John I. Laskin

The appellant, a commercial truck driver, was convicted of importing cocaine after 53 kilograms of cocaine were found hidden in his trailer.

At trial, the Crown introduced an expert police report on the use of commercial vehicles for transporting contraband.

The report contained both general opinions and case-specific opinions regarding the appellant's credibility and knowledge of the drugs.

The Court of Appeal held that the case-specific opinions were inadmissible as they usurped the role of the trier of fact.

Finding that the trial judge improperly relied on this inadmissible evidence to conclude the appellant knew about the cocaine, the majority allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, challenging the scope of a no-contact provision that included the Toronto Star.

The Court of Appeal found sufficient evidence to justify the continued inclusion of the Toronto Star in the condition, noting the appellant's history of threatening and harassing behaviour targeting media agencies.

The appeal was dismissed, subject to minor modifications proposed by the respondents.

The appellant settled and abandoned its appeal on liability and damages, proceeding only on the issues of costs and pre-judgment interest against two respondents.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal the trial judge's costs decisions, finding no error in principle in declining to award costs of the first trial or substantial indemnity costs of the second trial.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding pre-judgment interest, which had been inadvertently omitted below, awarding interest at 4 percent from the date of conversion.

The parties agreed to the costs of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the respondent in the agreed amount of $15,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The respondents built an addition to their home that encroached on a private right-of-way shared with the appellants.

The right-of-way was granted for vehicular ingress and egress.

The application judge found that the encroachment did not substantially interfere with the appellants' ability to use the laneway for its granted purpose and dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that an encroachment on a private right-of-way, even by a permanent structure, is only actionable if it substantially interferes with the dominant owner's reasonable use of the right-of-way.

The appellants moved to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal that dismissed their motion to set aside a Registrar's Order dismissing their appeal for delay.

The panel admitted fresh evidence showing that the delay was due to the inadvertence of former counsel, who failed to provide the full explanation for the delay or evidence of the appellants' intention to pursue the appeal.

Finding that the appeal raised serious issues regarding the scope of a receiver's authority, the court set aside the dismissal orders, extended the time to perfect the appeal, and awarded costs to the appellants.

The appellant was convicted of multiple fraud-related offences arising from a credit and debit card scheme.

At trial, the Crown relied heavily on the testimony of four former co-accused who had previously pled guilty based on agreed statements of fact implicating the appellant.

When these witnesses recanted their statements at trial, the trial judge admitted their prior statements for the truth of their contents under the K.G.B. framework.

The appellant appealed, arguing the statements should not have been admitted and that the trial judge's Vetrovec warning was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal held that while the statements met the test for threshold reliability, the Vetrovec warning failed to adequately explain to the jury the witnesses' strong motives to lie in their prior statements to obtain lenient sentences.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed the dismissal of its application seeking a declaration that a by-law and warranty agreement entered into by the declarant-appointed board were invalid.

The agreement limited the declarant's liability for common element deficiencies to the statutory warranties under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the by-law was within the board's broad authority under section 56 of the Condominium Act, was not contrary to the Act or the declaration, and was not unreasonable.

The court held that the initial directors acted lawfully in organizing the condominium's affairs as anticipated by the declaration and disclosed to purchasers.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a costs award made by the Superior Court of Justice.

Neither party appeared at the hearing.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the costs award and refused leave to appeal.

The Crown appealed an acquittal, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give effect to the 'on or about' language in the indictment and by refusing to amend the indictment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that an expansive interpretation of the date would be unfair given the alibi defence presented, and that the Crown's request to amend the indictment during closing submissions was too late and would prejudice the accused.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her motor vehicle accident claim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment because the appellant failed to plead facts relevant to discoverability in her statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a limitations defence must be pleaded in a statement of defence, and discoverability should be addressed in a reply, not anticipated in the statement of claim.

The court found a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding when the claim was discovered and granted the appellant leave to deliver a reply.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing his payment obligations under a Share Purchase Agreement.

He argued the business was illegal and that the agreements contemplated an ongoing supply of movies, raising credibility issues requiring a trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant provided only bald statements without supporting evidence, and upheld the motion judge's decision.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the motion judge and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent in the amount of $4,200.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident when the pickup truck he was a passenger in went through a red light and was struck by a transport truck going through a green light.

The jury found the driver of the pickup 95% liable and the driver of the transport truck 5% liable.

The appellants (the transport truck driver and owners) appealed, arguing the jury verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misdirected the jury on causation, and there was improper cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding evidence supported the jury's conclusion that a reasonably prudent driver should have been aware of the hazard, the jury charge was not in error when read as a whole, and the improper cross-examination was not serious enough to undermine trial fairness.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against one defendant arising from alleged negligent golf course design and breach of contract in a golf course development project.

The Court of Appeal held that the claimed loss, being diminution in the value of ten acres within a larger parcel, could only be advanced by the owner of the affected land.

The evidence supported the motion judge’s findings that the limited partnership did not own the land and that one appellant acquired the parcel for fair market value after any diminution had already occurred.

Because any loss had been suffered by prior owners, the appellants had no claim against the respondent.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Following a family law appeal in which the court removed a ten-year cap on spousal support and made support indefinite subject to variation on a material change in circumstances, the parties disputed the wording of the resulting order.

The respondent sought to preserve a deeming provision from the trial order that remarriage or three years of cohabitation would automatically constitute a material change.

The court refused to include that provision, holding that its order should track its reasons and should not fetter the discretion of a future judge on a variation application.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence following convictions for multiple sexual assaults against a child in respect of whom he occupied a position of trust and authority.

He argued the sentencing judge selected the wrong sentencing range because the assaults did not involve penetration and that a three-year penitentiary term should have been imposed.

The court held that, whether the starting point was three years or five years, the five-year sentence disclosed no error in principle, fell within the applicable range, and was not manifestly unfit given repeated assaults, grooming behaviour, exploitation of vulnerability, and trust-based abuse.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged summary judgment dismissing her negligence claim against the respondent physician.

The Court of Appeal held that, even assuming the respondent could be sued in negligence and owed a duty of care, there was no evidence from which a trier of fact could find that the respondent fell below the applicable standard of care.

A possible error in diagnosing the source of the appellant's problems was not, without more, evidence of breach of the standard of care.

The appeal was dismissed, and appeal costs of $2,500 inclusive were awarded to the respondent if demanded.

The appellant challenged trial findings in a family property dispute concerning an excluded property claim and the value of shares at the time of marriage.

The court held both issues were primarily factual and driven by credibility assessments to which appellate deference applied.

It rejected the submission that the trial judge misapplied the tracing requirement, finding instead that the appellant simply failed to trace the alleged excluded assets into property owned at separation.

The court also upheld the rejection of the appellant’s expert evidence on share valuation and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing an estate action for delay under rule 24.01(1)(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal accepted that the delay was unreasonable and inexcusable, but held that the respondents failed to establish the third branch of the dismissal-for-delay test: that the delay created a substantial risk that a fair trial would not be possible.

The court found the motion judge's conclusion on actual prejudice unreasonable given the continued availability of at least two physicians and significant documentary evidence bearing on testamentary capacity.

The appeal was allowed, the dismissal order was set aside, and the respondents' motion was dismissed.