Karen M. Weiler

Following a successful appeal by the defendant employer regarding a pension plan surplus dispute, the parties made submissions on costs.

The Court of Appeal determined that the litigation was aimed at ensuring the proper administration of the pension trust fund and would have benefited all transferred employees had the plaintiffs been successful.

Consequently, the court ordered that the costs of both parties for the appeal and cross-appeal be paid from the pension fund on a full indemnity basis.

The court fixed the employer's costs at $140,000 and the representative plaintiffs' costs at $43,000, and referred the determination of the reasonableness of the trial costs to the trial judge.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter after loading a shotgun that his girlfriend subsequently used to shoot and kill the victim.

The sentencing judge imposed an effective sentence of 12.5 years, including pre-trial custody credit.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was unfit given his minimal involvement in the actual killing.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the sentence was outside the appropriate range, noting the lack of evidence of actual participation in the killing and the absence of a serious related criminal record.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to nine years less credit for pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction for two counts of sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended his evidence and failed to address weaknesses in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to find the appellant's version of events incredible and the complainant's testimony credible and compelling.

The complainant's evidence was corroborated by physical bruising and another employee.

The respondent entrusted $5,000 to a courier who attempted to take $50,000 out of Canada without reporting it, leading to the seizure of the funds.

The respondent applied for a declaration that his interest in the funds was not affected by the seizure under s. 33 of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act.

The application judge granted the declaration, finding the respondent exercised all reasonable care.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the respondent failed to make necessary inquiries about legal restrictions or steps taken by the courier to comply, and thus did not exercise all reasonable care.

The Crown appealed the effective 14-month sentence imposed on the respondent for aggravated assault and break and enter after she invaded a neighbour's cottage and stabbed him.

The respondent, a 60-year-old first offender with mental health issues, had already completed the custodial portion of her sentence under stringent lockdown conditions.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown that the original sentence was demonstrably unfit and that a penitentiary sentence ought to have been imposed for general deterrence.

However, given fresh medical evidence of the respondent's positive progress and the fact she had already served her time, the court concluded re-incarceration would serve no useful purpose and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal harassment against his former spouse and was sentenced to an effective 17 months' incarceration and 3 years' probation.

He appealed the sentence, arguing it was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge committed no error in principle and appropriately weighed the aggravating factors, including a history of domestic violence and the profound fear instilled in the victims, against the mitigating factors.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 8 years (effective 6 years and 4 months) for trafficking 3 kilograms of cocaine.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in applying the parity principle by giving him a longer sentence than his co-accused, and by treating money forfeited by the co-accused as equivalent to jail time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant's greater culpability justified the longer sentence and that any error regarding the co-accused's forfeiture did not render the appellant's sentence unfit.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on consent, ordering that it proceed as per the attached minutes of settlement.

The cross-appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board granting an absolute discharge to an accused found not criminally responsible.

The accused had twice attempted to grab a police officer's gun during suicidal episodes.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Board erred in law by placing an onus on the hospital to prove the accused posed a significant risk to the public.

The Court also held that the Board's conclusion that the accused did not pose a significant risk was unreasonable, speculative, and contrary to the uncontradicted expert psychiatric evidence regarding her impulsivity and lack of insight.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision granting certiorari and setting aside his discharge at a preliminary inquiry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by dealing with the evidence on a piecemeal basis and choosing among competing inferences rather than considering the evidence as a whole.

The appellant appealed the decision of the motion judge dismissing his action.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting that the appellant failed to plead material facts for causes of action independent of his wrongful dismissal claim.

As the appellant had already amended his pleadings twice and did not provide a proposed statement of claim, the court upheld the refusal to grant leave to amend and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent landlords $29,661.70 for property damage and $3,395.70 for lost rent.

The appellants argued that the damage was caused by a tenant's disability and that the Human Rights Code protected them from liability.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, holding that the Human Rights Code does not obviate a disabled person's responsibility to pay for damage extending beyond reasonable wear and tear.

The Court upheld the property damage award but allowed the appeal regarding the loss of rent, finding that the tenant's overholding was lawful under the Tenant Protection Act.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellant was convicted of extortion after demanding the complainant purchase the distribution rights to a book he wrote about their past criminal involvement, threatening to distribute it to her community if she refused.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding the definition of a threat and the defence of reasonable justification, and failed to adequately review the complainant's cross-examination evidence where she admitted she was not explicitly threatened.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge adequate and the failure to review the cross-examination evidence not fatal given the short trial and the legal definition of a threat.

Borins J.A. dissented, finding the trial judge's failure to review the exculpatory cross-examination evidence constituted reversible error.

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the Government of Canada and multiple counts of fraud over $5,000 relating to a scheme involving sham vehicle sales to exploit aboriginal tax exemptions and fraudulently claim GST refunds.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons for the convictions.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge made conclusory findings of guilt without identifying the specific evidence establishing the appellants' participation in the illegitimate transactions or addressing the individual fraud counts.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sexual assault.

He appealed the convictions on the grounds that his statement to the police was obtained in violation of his Charter rights and that the trial judge made several errors in his charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant was not detained at the time of his police interview, as he voluntarily cooperated and was not a suspect.

The Court also held that while the trial judge should have given a fabrication instruction regarding the appellant's false statement, the omission did not affect the verdict given the compelling circumstantial evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was severely injured when she lost control of her vehicle after hitting the respondent's dog on a country road.

At trial, a jury found the respondent 35% responsible and the appellant 65% contributorily negligent, assessing damages accordingly.

The appellant appealed the jury's findings on contributory negligence, apportionment of liability, and damages, arguing that the jury relied on unreliable evidence from child witnesses and was misdirected on mitigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly instructed the jury and that the jury's verdict was not so plainly unreasonable and unjust as to warrant appellate interference.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for firearms and driving offences.

He argued that the police violated his s. 8 Charter rights by searching his vehicle after he was arrested for failing to identify himself under the Highway Traffic Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the police did not know the appellant's identity with certainty and that the search of the vehicle for identification was progressive and reasonable.

The conviction and the five-year sentence were upheld, noting the appellant's lengthy criminal record and breaches of prohibitions.

The respondent successfully sued her mother for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to protect her from sexual abuse by her father during her childhood.

The mother appealed, arguing the action was barred by the equitable doctrine of laches due to the 42-year delay in bringing the claim, and that she was powerless to intervene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on liability, finding no acquiescence by the respondent and that the mother failed to establish she was unable to protect her daughter.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding damages, reducing the award for lost income from $100,000 to $20,000 due to a lack of evidentiary foundation for the higher amount.

A cross-appeal regarding trial costs was dismissed.

The Ontario Racing Commission appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for misfeasance in public office, inducing breach of contract, and intentional interference with economic relations.

The liability arose after a Commission official informed a raceway that the respondent would not be approved as a starter, leading to his loss of employment, and the Commission subsequently frustrated his efforts to seek a hearing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the liability for misfeasance in public office, finding the Commission acted with reckless indifference to its statutory obligations by denying the respondent a hearing.

However, the Court found the trial judge erred in finding liability for inducing breach of contract and intentional interference with economic relations.

The appeal was dismissed and the damages award of $50,000 was upheld.

The respondent was denied workers' compensation benefits by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal, which found no causal link between his 1979 workplace back injury and his current back problems.

The Divisional Court allowed the respondent's application for judicial review, finding the Tribunal's decision patently unreasonable.

The Tribunal appealed.

Applying the newly established Dunsmuir standard of reasonableness, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the Tribunal's decision, holding that the Divisional Court erred by reweighing the evidence and that the Tribunal's factual findings were supported by the record and entitled to deference.