John I. Laskin

The appellant underwent a laparoscopically assisted vaginal hysterectomy and subsequently developed a severe infection and an ileovaginal fistula.

She sued her gynecologist and the general surgeon who performed a subsequent exploratory laparotomy for medical malpractice, alleging a burn injury to her small bowel caused the fistula.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no breach of the standard of care and that the fistula was caused by infection, not a burn.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings of fact and concluding that the 'but for' test for causation was correctly applied.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision upholding her conviction for assaulting an elderly patient.

She argued the trial judge erred by taking judicial notice of workplace pressures to explain a Crown witness's delay in reporting the assault, and by failing to properly apply the reasonable doubt standard.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law, noting the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) standard and considered the totality of the evidence.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant municipality appealed a decision quashing a by-law that authorized a licence agreement for a jet boat tour operator to use a municipal dock.

The application judge had found the by-law contravened the Planning Act because the use did not conform to the Official Plan's 'Conservation' designation and was not a legal non-conforming use.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the jet boat operation was a legal non-complying use under the Official Plan, as it was lawfully established by a prior by-law before the Plan was adopted.

The Court also found the licence agreement was not an unlawful disposition of land and did not create an illegal monopoly.

The young person appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentence was not clearly disproportionate to the offence and that there was ample evidence to support the trial judge's determination that the sentence served the purposes and goals of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment enforcing a debenture, arguing that a factual dispute over the exercise of an option and a claim for equitable set-off based on alleged misrepresentations raised triable issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the debenture created a stand-alone debt unaffected by the option agreement, and that the alleged misrepresentations did not go to the root of the respondent's claim.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that statements he made to police should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to a s. 10(b) breach.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the statements were taken in violation of s. 10(b).

However, the Court held that even if the statements were excluded, the verdicts would necessarily have been the same, as the appellant was the sole occupant of his own car, and a loaded gun was found on the back seat underneath his coat.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the restitution order made at trial following a conviction for fraud.

The trial judge found the amount of fraud was at least $15,645, which was justified by the evidence.

However, the trial judge made an arithmetical error in calculating the final amount.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, varying the restitution order to $10,845.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual offences, including rape.

He argued that the trial judge misused discreditable conduct evidence, erred in a severance ruling, and that the Crown's cross-examination was improper.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's careful reasons and ample reason to disbelieve the appellant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the serious nature of the offences, the vulnerability of the victims, and the appellant's prior record for sexual assault.

The Crown appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing its application for certiorari.

The preliminary inquiry justice had discharged the respondent on a charge of first degree murder, finding insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal held that the justice's sufficiency determination, even if arguably incorrect, did not constitute a jurisdictional error reviewable on certiorari.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on drug trafficking charges.

The trial judge had found that an undercover police officer entrapped the accused by asking 'Can you hook me up?' without reasonable suspicion, and excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the officer's question was merely an investigative step and did not provide an opportunity to commit an offence.

The Court set aside the finding of entrapment, entered guilty verdicts, and remitted the matter for sentencing.

The Court also noted that entrapment should only be considered after a finding of guilt, and that a stay of proceedings, rather than exclusion of evidence, is the proper remedy.

The Crown appealed a non-custodial sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal noted that while incarceration is typically warranted for this type of offence absent special circumstances, the respondent's exemplary conduct during the eight months on her conditional sentence, including making restitution and securing employment, meant that incarcerating her now would not serve the interests of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the claim failed on the prejudice arm of the ineffective assistance of counsel test.

The court concluded that the proposed fresh evidence and cross-examination on inconsistencies in the complainant's statements could not reasonably have been expected to affect the result at trial.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their claim for a readjustment to the purchase price paid to the respondent.

The appellants argued that the respondent's potential right to a reassignment of the mortgage created a cause of action against the financial corporation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no connection between the right to reassignment and any obligation to be bound by the agreement of purchase and sale.

The appellants sought to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal determined that the order below was interlocutory, as the motion judge had deferred the legal issue to trial.

The Court held that its appellate jurisdiction is statutory and does not extend to interlocutory orders, rejecting the argument that it had discretion to hear the appeal due to the issue's importance.

The appeal was quashed.

The accused was acquitted of multiple charges, including robbery and sexual assault, arising from attacks on sex-trade workers.

The trial judge found the identification evidence of three victims to be unreliable and concluded the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown appealed, arguing the evidence was overwhelming and the trial judge erred in his approach to similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Crown's right of appeal is limited to questions of law alone, and the trial judge's assessment of the reliability and weight of identification and similar fact evidence is a question of fact.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judge's decision to strike his pleadings and preclude his participation at a family law trial, as well as the resulting corollary relief orders.

The trial judge struck the pleadings after finding the appellant committed egregious and continuing breaches of non-depletion and restraining orders, and failed to meet disclosure obligations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to impose the severe sanction given the appellant's intransigence and the likelihood that his participation would only prolong the trial without advancing its truth-seeking purpose.

The Court also dismissed a motion to introduce fresh medical evidence and upheld the trial judge's substantive awards for equalization, child support, and spousal support.

The appellant sold a motor vehicle to a dealership that financed its inventory through the respondent.

After the dealership made an assignment in bankruptcy and its cheque to the appellant bounced, the appellant took possession of the vehicle.

The appellant argued that the respondent had disposed of the vehicle under s. 63 of the Personal Property Security Act, thereby discharging its security interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that no such disposition occurred and dismissed the appeal, confirming the respondent's priority.

The appellant pleaded guilty to arson and was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment, probation, and a $40,537.50 restitution order in favour of the insurance company.

He appealed the restitution order.

The Court of Appeal held that while an insurance company can be the subject of a restitution order under s. 738(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider the appellant's inability to pay and the unfairness of the order given that the co-perpetrators who initiated the arson and received the insurance money were not ordered to pay restitution.

The appeal was allowed and the restitution order was set aside.

Following an appeal in which the respondents were largely successful, the Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement.

The court ordered the appellants to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal, fixed at $50,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her claim for intentional infliction of mental or emotional harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial because the appellant failed to produce any evidence of harm or illness, which is an essential element of the tort, over the eight years the matter had been outstanding.