John I. Laskin

The appellants challenged an order declaring them vexatious litigants, arguing that the responding party improperly proceeded by motion rather than application and that this procedural error required the judgment to be set aside.

The court held that the responding party should have proceeded by application, but found the misdescription caused no prejudice because the appellants had full notice of the case against them.

The court further rejected the argument that the appellants' application to lift an earlier stay had to be heard first.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant challenged a motion judge’s refusal to set aside a noting in default, arguing that the finding that it was merely delaying trial was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal held that the impugned finding was justified on the record and accepted the motion judge’s view that the pleading complaints amounted to clutching at trivialities.

Because that finding was central to the refusal to set aside the default, appellate intervention was unwarranted.

The appeal was dismissed with partial indemnity costs fixed at $8,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The appellants sought to adduce fresh evidence and appealed a trial judgment finding the respondent entitled to 20 per cent of the net proceeds of sale of a property.

The court held that the proposed fresh evidence did not meet the criteria for admission, as most documents were available at trial and others were irrelevant to the issues on appeal.

The court rejected the argument that the trial judge imposed liability on an unpleaded basis, holding that the declaration of trust was evidence of the pleaded agreement.

The court also upheld the trial judge’s treatment of the calculation of net proceeds and the partial indemnity costs award.

The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed, with no costs on either.

The appellant challenged a summary judgment determination in a real estate commission dispute, arguing the motion judge improperly exercised the expanded fact-finding powers under revised Rule 20.

The Court of Appeal held that, having regard to the language of the rule and the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance in Hryniak, the motion judge did not err in making the findings necessary to determine the claim.

The central disputed finding, whether the broker showed the property to the purchaser, was characterized as a purely factual issue attracting strong appellate deference.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

In a bankruptcy appeal arising from a disallowed proof of claim, the court considered when service of a notice of disallowance became effective for purposes of the 30-day appeal period under s. 135(4) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

Although the trustee's notice was actually delivered to the law firm identified for correspondence on April 17, 2012, it was addressed to the creditor rather than care of counsel, and there was no acceptance of service by the law firm.

The court held that resort had to be made to the deeming provisions in the Rules of Civil Procedure, making service effective on the fifth day after mailing.

The notice of appeal filed on May 18, 2012 was therefore in time.

The appeal was allowed, the Superior Court order set aside, and the Registrar's order restored.

In a first degree murder appeal arising from a joint trial with antagonistic defences, the appellant's counsel was required to withdraw mid-trial and no replacement counsel could be found despite extensive efforts.

The trial judge refused severance or a mistrial and instead appointed amicus curiae with an expanded mandate.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge asked the wrong question, relied on unsupported considerations, failed to consider highly relevant factors, and thereby unreasonably exercised discretion under the interests of justice standard.

Amicus was not an adequate substitute for counsel in a complex murder trial, and the resulting loss of representation deprived the appellant of a fair trial and caused a miscarriage of justice.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment ordering the release of a statutory holdback to the respondent subcontractor.

The appellants argued the respondent failed to provide required close-out documentation, including as-built drawings and an engineering certificate, and that the matter should have proceeded to trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge properly applied the summary judgment standard and correctly concluded the required documents had been provided.

The court ordered the immediate payout of the holdback funds and dismissed a motion to introduce fresh evidence.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's refusal to grant an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the refusal given the history of the proceedings and the absence of any merit in the appellant's claim.

Costs were awarded to each respondent.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for an unprovoked and brutal aggravated assault, arguing it was manifestly unfit and failed to give proper effect to denunciation and deterrence.

The sentencing judge had effectively imposed a low penitentiary sentence after giving credit for pre-sentence custody, emphasizing the principle of rehabilitation to give the respondent one last chance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion regarding the respondent's rehabilitative prospects and seeing no basis for appellate intervention.

The defendants appealed a trial judgment regarding a 1994 promissory note, arguing the trial judge failed to consider a 1983 agreement, a cancellation clause, the appropriate interest rate, and the principle of proportionality in costs.

The plaintiff cross-appealed on interest and costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding the note was clear on its face, the cancellation clause was inapplicable due to prior default, and the trial judge made no reversible error in exercising discretion over interest and costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, arguing the trial judge unfairly commented on his evidence and failed to relate the evidence to the elements of the offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's caution regarding the appellant's after-the-fact theory was fair and the review of the evidence was sufficient.

The Court also noted the lack of objection at trial and the overwhelming case against the appellant.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that it was a proper case for summary judgment and agreed with the reasons of the motion judge.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the calculation of a mortgage payout rate and the validity of a prepayment clause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the prepayment clause was not void for uncertainty and that the calculation of the payout rate at 4.35 percent was substantiated by the lender's evidence given the risk-free nature of the loan.

The appellant recruitment agency sued the respondent trucking companies for breach of contract after its services were terminated.

The trial judge found only the subsidiary company liable for failing to provide six months' notice, but that company subsequently went bankrupt.

On appeal, the appellant argued the parent companies were liable for inducing breach of contract and under the common employer doctrine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the inducing breach claim was not pleaded at trial and lacked the requisite intent, and upholding the trial judge's finding that the contract was solely with the subsidiary.

The respondents' cross-appeal regarding a Sanderson costs order was also dismissed.

Following the release of the main appeal decision, the appellants and respondents settled the issue of costs.

The respondents sought an additional $5,000 in partial indemnity costs against the interveners.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs against the interveners, finding that the respondents had already recovered substantial costs from the appellants and incurred only nominal costs from the intervention.

The appellant was originally charged with indictable offences and elected trial by judge and jury in the Superior Court of Justice.

On the trial date, the Crown re-elected to proceed by summary conviction, and the appellant pleaded guilty before the Superior Court judge.

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Crown had the authority to re-elect the mode of proceeding, the Superior Court of Justice is not a summary conviction court and lacked jurisdiction to take the guilty pleas and impose sentence.

The appeal was allowed, the sentence and pleas were quashed, and the matter was remitted to the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's refusal to restore an action that had been dismissed for delay by the registrar.

The Court of Appeal found that the registrar had no jurisdiction to dismiss the action because the 90-day period following the status notice had not elapsed.

Furthermore, the motion judge erred in finding prejudice to the respondent based on the disposal of a fuel tank prior to the dismissal, as this was not prejudice arising from the dismissal itself.

The appeal was allowed, and the registrar's dismissal order was set aside.

The young person appealed a custodial sentence of 300 days followed by 14 months' probation for the sexual assault of a friend.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by treating his trial testimony as an aggravating factor and that the sentence was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and noting the sentencing judge properly considered the appellant's lack of empathy and remorse, as evidenced by text messages sent after the assault, rather than his trial testimony.

The appellant pleaded guilty to break, enter and theft of a dwelling house and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

He was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment, less 1:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by declining to grant enhanced credit at a rate of 1.5:1.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to discharge the onus of demonstrating that enhanced credit was warranted.

The appellant appealed his convictions on nine counts of sexual offences involving two minors.

He argued that the trial judge's interventions during witness examinations created an appearance of unfairness and that the trial judge improperly minimized the impact of a false statement made by one of the complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's interventions, while numerous, did not create an appearance of unfairness or suggest he had pre-judged the appellant's credibility.

The court also held that the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the complainant were entitled to deference.