Stephen T. Goudge

The plaintiffs in a proposed class action appealed a motion judge's decision striking out several claims from their statement of claim against an insurer regarding the sale and administration of universal life insurance policies.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reinstating the claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, and deceit and fraud, finding it was not plain and obvious these claims would fail.

The court upheld the striking of allegations concerning releases because the plaintiffs failed to request specific relief for those who signed them.

The appellant appealed an order of the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that there was no viable defence on the record and that the interests of justice were considered.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's order dismissing his contempt motion, setting an access order, and determining child support.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the dismissal of the contempt motion or the access order, noting that the children's ages (almost 17 and 14) required their wishes be given significant weight.

The court affirmed that the respondent mother should encourage the children's relationship with the appellant, but ultimately upheld the motion judge's orders as being in the children's best interests.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The appellant appealed an order regarding standing under Rule 38.11.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant was at best contingently affected by the recognition order and thus did not have standing.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $20,000.

The appellant mother appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing her appeal from an Ontario Court of Justice order making her two children Crown wards with no access.

The children, diagnosed with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, were apprehended at birth.

The mother argued the trial judge erred in overemphasizing the risk of ongoing litigation and the need for finality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences were reasonable and there was no error in the weight assigned to the children's need for finality.

Fresh evidence regarding a failed foster placement did not alter the conclusion that Crown wardship without access remained in the children's best interests.

The appellant was convicted of armed robbery and firearms offences.

At trial, the victim recanted his preliminary inquiry identification of the appellant.

The Crown introduced the preliminary inquiry evidence for its truth and a video of the victim's initial photo line-up identification.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the use of the video line-up, prior inconsistent statements of a witness, and the failure to give a Vetrovec warning for the recanting victim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate and the trial judge's cautions regarding the witness's evidence were sufficient.

The appellant garnishee appealed an order directing payment to the respondent judgment creditor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the motion judge to conclude the appellant had not established any debt owed to him by the debtor company to justify an offset.

The court also upheld the order for direct payment to the respondent, as there was evidence the respondent was the only execution creditor.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder in the death of his wife.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to leave the defence of provocation with the jury and by improperly instructing the jury on how to use his post-offence conduct to infer intent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that there was an air of reality to the subjective element of provocation despite the appellant's testimony that he was not angry.

The Court also held that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that they could use the appellant's bizarre post-offence conduct to infer an intent to kill, as such conduct was equally consistent with manslaughter.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge breached his right to be present at his trial under s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code by holding in-chambers discussions about a Parks challenge and having private conversations with potential jurors.

The Court of Appeal held that the in-chambers discussions were preliminary and did not breach the Code.

While the private discussions with potential jurors did breach s. 650(1), the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iv), finding that the appellant suffered no prejudice as his counsel was present, no objections were raised, and all jurors spoken to privately were excused.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission sought directions regarding Canada's obligations under the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement to provide documents archived at Library and Archives Canada (LAC) and documents relating to the TRC's legacy mandate.

Canada moved to strike the TRC's request, arguing the TRC lacked capacity and standing, and moved to strike several affidavits.

The court held that the TRC had capacity to bring the proceedings and declined to strike most of the affidavits.

On the substantive issues, the court ruled that Canada's obligation to provide relevant documents extends to those archived at LAC, but that the TRC's legacy mandate does not include evaluating Canada's policy responses, meaning Canada need not produce documents relating to those responses.

Following an appeal where the appellant was partially successful in reversing a significant portion of the trial judge's award, both parties sought partial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal determined that because neither party was wholly successful at either the trial or appellate level, the appropriate disposition was no order as to costs for the appeal, the motion, or the trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his sentence as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge made several errors in his jury instructions, including failing to charge on the mens rea of consent and improperly instructing on prior consistent statements.

He also argued the sentencing judge committed a Johnson error by failing to consider a long term offender designation before imposing a dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court found no reasonable possibility that a long term offender designation would have been imposed given the expert evidence of the appellant's high risk to reoffend.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claim against the respondent.

The trial judge found that the respondent had discussed his concerns with the appellant regarding a third party taking title to a property without being bound by a joint venture agreement.

The trial judge also found that the appellant instructed the respondent to proceed with the transfer regardless.

The Court of Appeal held that these findings of fact were supported by the evidence and did not constitute palpable and overriding errors.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a leaseholder of a parcel within a large private property owned by a corporation, was charged with driving an off-road vehicle in the common area without a helmet, contrary to the Off-Road Vehicles Act.

He argued he was exempt from the helmet requirement because he was an 'occupier' of the common area.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was not an occupier of the common area, as he did not have physical possession, responsibility for its condition, or control over who could enter it.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

The appellant appealed a decision determining that interest on the principal outstanding under a note runs from the date of issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that without clear language, interest does not run on the balance owed before the note was issued and the payee, principal, and rate were fixed.

The mother appealed an order staying her claims under the Divorce Act and Family Law Act for lack of jurisdiction.

The father cross-appealed the dismissal of his motion seeking the return of the children to China under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the mother's appeal, finding she was not ordinarily resident in Ontario and lacked a real and substantial connection to the province.

The Court allowed the father's cross-appeal, finding the children were habitually resident in China and not physically present in Ontario when the application commenced, thereby depriving the Ontario court of jurisdiction under s. 22 of the CLRA.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court to determine the appropriate order under s. 40 of the CLRA.

The appellant pleaded guilty to offences committed before the Truth in Sentencing Act came into force, but was charged after it came into force.

The trial judge applied the Act, limiting pre-sentence custody credit to 1.5 days for each day served.

The appellant appealed, arguing the Act should not apply retrospectively to offences committed before its enactment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 5 of the Act clearly displaces the presumption against retrospectivity by explicitly applying to persons charged after the Act came into force.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for fraudulent misrepresentation regarding a leaky basement in a home they sold to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of fraudulent misrepresentation concerning the history of leaks but found the trial judge erred in finding an implied representation regarding construction plans.

Consequently, the court reduced the damages award to exclude repair costs unrelated to the specific misrepresentation established, lowering the award by $22,157.58 to $48,040.62.

The plaintiffs invested in worthless start-up companies on the advice of their financial advisor, who was registered to sell mutual funds through the appellant dealer.

The advisor promoted these off-the-books investments openly from his office.

The trial judge found the dealer liable in negligence for failing to supervise the advisor and vicariously liable for his actions, concluding he was an employee rather than an independent contractor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the dealer's appeal, upholding the findings that the dealer breached its duty to supervise its mutual fund sales agent and was vicariously liable for his wrongdoing.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after an elderly woman died of asphyxiation when an intruder taped her mouth shut during a break-in.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the review of evidence, the legal duty to act, and the presentation of factual scenarios concerning the intruder's intent.

The appellant also argued the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury charge and concluding it was reasonable for the jury to infer the appellant was present when the victim asphyxiated.