argued this evidence was highly prejudicial and had low probative value, and that the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) principles should have factored into its admissibility.

The sentence appeal argued for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect for the prior incident evidence, noting its relevance to the appellant's state of mind regarding consent.

The court also found that YCJA principles did not impede the admissibility of such evidence in this context.

The sentence was upheld as proportionate, despite mitigating factors, due to significant aggravating features.

The appellant, a 19-year-old first-time offender, pled guilty to possessing a loaded prohibited handgun for a dangerous purpose after brandishing it during an altercation.

The sentencing judge imposed a four-year penitentiary sentence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred by breaching the appellant's right to be heard regarding his intent to shoot, and by overlooking principles governing the sentencing of youthful first-time offenders, family separation consequences, and multiple offences arising from the same circumstances.

The appeal was allowed and a three-year sentence was substituted.

The appellant, Oleksandr Ostashkov, appealed his conviction and sentence after pleading guilty to breaking and entering and possession of stolen property.

He sought to strike his guilty plea, arguing it was involuntary due to parental pressure.

He also appealed his sentence, claiming it was unduly harsh, particularly the restitution order.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's finding that the plea was voluntary, noting that while parental pressure was a factor, it did not negate his volitional decision, which was also influenced by new incriminating evidence.

The court also found no error in the sentence imposed, determining it was neither demonstrably unfit nor based on an error in principle, and upheld the restitution order.

Both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal were dismissed.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a release and minutes of settlement executed by an employee after termination.

The core issue was whether the settlement documents released the employee's claim for damages related to vested stock units.

The motion judge found the vested stock units were not released, concluding the settlement made little economic sense otherwise.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in law by allowing the factual matrix to overwhelm the clear and broad language of the settlement documents, misapplying the guidance on narrow construction of releases, and improperly evaluating the economic benefits of the settlement.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the judgment for the employee and granting judgment in favour of the employer, finding the vested stock units claim was released.

This appeal addressed the correct analytical approach to interpreting a consent judgment, an issue of first impression for the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The case involved estate litigation concerning the sale of a farm, where the parties had signed Minutes of Settlement and a Consent Judgment.

The application judge had interpreted the Consent Judgment using a dictionary definition, concluding the farm sale provision was not included and that the appellants had repudiated the Minutes of Settlement.

The Court of Appeal held that consent judgments should be interpreted using contractual principles, considering surrounding circumstances, but found the application judge's error immaterial as the Consent Judgment selectively incorporated terms from the Minutes of Settlement, excluding the farm sale.

The Court also upheld the finding that the respondents had accepted the appellants' repudiation of the Minutes of Settlement.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought to overturn convictions for possession of a stolen vehicle, drugs for trafficking, careless use of a firearm, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and challenged the total 10-year sentence.

The conviction appeal argued misapprehension of evidence regarding the firearm's location.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings, noting the judge's reasoned assessment of witness credibility despite inconsistencies.

The sentence appeal contended errors in applying the totality principle and the correct sentencing range for recidivist firearms offenders.

The Court affirmed that sentencing ranges are flexible and that the imposed sentence was proportionate, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation given the gravity of the offences involving guns and drugs, and the offender's extensive criminal record, while acknowledging mitigating factors.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and possessing proceeds of crime after a trial judge admitted evidence despite a s. 10(b) Charter breach.

The police delayed the appellant's access to counsel for nearly ten hours, based on an operational plan to secure search warrants first.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis by underestimating the impact of the breach on the appellant's security of the person.

The Court concluded that the breach was serious and deliberate, outweighing society's interest in admitting the evidence, and ordered the exclusion of the gun and cash, leading to acquittals.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim for a resulting trust and the granting of the respondents’ claim for partition and sale of a property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the resulting trust claim was statute-barred under the Real Property Limitations Act, lacked material corroboration under the Evidence Act, and would have been rebutted by evidence of a gift.

The court also upheld the dismissal of the appellant's claim for compensation for work done on the property and the order for partition and sale.

A motion to adduce fresh evidence was also dismissed.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for serious sexual assault and assault charges, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition continuing his detention order.

The appellant sought a conditional discharge, arguing it was the least onerous and restrictive option given his recent progress in managing his mental disorder and substance use.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding it reasonable and supported by evidence, particularly the psychiatrist's view that a detention order was necessary for rapid intervention in case of relapse, given the appellant's history of substance abuse and associated violence.

The court emphasized the Board's obligation to protect public safety and the high standard for overturning Board decisions.

The appellant, a lawyer and former senior advisor to the Kenyan Prime Minister, appealed the dismissal of his defamation and breach of privacy action against Refinitiv Limited and Sitel Operating Corporation.

The action stemmed from his inclusion as a politically exposed person (PEP) in Refinitiv's World-Check Database, which allegedly led to a money transfer being held, and subsequent alleged defamatory statements by a Sitel customer service agent.

The motion judge had dismissed the action, finding the appellant was properly classified as a PEP, the database statements were true and publicly sourced, and any claims against Sitel were covered by a prior release or lacked evidence of defamation.

The motion judge also awarded substantial indemnity costs due to the appellant's unreasonable litigation conduct.

The Court of Appeal found no factual or legal errors in the motion judge's decision, agreeing that the claim was meritless and upholding the costs award.

The appellant, Asim Shabbir, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, alleging fundamental errors in the trial judge's jury instructions.

The grounds of appeal included the failure to provide a "Villaroman" instruction regarding circumstantial evidence (specifically, the complainant's alleged drugging), inadequate instructions on assessing evidence inconsistencies, and a "Laboucan" error concerning the accused's credibility.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions, when read as a whole and in context, were functionally adequate.

The court noted the defence counsel's failure to object to the instructions at trial and that closing submissions could address certain gaps.

The court also found no error in the instruction regarding separate consideration of co-accused.

The moving party, a self-represented lawyer, sought to set aside a registrar's order administratively dismissing his family law appeal for delay and requested an extension of time to perfect it.

The moving party had previously been granted an extension but failed to file the required documents, claiming inadvertence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the explanation for delay unsatisfactory given the moving party's history of non-compliance with court orders and the Rules, and concluding that a further extension would prejudice the responding parties.

The applicant, an 83-year-old man convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault and sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment, applied for bail pending his appeal.

The court found that while the appeal was not frivolous due to an arguable ground regarding the admission of expert evidence, the applicant failed to establish that he would surrender into custody.

The court noted the applicant's significant resources, history of non-compliance with court orders, and the unsuitability of his proposed surety.

Furthermore, the court held that the applicant's detention was necessary in the public interest to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, given the gravity of the offences and the weakness of the remaining grounds of appeal.

The application for bail was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising three grounds related to the trial judge's assessment of consent.

The first ground argued the judge erred in finding no consent to pre-intercourse activity, which the Court of Appeal clarified was a misunderstanding of the trial judge's reasons, noting the judge understood prior activity was consensual but highlighted the lack of explicit consent.

The second ground contended the judge erred in disbelieving the appellant's claim of seeking explicit verbal consent for more invasive activity, which the Court dismissed, affirming the judge's right to assess credibility holistically.

The third ground alleged the judge relied on ungrounded assumptions regarding consent to unprotected sex due to a past chlamydia diagnosis; the Court found this discussion was not central to the rejection of the appellant's evidence and was a permissible factor in assessing consent likelihood.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, uttering threats, and failing to comply with a release order.

The appeal raised two grounds: an alleged s. 10(b) Charter violation regarding the right to counsel, and an alleged error in refusing an election for a preliminary inquiry under s. 536 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusions that the appellant's right to counsel was respected and that an election for trial by judge alone had already been made.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to eight years in jail.

He appealed the conviction, raising three grounds: the trial judge erred by not applying Vetrovec principles to a witness's evidence and failing to provide sufficient reasons for relying on it, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a Vetrovec caution is not mandatory in judge-alone trials and the trial judge was aware of the witness's credibility issues, relying only on corroborated aspects of his testimony.

The court also found the verdict reasonable, as the circumstantial evidence, viewed holistically, amply supported the conclusion that the appellant knowingly possessed the package.

The appellant, Guled Mohamed, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He raised three grounds: the trial judge erred in finding he lacked standing to challenge the search warrant, erred in inferring guilt from circumstantial evidence, and rendered an unreasonable verdict due to insufficient evidence of his knowledge of the cocaine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings on standing, the application of circumstantial evidence, and the reasonableness of the verdict.

The court clarified that a trial judge is not bound to accept the Crown's theory on standing if the accused presents contradictory evidence, and reiterated the standard for assessing circumstantial evidence and unreasonable verdicts.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario addressed costs and a sealing order following its dismissal of the appellant's Charter challenge to a Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) audit.

The court ordered each party to bear its own costs for both the appeal and the fresh evidence motions, citing divided success on the appeal and reasonable conduct regarding the fresh evidence motions.

Regarding the sealing order for fresh evidence, the court dismissed the appellant's request for a full sealing order, instead ordering limited redactions to the CRA final audit, consistent with a prior Superior Court order, to balance the open court principle with privacy and safety concerns, particularly given allegations of government wrongdoing.

The appellant was convicted of drug and firearm offences.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the search warrant used to obtain evidence was improperly issued.

Specifically, he contended that the Information to Obtain (ITO) was misleading and that tips from confidential informants (CIs) and an anonymous caller were not sufficiently compelling, credible, or corroborated to establish reasonable and probable grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the legal test for reviewing search warrants and the `Debot` criteria for assessing CI reliability.

The court concluded that the issuing justice had reasonable and probable grounds to issue the warrant, even if certain information in the ITO were excised.