Karen M. Weiler

The appellant appealed a decision confirming the downgrading of his driving licence from Class B to Class G due to a diagnosis of congestive heart failure.

The appellant argued that the decision-makers failed to consider all medical evidence and improperly applied the legislation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Tribunal's consideration of the evidence or its reliance on nationally recognized medical standards.

The appellant appealed an order declaring its registered lien against the respondent's equipment invalid.

The respondent had leased equipment to a related company of the appellant under an agreement that expressly prohibited the creation of any liens without prior written consent.

The appellant, knowing of this prohibition, performed work on the equipment and registered a lien under the Repair and Storage Liens Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant knew of the prohibition, the respondent did not consent to the lien, and the contractual prohibition applied to all types of liens, including those under the Act.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Michigan and brought an action in Ontario against the Michigan driver and owner, an unidentified driver, and her own Ontario insurer.

The defendants successfully moved to stay the action on the basis of forum non conveniens, arguing Michigan was the more appropriate forum.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred by failing to give weight to the plaintiff's choice of forum and by not considering the claim as a whole, including the necessary claim against the Ontario insurer.

The appeal was allowed and the stay was set aside, allowing the action to proceed in Ontario to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

The plaintiff was injured in a boating accident involving two defendants.

Prior to trial, the plaintiff entered into a Mary Carter agreement with one defendant, receiving a settlement of $365,000 for damages.

At trial, the jury assessed total damages at $312,021 and apportioned liability between the plaintiff and both defendants.

The trial judge refused to deduct the settlement amount from the damage award and ordered the non-settling defendant to pay his proportionate share.

The non-settling defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the settlement monies must be deducted from the total damage award to prevent double recovery.

Since the settlement exceeded the total damages assessed, the action against the non-settling defendant was dismissed.

The respondent paid $222,500 to purchase shares but never received them.

The motion judge granted partial summary judgment for $202,500, accounting for a $20,000 counterclaim.

The appellants appealed, arguing an alleged oral agreement regarding profit sharing created a genuine issue for trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial as the individual appellant admitted to personally guaranteeing the subscription price and failing to pay.

The appellant appealed his conviction and three-year sentence for the sexual assault of an 11-year-old child.

He argued the trial judge's findings were unreasonable, misapprehended DNA and medical evidence, and failed to properly apply the W. (D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and free of legal error.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence reduced to two years, because the trial judge had sentenced the appellant based on a more invasive assault than the one for which he was convicted.

The appellant law firm and the respondent client entered into a contingency fee agreement containing an arbitration clause.

A dispute arose over the fee calculation, and the appellant served a notice of arbitration.

The respondent successfully applied to the Superior Court to strike the notice on the basis that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable for public policy reasons under the Solicitors Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge did not err in assuming jurisdiction to decide the threshold issue of enforceability.

However, the Court found that the arbitration clause was enforceable, provided the arbitrator conducts the arbitration in accordance with the substantive statutory protections of the Solicitors Act, including assessing whether the fee is fair and reasonable.

The appellant, a violent recidivist, was convicted of sexual assault with a weapon, unlawful confinement, and theft under $5,000 against a 15-year-old stranger.

He was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, consecutive to 30 months of pre-sentence custody credited at 1.5 to 1, with an order for delayed parole.

On appeal, he argued the sentences should be concurrent, he should receive 2 for 1 credit, and the delayed parole order was tainted by bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the consecutive sentences, the reduced pre-sentence credit, or the delayed parole order.

The accused were separately convicted of driving 'over 80'.

In both cases, the trial judge found the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the breathalyzer demand, but allowed the Crown to rely on the presumption of identity in s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code because the accused did not bring a Charter application.

The summary conviction appeal court quashed the convictions, holding that a 'demand' under s. 258(1)(c) must be a valid demand made on reasonable and probable grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeals and restored the convictions, holding that under R. v. Rilling, the Crown need not prove reasonable and probable grounds to rely on the presumption of identity unless the accused brings a Charter application.

The appellant, an innocent bystander, was rendered paraplegic after being struck by a bullet fragment during a drive-by shooting.

She brought an action against the unidentified driver of the vehicle and her own automobile insurer under the OPCF 44R Endorsement.

The insurer successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the injuries did not arise directly or indirectly from the use or operation of an automobile.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the vehicle was used for an ordinary purpose, the shooting was a distinct and intervening act that broke the chain of causation.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and reversed the onus of proof regarding his knowledge and control of the property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to infer knowledge and control, and concluding that the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof.

The court also found no basis to interfere with the sentence.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 15 months' imprisonment and a three-year driving prohibition for dangerous driving.

He argued the trial judge gave insufficient weight to the gap principle regarding his 1993 prior conviction for the same offence, and that the sentence and driving prohibition were excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge appropriately weighed denunciation and deterrence over the gap principle due to the appellant's provincial driving record.

The court held the sentence and driving prohibition were fit given the appellant's record and ongoing disregard for public safety.

The respondent insurer brought a motion for security for costs of the appellant's appeal.

The underlying action involved a motor vehicle accident claim that was dismissed after the insurer successfully moved to enforce a settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion for security for costs, finding good reason to believe the appeal was frivolous and vexatious, and that the appellant had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay the costs of the appeal.

The appellant was ordered to post $5,000 in security.

Following the appellant's partial success on appeal regarding the calculation of the equalization payment, the court addressed costs.

Because the appeal increased the property award beyond the respondent's offer to settle, the court set aside the trial judge's costs award of $82,822 in favour of the respondent, ordering each party to bear their own costs at trial due to divided success and relative means.

The appellant was awarded $5,000 in costs for the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of welfare fraud for collecting social assistance while in an undisclosed common law relationship and failing to disclose support payments.

She appealed the convictions and the $90,127.15 restitution order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the first conviction, finding the trial judge did not err in determining she was a common law spouse based on family court affidavits.

However, the Court set aside the second conviction because the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding her disclosure of support payments, which the Crown had conceded she reported.

The restitution order was correspondingly reduced to $51,263.85.

The appellant pled guilty to assault causing bodily harm following a racially motivated group attack on a disabled victim.

He appealed his five-year sentence, arguing he received insufficient credit for pre-trial custody and that his sentence offended the parity principle compared to his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant's role as the instigator, his use of racial slurs, and his extensive criminal record distinguished him from his co-accused.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decision to limit pre-trial custody credit, concluding the overall sentence was fit given the brutal and senseless nature of the attack.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision that had upheld his conviction.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the proposed appeal did not raise a pure question of law.

Furthermore, the court concluded that the appeal lacked the apparent merit necessary to warrant a second level of appellate review.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge's decision that overturned the accused's conviction for driving 'over 80'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction.

The Court held that the appeal judge erred in finding that an officer could not form the requisite suspicion for a roadside breath demand under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code based on the smell of alcohol on a driver's breath, affirming R. v. Lindsay.

Furthermore, the trial judge correctly applied the W.D. test by concluding that the accused's 'evidence to the contrary' did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The respondent operated a direct mail business in Ontario that sold lottery tickets and merchandise to persons outside Canada.

He was acquitted of making false or misleading representations 'to the public' under s. 52(1) of the Competition Act because the trial judge held the phrase only applied to the Canadian public.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that 'to the public' is not restricted to the Canadian public where there is a real and substantial link to Canada.

However, the Court ordered a new trial because the trial judge's excessive interventions and cross-examination of the respondent compromised the appearance of trial fairness.

The Court also clarified that reliance on legal advice is a mistake of law, not fact, and that the post-1999 mens rea requirement for s. 52 requires proof of knowledge or recklessness regarding the misleading nature of the representations.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court judgment regarding a cottage property lease, arguing for the first time on appeal that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because the Residential Tenancies Act applied and gave exclusive jurisdiction to the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The Court of Appeal held that the Superior Court had jurisdiction over the equitable and monetary relief claimed, which exceeded the Board's jurisdiction.

The Court further declined to allow the appellants to raise the new statutory argument on appeal, citing the lack of a factual record, prejudice to the respondents, and the interests of finality.

The appeal was dismissed.