Steve A. Coroza

The appellant, N.A., appealed a one-year custodial sentence for historical sexual interference.

The trial judge had erred by concluding that a mandatory minimum sentence applied, which incorrectly precluded a conditional sentence.

Despite this conceded error, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the numerous aggravating factors, including the victim's youth, the severe impact of the crime, the breach of a position of trust, and the appellant's victim-blaming, justified the sentence.

The court concluded that the case did not fall into the rare category where a conditional sentence would be appropriate for this type of crime, even with the legal error.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual interference, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant's text message as a spontaneous utterance.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed palpable and overriding errors and errors of law by improperly concluding that the parties agreed on the immediate timing of the text message, failing to consider the risk of "bootstrapping" (using the statement's content to prove its spontaneity), and not resolving conflicting evidence regarding the timing of the message.

The Court held that the text message was inadmissible hearsay and a prior consistent statement, and its improper admission materially affected the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility on both counts.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants, Fredrick and Patricia Kentner, appealed the summary dismissal of their first appeal to the Provincial Offences Appeal Court, which concerned convictions and a sentence for environmental offences related to unlawful fill operations.

The appeal was based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by their paralegal and errors in the original conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no ineffective assistance as the appellants' failure to pay fines (a mandatory condition for appeal) was a deliberate choice unrelated to the paralegal's conduct, and a waiver application would have had no prospect of success.

The court also found no merit in the conviction appeal, affirming the trial judge's reliance on regulatory maps for jurisdiction, and no basis to interfere with the sentence, which included a $25,000 fine and a property rehabilitation order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault and sexual assault, arguing denial of his right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter and ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to bring a s. 11(b) application.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's refusal to hear the late s. 11(b) application, noting it was a tactical decision and had been expressly abandoned by counsel with the appellant's awareness.

The court also found no ineffective assistance of counsel, as the decision not to bring the application was informed and reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of arson and other charges, appealed his conviction on two grounds: alleged legal and factual errors by the trial judge and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's comprehensive findings in an overwhelming circumstantial case, and concluding that the appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel did not meet the required threshold of incompetence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following its August 15, 2024 decision.

The parties resolved the costs of the appeal and underlying prejudgment interest motions by consent.

The respondent agreed to pay the appellants an all-inclusive amount of $60,000 for appeal and motion costs.

The appellants were convicted of various drug-related offences following a large-scale police investigation involving wiretaps, tracking warrants, and search warrants.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the application judge erred in dismissing their pre-trial Garofoli applications challenging the constitutionality of the searches and interceptions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no errors in the application judge's assessment of the wiretap authorizations, the reliance on confidential informants, the refusal to excise certain information from the warrants, and the determinations regarding reasonable expectations of privacy in condominium units and common areas.

The mother appealed an order denying her permission to relocate her three-year-old daughter from Toronto to Ennis, Ireland.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made material errors, seriously misapprehended evidence, and committed legal errors in his "best interests of the child" analysis under the Divorce Act.

Specifically, the trial judge erred in assessing family violence allegations, making unfounded assumptions about the mother's family's attitude towards the child's biracial heritage, and concluding that the mother manipulated the court system.

The trial judge also erred by re-characterizing the relocation case as a "support case" and misapplying the burden of proof.

The appeal was allowed, the trial decision set aside, and a new trial ordered on an expedited basis, with costs awarded to the mother.

Marc Gauthier appealed his conviction for first-degree murder of Tammy Avery.

The appeal raised two main issues: the admissibility of a voicemail left for his doctor (Dr. Morrison) and the voluntariness of confessions made to police and correctional officers.

The Court of Appeal found no reasonable expectation of privacy in the voicemail, as it constituted criminal harassment, and thus it was admissible.

While the court found the trial judge erred in admitting the confessions due to an inadequate evidentiary record regarding voluntariness, it applied the curative proviso, concluding that this error did not impact the verdict as the confessions only confirmed the undisputed fact of the killing, not the mens rea for first-degree murder.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's decision to reduce prejudgment interest on non-pecuniary damages from the presumptive 5% to 1.3%.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by misinterpreting the statutory scheme under the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, failing to consider all mandatory factors under s. 130(2), and misinterpreting "changes in market interest rates." The Court clarified that the 5% rate is presumptive and can only be deviated from in unusual or special circumstances, with the onus on the party seeking deviation.

The appeal was allowed, and the 5% rate was reinstated.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's prejudgment interest order, arguing errors in applying statutory rates and discretion under the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by misapplying the presumptive 5% rate for non-pecuniary damages, misconstruing the purpose of non-pecuniary damages, and misinterpreting "market interest rates" by equating them with statutory prejudgment rates.

The trial judge also improperly rejected evidence of the insurer's and appellants' actual investment returns.

The appeal was allowed, and the prejudgment interest rate for both non-pecuniary and past pecuniary damages was increased to 8.46%.

The appellant sought to certify a class proceeding alleging a price-fixing conspiracy in the Canadian canned tuna market.

The motion judge dismissed the certification motion, finding a failure to plead material facts for a reasonable cause of action and an insufficient evidentiary basis for common issues.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the claim lacked material facts to support a Canadian conspiracy and that there was no sufficient factual basis for the proposed common issues, particularly given the distinct Canadian and U.S. tuna markets.

The court also confirmed its jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as the lower court's order effectively ended the proceeding.

The appellant, Akshay Prasad, sought to reopen his appeal from conviction for cocaine trafficking, based on fresh expert evidence concerning the unreliability of digitally enhanced audio recordings and transcripts due to "priming" and listener bias.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the motion, finding the proposed expert evidence inadmissible at trial as it was not necessary and usurped the trier of fact's role.

The court also found the evidence not cogent and that due diligence was not met for its admission as fresh evidence on appeal, concluding there was no clear and compelling case of a miscarriage of justice to warrant reopening the appeal.

The appellants, six defendants in a construction dispute, appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their request to permanently stay the action.

They argued that a partial settlement between the plaintiff (respondent) and three other defendants (including an insurer) was not immediately disclosed, constituting an abuse of process.

The settlement involved the plaintiff assigning claims to the insurer and contemplating a Pierringer Agreement.

The motion judge found the settlement did not significantly alter the litigation dynamics to require immediate disclosure and that disclosure, if required, was immediate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the settlement did not significantly alter the litigation dynamics, emphasizing that the claims against the settling parties were fundamentally distinct from those against the appellants, and the use of the term "Pierringer Agreement" was not determinative without a substantive change in adversarial positions to cooperative ones.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted for delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The application judge found a delay exceeding the presumptive Jordan ceiling.

The Crown argued three errors: mischaracterizing preliminary inquiry delay, failing to deduct judicial deliberation time for committal reasons, and failing to account for defence's untimely s. 11(b) concerns.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the first point.

For the second point, the court clarified that judicial deliberation time for interlocutory matters is generally included within the Jordan ceilings.

The third point was not considered due to an insufficient factual record.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondent, Christopher Musclow, for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The stay was based on an alleged breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 59.5 months, with 18.5 months attributed to defence delay and 21 months to exceptional circumstances (illness of a key police witness), leaving a net delay of 20 months, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The application judge, however, found the delay unreasonable by considering the total delay, including the exceptional circumstances, when assessing if the case took "markedly longer than it reasonably should have." The Court of Appeal found this approach erroneous, clarifying that exceptional circumstances, once deducted, should not be reconsidered in the below-ceiling analysis.

The appeal was allowed, and the stay was set aside.

The appellant, Noah King, appealed his convictions for 12 serious offences and a 7-year imprisonment sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of evidence.

However, the court found the 7-year sentence to be demonstrably unfit, noting the trial judge's unclear reasoning for the sentencing range despite properly identifying Gladue principles.

The sentence was reduced to 5 years' imprisonment, with specific reductions applied to various counts.

The appellant, Gordon Morin, appealed his conviction and sentence for multiple counts of abuse against his domestic partner.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the conviction appeal, ordering a new trial.

The trial judge erred by improperly using the complainant's prior consistent text messages as corroborating her in-court testimony and contradicting the appellant's evidence, in violation of the hearsay rule and the rule against self-corroboration.

The trial judge failed to instruct herself on the permissible and impermissible uses of these statements, which was critical in a case turning on credibility.

The appellant, Chad Michael Kennedy, appealed his convictions for arson, criminal harassment, uttering death threats, possession of an explosive substance, disobeying a court order, and breaches of probation, as well as his global sentence of 28 months.

The appeal primarily focused on the reliability of eyewitness identification and alleged inconsistencies with video evidence regarding the arson charges.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly cautioned himself regarding eyewitness testimony and adequately grappled with the alleged inconsistencies, concluding the video quality was too poor to contradict the eyewitness account.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in principle.

The appellant, D.B., appealed his convictions for three historical sexual offences against his niece.

The appeal raised three grounds: improper use of evidence regarding the appellant's reaction/inaction when confronted with allegations, improper Crown submissions inviting the jury to infer the appellant lied to secure an acquittal, and failure to caution the jury on extrinsic misconduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury was not sufficiently instructed on the lack of probative value of the reaction evidence and on the impermissible reasoning regarding the appellant's motive to lie.

These errors undermined the presumption of innocence and left the jury unequipped to fairly decide the case.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, sentence set aside, and a new trial ordered.