John I. Laskin

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their counter-claim and awarding $32,000 in costs against them.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellants were denied procedural fairness because the respondent's notice of motion did not seek dismissal of the counter-claim, and the respondent's counsel had explicitly advised the motion judge that such relief was not sought.

The dismissal of the counter-claim was set aside due to this lack of fair notice.

However, the court declined to stay enforcement of the judgment pending the counter-claim's disposition because the lease waived any right to set-off.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appellant bank's appeal from an order granting leave to amend a statement of claim.

The respondents argued the order was interlocutory, meaning the appeal should lie to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the order permitting the amendment did not deprive the appellant of a substantive defence but simply allowed the matter to proceed to trial.

The appeal was quashed.

The appellant appealed an order striking his claim, which sought to challenge a prior order directing that proceeds from the sale of his son's house be paid into court pending a priorities dispute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the claim was an attempt to relitigate issues already determined.

The court also denied leave to amend, finding that no amendment could remedy the fundamental flaw in the claim.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention in a medium secure unit rather than a minimum secure unit.

The Board relied on the appellant's recent alcohol use, antisocial activities, and elopement risk.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board's decision was reasonable and reflected the least onerous and least restrictive alternative, given the appellant's history of violence when intoxicated and his treating psychiatrist's evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff was injured in a charity bicycle ride when the defendant swerved and clipped his wheel.

The defendant pleaded volenti and contributory negligence, and served a jury notice.

At trial, the judge struck the jury notice, finding that the jury would be confused by the waiver signed by the participants and the volenti defence.

The trial judge found the defendant entirely liable.

The defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in principle by striking the jury notice.

The volenti defence is not a claim for declaratory relief, and a properly instructed jury could understand the limited legal effect of the waiver.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and arson-related offences after his hardware store was destroyed in a fire set by co-conspirators to collect insurance proceeds.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in his Vetrovec warning regarding colluding witnesses, improperly admitted hearsay statements under the co-conspirator exception, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

He also appealed his 12-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings, and held the verdict was reasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was fit given the appellant's high degree of moral blameworthiness.

The appellants were involved in a rear-end motor vehicle collision and sued for personal injuries.

At trial, the judge failed to instruct the jury that the evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant in a rear-end collision.

Furthermore, the trial judge permitted the respondents to introduce extensive surveillance evidence that had not been disclosed in an affidavit of documents, leading to a trial by ambush.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, substituted a finding of liability against the respondents, and ordered a new trial on the issue of damages due to the severe prejudice caused by the undisclosed surveillance evidence.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to undue delay.

The delay included a period following a mistrial caused by a misstep by the trial judge.

The application judge characterized this period as institutional delay, noting the unusual circumstances and the failure of the Crown or the court to canvas earlier trial dates.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's conclusions regarding the characterization of the delay or the finding of prejudice, and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges including sexual assault.

Before sentencing on the convictions, the trial judge declared a mistrial on the convictions after admitting he had visited the dating website where the accused and complainant met and had discussed it with the investigating officer in chambers.

The trial judge concluded he was functus officio regarding the acquittals.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the trial judge's independent research and comments created a reasonable apprehension of bias that tainted the acquittals.

A new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the 18-month global sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing that the sentences for the two offences should normally be consecutive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the global sentence was not demonstrably unfit for this offender.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder after his three children tried to kill their mother.

At trial, the Crown theorized that the appellant used his religious beliefs to influence the children, and made inflammatory remarks during closing submissions comparing the appellant to notorious cult leaders and calling him a 'Jesus nut'.

The trial judge did not correct these remarks or instruct the jury on how to use the evidence of the appellant's religious beliefs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the Crown's improper comments and the trial judge's failure to intervene rendered the trial unfair and caused a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant architect appealed a summary judgment dismissing its third party claims for contribution and indemnity against two sub-trades in a complex construction delay dispute.

The motion judge had dismissed the claims on the basis that there was no firm evidentiary foundation for the sub-trades' liability.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge committed an error in principle by failing to assess the advisability of summary judgment in the context of the litigation as a whole.

Because the sub-trades' responsibility for project delays remained a live issue in the main actions, granting partial summary judgment created an unacceptable risk of duplicative proceedings and inconsistent findings of fact.

The appellant employer appealed a summary judgment order awarding damages for wrongful dismissal to a 31-year employee.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred by using a 'bridging-to-retirement' approach to calculate the notice period and by failing to deduct mitigation income.

However, the Court upheld the motion judge's alternative finding of a 22-month notice period, as well as the awards for loss of pension benefits and a contractual retirement allowance.

The appeal was allowed in part to deduct mitigation income and adjust the notice period calculation, and the cross-appeal was allowed to increase the notice period to 22 months and remit the costs issue.

The appellant orthopedic surgeon appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for medical malpractice after the respondent developed compartment syndrome following the application of a full circumferential cast.

The trial judge had strongly criticized the appellant's counsel for reviewing and discussing draft reports with their expert witnesses, ruling that such practices were improper under the 2010 amendments to Rule 53.03.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law, confirming that consultation between counsel and expert witnesses is essential and protected by litigation privilege absent a factual foundation of improper influence.

The Court also found the trial judge erred by using expert reports not in evidence to contradict viva voce testimony.

However, the Court concluded these errors did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, as the respondent's expert evidence was overwhelmingly stronger.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued for non-pecuniary damages.

The trial judge found the respondent met the statutory impairment threshold but dismissed the action because the respondent did not provide corroborating evidence of his change in function from a witness other than himself, as required by s. 4.3(5) of O. Reg. 461/96.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the regulation does not preclude the injured person from providing the corroborative evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the regulation requires corroboration of the physician's evidence, which can be provided by the injured person's own testimony.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge failed to make a finding of causation regarding whether the complainant's wounds were caused during a swarming in a parking lot or by flying glass.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the inescapable inference from the trial judge's reasons was that the wounds were caused during the parking lot assault, consistent with the Crown's theory and the complainant's accepted testimony.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting the sentencing judge did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Summers.

The appellant was granted 1.5 to 1 credit for all pre-sentence custody, resulting in a further 5 months of credit.

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible for criminal harassment and other offences, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board continuing her detention.

She argued she was entitled to an absolute discharge as she only posed a risk of minimal harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition was reasonable and supported by the evidence, though it encouraged the Board to explore community integration at her upcoming annual review.

Following a successful appeal, the court received submissions regarding the costs of the proceedings below before the Registrar in Bankruptcy and the Superior Court.

The parties had previously agreed to fix those costs at $20,000 when the respondent was successful.

The Court of Appeal found no reason to depart from the agreed amount or to deny the successful appellant its costs, ordering the respondent to pay $20,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellant, a convicted drug dealer, appealed a full forfeiture order of his residential property under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The property was heavily fortified and used for commercial cocaine distribution.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the property was a fortified drug property and that full forfeiture was not disproportionate given the nature of the offences, the appellant's extensive criminal record, and his ties to organized crime.

The appeal was dismissed.