Stephen T. Goudge

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance based on a police officer's observation of an alleged hand-to-hand transaction with a third party.

The third party testified that he acquired the drugs from another source prior to the encounter.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's explanation but failed to address the third party's exculpatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that this failure required a new trial, as the reasons did not indicate whether the evidence was rejected or considered.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of importing firearms and alcohol from the United States into Canada.

One appellant's conviction appeal was dismissed as the trial judge properly assessed the unsavoury co-accused witness's testimony and found sufficient corroboration.

The other two appellants' conviction appeals were allowed and new trials ordered because the trial judge's reasons failed to address whether they had the requisite mens rea (knowledge or wilful blindness) for the firearms offences, as opposed to just the alcohol offences.

One appellant's sentence for the alcohol offences was varied to time served.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the Information to Obtain (ITO) was misleading because it omitted the phrase 'he is not a drinker', failed to state that no one smelled alcohol on his breath, and because the officer testified at the preliminary inquiry that he only had a 'suspicion' rather than reasonable and probable grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no meaningful difference caused by the omissions and accepting the officer's explanation at trial, which negated any suggestion of an attempt to mislead.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that the gas company's conduct broke the chain of causation between his tampering with a gas meter and the subsequent explosion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the appellant altered the meter and that his actions were a substantial contributing cause of the explosion.

The court also rejected the admission of fresh evidence, finding it immaterial.

This was a costs endorsement following a family law appeal.

The court held that success on the appeal was divided and ordered that each party bear their own costs of the appeal.

The court further declined to interfere with the trial judge's costs award, finding it reasonable and noting that the result of the appeal would have only a modest monetary impact on the trial decision.

The appellant sought appellate relief after a lower court refused to grant a declaration that the Crown has a general post-trial and post-appeal duty to preserve evidence for the lifetime of an offender convicted of a life-imprisonment indictable offence.

The application below had been grounded in the loss of autopsy photographs said to be potentially relevant to a miscarriage of justice review under s. 696.1 of the Criminal Code, but the appellant accepted on appeal that no Charter breach had been established from their loss.

The Court of Appeal held there was no basis to entertain the appeal because the appellant advanced a new declaratory theory not supported by the record and not adjudicated below.

The appeal was dismissed, with no costs.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision finding the respondent tenant not liable for excess hard costs incurred in constructing a commercial building.

The dispute centered on a clause in the Offer to Lease requiring the tenant to pay excess costs provided they were in accordance with contracts approved by the tenant.

The appellant argued the clause was a meaningless vestige from an earlier draft, but the Court of Appeal disagreed, finding the plain meaning of the contract required the tenant's approval.

The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent's cross-appeal on costs was also dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and conspiracy after the trial judge found he was the driver of the getaway vehicle.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the inference that the appellant's van was the getaway vehicle was available given the circumstantial evidence, including his presence in a running van near the robbery scene in the middle of the night.

The appellant failed to appear for his appeal against a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

Noting that his next annual review was imminent, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The Ministry of the Environment appealed a CCAA judge's order declaring that environmental remediation orders issued against the insolvent respondents were financial in nature and subject to a CCAA stay of proceedings.

Applying the Supreme Court's decision in AbitibiBowater, the Court of Appeal held that ongoing environmental remediation obligations are only provable claims if it is sufficiently certain that the province will perform the work and seek reimbursement.

The Court found it was not sufficiently certain the MOE would perform the remediation for most of the sites, as the orders were also directed at subsequent owners.

The appeal was allowed, and the stay was modified to apply only to the portion of the London property still retained by the respondents.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a young child, arguing the trial judge engaged in oath-helping, misapprehended evidence regarding his credibility, and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not improperly use prior consistent statements, correctly identified inconsistencies in the appellant's testimony, and provided sufficient reasons that properly applied the W.(D.) framework.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was reasonable for the Board to accept the treating physician's opinion evidence that substance abuse would lead to a deterioration of the appellant's mental stability and a return to conduct similar to the index offences.

The Ministry of the Environment appealed a CCAA judge's decision that environmental remediation orders issued against an insolvent company were subject to a stay of proceedings.

The insolvent company had abandoned a contaminated site after selling its other assets.

Applying the Supreme Court's decision in AbitibiBowater, the Court of Appeal found it was sufficiently certain that the Ministry would perform the remediation work itself, making the regulatory orders in substance a provable monetary claim in the insolvency.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an Ontario mining company, sued American engineering consultants for negligent misrepresentation regarding studies for a Costa Rican gold mine.

The defendants successfully moved to stay the action for lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the tort of negligent misrepresentation was committed in Ontario, as the studies were received and relied upon at the appellant's Toronto head office.

This established a presumptive real and substantial connection that the defendants failed to rebut.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to determine forum non conveniens.

The appellant appealed an order striking out claims for breach of contract based on representations in an information folder regarding the Can-Am Fund.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that it was plain and obvious no cause of action existed for breach of contract, given the governing statutory scheme and warnings in the materials.

The application for leave to appeal the costs order was also dismissed.

The respondent was convicted of driving while holding a hand-held wireless communication device contrary to s. 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appeal judge allowed the appeal, holding that the Crown must prove the cellphone was capable of receiving or transmitting.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the requirement for a device to be capable of receiving or transmitting applies only to prescribed devices, not to cellphones.

The respondent was charged with driving while holding a hand-held wireless communication device after a police officer observed her holding a cellphone while stopped at a red light.

The respondent claimed she had only momentarily picked it up after it fell to the floor.

The trial court convicted her, but the appeal judge allowed her appeal, finding that 'holding' required sustained physical contact.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the ordinary meaning of 'holding' and the road safety objectives of the Highway Traffic Act dictate a complete prohibition on having a cellphone in one's hand while driving, regardless of the duration.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the statement that the appellant quit was res judicata and protected by qualified privilege.

However, the Court intervened on the costs award, finding the appellant did not have a fair opportunity to make submissions and the respondent failed to provide information about the costs of the action.

The costs award for the summary judgment motion was fixed at $15,000, with the balance of the action's costs to be assessed.

No costs were awarded for the appeal due to divided success.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's decision regarding a franchise dispute.

They argued that the trial judge erred in deducting rent and related expenses under s. 6(6)(a) of the applicable Act, and in finding that a letter dated May 2, 2007, constituted a five-year franchise agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the damages calculation and concluding that the trial judge's finding regarding the letter was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

Costs of $8,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a trial decision finding that the crash of his twin-engine airplane was not an 'accident' under his insurance policy.

The trial judge had concluded the crash was not an accident because the appellant attempted to take off with only one engine engaged, yet also found he did not know he was running an extraordinary risk.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's reasons were unclear as to whether the appellant was reckless or merely negligent, and found she did not apply the correct standard.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.