Stephen T. Goudge

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The Court of Appeal ordered no costs of the appeal against the third party.

The costs of the certification motion were remitted to the motion judge to be dealt with in light of the Court's reasons.

The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $50,000 for fees and $10,000 for disbursements, plus applicable taxes.

Following an appeal, the Court of Appeal considered written submissions regarding the costs of the motion before the lower court.

The Court ordered that the costs of the motion be remitted to the motion judge for reconsideration in light of the appellate reasons.

The appellant, a discharged bankrupt, appealed an order striking a designation of matrimonial home she registered on title and prohibiting her from registering another.

The appellant had previously made an assignment in bankruptcy and vacated the home.

Her trustee in bankruptcy settled her equalization claim, including the home, which was approved by the court without her opposition.

The settlement allowed the respondent to alienate the home.

The appellant registered a second designation after the first was ordered removed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant could not rely on her personal right to possession under s. 19 of the Family Law Act to impede a court-approved settlement she did not oppose.

The appellant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sued her insurer.

After the limitation period expired, she sought to amend her statement of claim to explicitly plead an uninsured motorist claim, in addition to an underinsured motorist claim.

The Master allowed the amendment, finding the original claim sufficiently raised the issue.

The Superior Court judge reversed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the Master's order, holding that the original claim, read generously, reasonably communicated an uninsured motorist claim, and the amendment merely clarified it rather than asserting a new cause of action.

This was a costs endorsement following an appeal.

On consent, the parties agreed that the costs of the appeal should be fixed at $15,000 to the respondent to the appeal, inclusive of fees, disbursements and applicable taxes.

The Court of Appeal ordered costs in that amount.

The appellants challenged a regulatory decision reducing a power generator's proposed revenue requirements for nuclear compensation costs during a forward test period.

The Court of Appeal held that future compensation costs mandated by existing collective agreements were committed costs, not forecast costs that could simply be managed downward.

The Board acted unreasonably by relying on hindsight and current benchmarking information unavailable when the collective agreements were made, and by failing to conduct a prudence review based on what was known or ought to have been known at the time of the commitments.

The matter was remitted to the Board for rehearing in accordance with those principles.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence following convictions on four counts of sexual abuse and a 30-month custodial sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge failed to reconcile inconsistencies in the evidence relating to the sexual assault count and that this undermined the broader credibility findings.

The court held the trial judge was alive to the alleged inconsistencies and found no inconsistency that would vitiate the conviction on count 9.

The sentence was held to be well within the acceptable range.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellants appealed a judgment enforcing a settlement and release, as well as the associated costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding no surprise or prejudice to the appellants regarding the settlement issue and agreeing with the motion judge's reasons.

However, the Court granted leave and allowed the appeal regarding costs, finding no basis for an award exceeding partial indemnity.

The costs order below was set aside and replaced, and costs of the appeal were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a child protection judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that the best interests of children require child protection matters to proceed expeditiously.

The court noted that permitting the appeal to proceed would delay final resolution contrary to policy imperatives, and that the appeal had very little merit.

The self-represented appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the lower court's reasons and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents in the fixed amount of $2,500.

The respondent contracted to provide fundraising services to the appellant Indian band for a fee of 15 percent 'including GST'.

The appellant, being tax-exempt under the Indian Act, argued that the phrase meant it was entitled to a discount equivalent to the GST a non-exempt client would pay.

The application judge rejected this interpretation, finding the contract unambiguous.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the phrase simply referred to the GST the appellant had to pay, which was zero, and did not imply any discount from the 15 percent fee.

The appellant municipality appealed a no-fault remediation order issued by the Ministry of the Environment under s. 157.1 of the Environmental Protection Act following a fuel oil spill that migrated onto municipal property.

The appellant sought to introduce evidence before the Environmental Review Tribunal to prove that others were at fault for the spill, relying on the 'polluter pays' principle.

The Tribunal excluded this evidence as irrelevant to the environmental protection objective of the Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Tribunal's decision, confirming that evidence of third-party fault is irrelevant to whether a no-fault order should be revoked.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding a collateral mortgage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the limitation period did not begin to run until a demand was made.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $7,500.

Following an appeal concerning a provincial offence, both parties sought costs.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs to either party.

The court noted that under the Provincial Offences Act, the general rule is that costs are not awarded in provincial offence appeals.

Furthermore, the appeal raised a novel issue of public importance regarding the interpretation of 'occupier', making a costs award inappropriate.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a stabbing during a drug deal.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge made errors in instructing the jury.

The Court of Appeal found two significant errors: failing to provide a limiting instruction on the hearsay portion of a witness's police statement, and improperly instructing the jury that post-offence conduct could be considered in determining the appellant's state of mind for murder versus manslaughter.

The cumulative effect of these errors required a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against his nieces and great-niece.

The trial judge had stated that allegations of sexual misconduct made against a family member are inherently more credible than those against a non-family member due to the explosive nature of such complaints.

The Court of Appeal held that this analytical framework was improper and constituted a reversible error.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Person in Charge for Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence, finding it trustworthy and relevant to the issue of risk to public safety.

Concluding that the fresh evidence could reasonably have affected the Board's decision, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new hearing before the Board.

The Registrar of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission applied to revoke a liquor licence held by a full-patch member of the Hells Angels.

The board dismissed the application, and the Divisional Court affirmed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the board erred in law by applying a 'balance of probabilities' standard instead of the lower 'reasonable grounds for belief' standard required by s. 6(2)(d) of the Liquor Licence Act.

The board also misconstrued the test by improperly limiting its analysis of the licensee's past conduct to his operation of the business and requiring evidence of past criminal activity.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the board for reconsideration.

The appellant appealed his conviction following a guilty plea in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown had elected to proceed by indictment on hybrid offences, and the appellant elected to be tried in the Ontario Court.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the convictions, noting the appellant had already served his sentence.

The appellant was tried by a judge and jury for arson.

In response to a jury question, the trial judge instructed the jury for the first time on the included offence of attempted arson, stating the mens rea included recklessness.

The jury convicted the appellant of attempted arson.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that whether recklessness applies to attempt offences is unsettled law.

Because the trial judge raised this issue late, depriving the defence of the opportunity to research or address it in closing, the conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.