Karen M. Weiler

The appellant pleaded guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment with 18 years of parole ineligibility.

He subsequently sought to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial judge dismissed.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence from his co-accused, appealed the dismissal of his motion to withdraw the plea, and appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to admit fresh evidence, finding it lacked credibility as the co-accused refused to answer critical questions.

The Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the guilty plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in extending the period of parole ineligibility based on the appellant's high culpability and poor pre-sentence report.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to continue his detention in a maximum security facility at the Mental Health Centre Penetanguishene.

The appellant sought a transfer to a medium security facility and escorted privileges within a ten-kilometre radius.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board had considered all relevant information, including the appellant's age, and had imposed the least onerous and least restrictive disposition given his frail mental condition, aggressive behaviour, and unanimous medical opinion that he was not manageable in a less secure environment.

The appellants appealed convictions for two counts of first degree murder and two counts of conspiracy to commit murder arising from planned execution-style killings.

They argued that undisclosed police criminal-record checks on prospective jurors created an unfair jury selection process and that the trial judge's final charge contained multiple reversible errors, including inadequate Vetrovec cautions and erroneous instructions on duress, conspiracy, included offences, bad character, and written jury materials.

The court held that any positive criminal-record information should have been disclosed, but the appellants failed to show a reasonable possibility that the non-disclosure affected the verdict or the overall fairness of the trial, particularly given trial counsel's awareness and inaction.

Although aspects of the charge were imperfect, the instructions were adequate when read as a whole and the prosecution case was overwhelming.

The appeals were dismissed.

Following an appeal where success was divided, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The appellant succeeded on the central issue of the court's jurisdiction, while the respondents succeeded on the issues of venue transfer and striking out portions of the statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellant $12,000 in costs for the appeal, reflecting her success on the primary issue but acknowledging the divided outcome.

The costs order for the first instance motion was varied to no costs, as success on that motion was also divided.

The appellants appealed an order granting an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the adjournment was an interlocutory order and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction.

Costs of $700 were awarded to the respondent, reduced due to the late filing of materials.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its application for a declaration interpreting provisions of the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002 regarding the registration status of a broker or salesperson no longer employed by a brokerage.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motions judge that there was no live dispute or lis between the parties, as the specific broker's registration had been revoked.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The self-represented appellant appealed the final judgment of the Superior Court of Justice striking her statements of claim.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the comprehensive reasons of the judge at first instance and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $1,000 to the respondents.

Justice for Children and Youth brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in a series of appeals brought by the Children's Lawyer.

The appeals concerned a Superior Court judge's order, made under parens patriae jurisdiction, requiring the Children's Lawyer to represent children in matrimonial litigation due to exigent circumstances.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to intervene, finding that the proposed intervener could provide useful assistance on the impact of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the court's parens patriae jurisdiction, especially since no party was responding to the appeals.

The applicant, convicted of aggravated assault and other offences for administering cocaine to her two-year-old son, applied for bail pending her appeal.

She argued her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance due to a pending suspension by the Law Society and a breach of the duty of loyalty.

The Court of Appeal found the grounds of appeal to be weak, noting the trial judge had already dismissed a mistrial application on these grounds.

Given the serious nature of the offences and the weak appeal grounds, the court held the applicant failed to show her detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding that it wrongfully dismissed the respondent employee.

The employee had forged his supervisor's signature on a letter regarding severance pay for a subordinate.

The trial judge applied the principle of proportionality, concluding the forgery was an isolated error in judgment rather than a fundamental breach of trust justifying dismissal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's appreciation of the evidence or application of the law.

The appellant operated a business arranging hotel accommodations for sports teams, receiving commissions from the hotels but no remuneration from the teams.

He was charged with acting as an unregistered travel agent under the Travel Industry Act, 2002.

The justice of the peace acquitted him, finding he did not sell travel services to the teams as a principal.

The Ontario Court of Justice reversed the acquittal and entered a conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory definition of 'travel agent' includes a person who sells travel services to consumers as an agent for the provider of those services.

The appellant creditor brought an application for a bankruptcy order against the respondent debtor.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the appellant failed to establish at least $1,000 of unsecured debt because its estimate of the security's value was absurdly low.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the relevant date for valuing the security is the date of the application.

At that time, the appellant's mortgage ranked behind a Canada Revenue Agency super priority claim for unpaid GST, leaving the appellant with over $100,000 in unsecured debt.

The appeal was allowed and the bankruptcy application was granted.

The plaintiff appealed a summary judgment dismissing a certified class action against a vehicle repair franchisor.

The class alleged the franchisor breached the Motor Vehicle Repair Act and Consumer Protection Act by charging estimate fees for an 'Inspection Service' when repairs were authorized.

On appeal, the plaintiff sought to admit fresh evidence of a training manual that contradicted the franchisor's evidence and had not been disclosed during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding the due diligence test less significant when the opposing party failed to disclose it.

The court set aside the summary judgment, concluding the motions judge lacked a full record and a genuine issue for trial existed regarding conspiracy.

The Crown appealed the sentence of six years imposed on the respondent for trafficking methamphetamine and marihuana, as well as the sentencing judge's refusal to impose a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the length of imprisonment, finding the sentence low but not warranting interference.

However, applying the Supreme Court's decision in Lavigne, the Court held the sentencing judge erred by considering the respondent's inability to pay when deciding whether to impose a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The Court allowed the appeal on this issue, imposed a fine of $37,100, and remanded the matter to determine the time limit for payment.

The appellant appealed his nine-year sentence for robbery and attempted robbery using an imitation firearm and disguise.

He argued the sentence overemphasized his dated record and failed to account for the totality and gap principles.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the sentencing judge failed to properly account for an effective ten-year gap between the appellant's prior robbery convictions and the present offences.

Leave to appeal was granted, and the total sentence was reduced to seven years.

The appellant, who was struck by a vehicle as a child pedestrian, appealed the dismissal of her action following a jury trial.

She argued the trial judge erred in permitting cross-examination on a hospital record and in the jury charge regarding the driver's duty of care and proper lookout.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's limiting instructions cured any prejudice from the cross-examination and the jury charge adequately equipped the jury to assess the driver's negligence and reverse onus.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender, arguing he should have been designated a long-term offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge did not err in concluding there was no reasonable possibility of successful treatment to control the risk the appellant posed in the community.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to decline jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was a real and substantial connection between the Ontario court and the claim, satisfying the test for jurisdiction simpliciter under both Muscutt and Van Breda.

The Court also found no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion regarding the forum non conveniens analysis, noting that even if recent Supreme Court jurisprudence attenuated the juridical advantage point, there were sufficient other bases to support the decision.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $12,000.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Superior Court decision that dismissed his summary conviction appeal from a 1999 Ontario Court decision.

The appellant failed to appear at the hearing.

The Court of Appeal heard the matter in his absence and denied leave to appeal, finding that the appeal had no merit and raised no issues of importance beyond the parties.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his application for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition to stop a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The application had been dismissed because the appellant left the courtroom before it was completed.

The Court of Appeal heard the appeal in the appellant's absence and dismissed it as moot and without merit, noting that the trial he sought to stop had already taken place.